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Abstract
CODRIN NEDITA: Three Essays on Intellectual Property Rights and
International Technology Transfer.
(Under the direction of Prof. Patrick Conway.)
Developing countries today face external pressures to implement stronger intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPRs). These countries are in general characterized as ”imitators” that learn from
technology transferred from innovating (industrialized) countries. Therefore, implementing
IPRs would seem counterintuitive for developing countries as it restricts their ability to imi-
tate. However, the true impact of IPR policy in developing countries remains largely unclear.
My research unravels some of the links between IPRs, and technology transfer issue in the
following three essays.
My first essay focuses on the Indian pharmaceutical market. I describe the transition
dynamics of imposing stronger IPRs in a theoretical model and I test the implications of this
model for the adjustment path of innovation, imitation and R&D offshoring using a panel of
354 Indian pharmaceutical firms over the period 1989 to 2008. I find that that innovation
behaves as expected while imitation exhibits an unexpected increase after the announcement
and decreases after the policy change. To better understand this transition, the second essay
examines the short-run and long-run effects of stronger IPRs within two types of endogenous
product-cycle models developed by Grossman and Helpman.
In my third essay I analyze the offshoring decision of companies for either forming a joint
venture with a local firm or entering a contractual partnership, with a special focus on the
research and development activity. First I present a theoretical model that describes this
decision and then I test the implications of the model in the pharmaceutical market for a
panel of 89 countries over the period 1990 to 2009. I find that weak IPRs in the destination
country support a joint venture partnership to reduce the risk of knowledge leakage while large
fixed costs of establishing a joint venture supports a contractual partnership.
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Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection is the subject of heated debate in international
policy negotiations. Many developing countries feel that the Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property (TRIPs) agreement signed in the Uruguay Round benefits rich countries
at the expense of the poor. A major argument in favor of tighter IPRs has been that they
encourage innovation from which all the regions of the world benefit. However, a number of
countries do not find this argument convincing. The counterargument has been that tighter
intellectual property rights only strengthen the monopoly power of large companies that are
based in industrial countries, to the detriment of the less developed countries.
One of the developing countries which enforced weak IPRs until 2005 is India. My research
interests are related to the development of the Indian pharmaceutical market based on a very
important domestic policy: the passage of the Patents Act (1970). Pharmaceutical products
(along with other products like food and agrochemicals) became unpatentable and the lifes-
pan of patents for pharmaceutical processes was reduced to 5 years. Between 1970 and 1995
India maintained this weak patent protection system that fostered growth of the domestic
pharmaceutical industry and decreased the presence of multinationals. According to Saranga
and Phani (2005), the pharmaceutical industry in India was based on reverse-engineering of
existing drugs developed by the multinational companies (MNC). Indian firms directed most of
their R&D expenditures in that direction. A smaller part of R&D efforts was used to develop
existing formulations such that the final product will be similar but not identical with the
existing patented drugs. By signing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights in 1995, India agreed to strengthen its protection of intellectual property by
2005. How would this policy change affect the Indian pharmaceutical market? I answer this
question in the first essay by conducting a theoretical and empirical analysis.
In my first essay I employ the Grossman and Helpman (1991b) variety model to study the
effect of stronger IPR protection on innovation and imitation in India. Previous theoretical
studies analyzing the effects of strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in developing coun-
tries discuss the changes in steady-state equilibrium following such a policy change. My first
contribution is to derive the impact of stronger IPRs in the transition dynamics of variables
between steady-states. Analyzing this dynamic model, I find that in the short run stronger
Southern IPR protection promotes innovation and discourages imitation. Both innovation and
imitation fall, however, in the long run (steady state). Second, I analyze the impact of the
strengthening of IPRs when there is an announcement that the policy will change prior to
it being implemented. I show that following the announcement, innovation jumps but not
as much as in previous situation, and then it keeps increasing until the time of the policy
change when it slowly starts to decrease to the new steady state. Imitation decreases after
the announcement, but less than before, and it continues to decrease until it approaches its
new lower steady state level. In the case of an announcement, both innovation and imitation
approach their new steady-states faster.
I test the above theoretical predictions using firm-level data and a fixed-effects estimation
technique. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first such test of the Grossman and Help-
man (1991b) dynamic model. I use a panel of 354 Indian pharmaceutical firms over the period
1989 to 2008. This firm level dataset is combined with two patent datasets in order to create
the necessary measures for testing the dynamic model. The results suggest that innovation
increases faster after the announcement and it continues to increase, though at a slower rate,
even after the new intellectual property rights policy is in place. On the other hand imita-
tion exhibits an unexpected increase after the announcement and it decreases after the policy
change. R&D offshoring follows a similar path with innovation. This unexpected increase in
imitation is the result of Indian firms taking advantage of the time left under the old IPRs
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regime.
Based on the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991a and 1991b) and the other authors
who employed their models, one would expect a swift shift in the rates of innovation and
imitation to the new steady state after the policy change. The empirical results presented in
my first essay suggest a smoother transition. The transition to the new steady state can be
a slow process and even though the policymakers in India might prefer the new steady state
to the initial situation, the transition to the new steady state might have an initial negative
impact on the Indian economy. The task of the second essay is to have a closer look at the
transitional dynamics of imposing stronger intellectual property rights. In this essay I find a
few important relationships between exogenous changes in the parameter of the model and the
transition path to the new steady state. For example, a larger developed country requires a
longer time to reach the new steady state if imitation is endogenous when compared to the case
with exogenous imitation. The opposite is true when we are talking about a larger developing
country. Given that the economy is a dynamic system, the second essay has yielded some
interesting results with respect to the short-run effects of a change in the intellectual property
rights. Many existing studies compromise such analysis by only drawing conclusions about
the long-run effects (the steady states), whereas this dynamic analysis enables us to determine
both the short-run and the long-run effects.
The pharmaceutical industry provides an interesting example regarding the importance
that IPR protection has in this sector and the changes that took place in the last twenty years
in terms of IPR protection across the world. As mentioned before, in 1995 signatories to the
TRIPs agreement agreed to grant product patents by 2005 for pharmaceutical innovations as
a condition of membership in WTO. Since 2005, firms from signatory countries have not been
able to sell reverse engineered (copied) products. Their business model was affected by the new
IPR laws and the firms in the pharmaceutical industry had to adapt to a new environment.
To mention a few successful stories, Ranbaxy of India has purchased production facilities in
seven foreign countries (China, Ireland, Malaysia, Nigeria, Romania, U.S.A. and Vietnam). In
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South Africa, it formed a subsidiary with a local firm (Adcock Ingram) to promote sales of
their products on the local market. This is a very common strategy for Indian firms to speed
up market approvals and improve customer acceptance of their products. Cipla of India formed
joint ventures with Eli Lilly (to sell products in U.S.), Novopharm (to sell products in Canada)
and Enaleni Pharmaceuticals Limited (to sell products in South Africa). Lupin of India col-
laborates with Merck Generics (to sell products in U.K.) and McGaw Inc. (to sell products in
U.S.). Collaboration between local firms and multinational companies is not limited to pro-
duction or marketing. Recent collaboration was targeted towards research and development
of new products. For example, Ranbaxy has a global alliance with GlaxoSmithKline Plc. re-
garding research and development activities and with Eli Lilly regarding clinical trials of drugs.
The ”make-or-buy” decision is fundamental to industrial organization, but the concept
applies to international trade too. Making a new finished product requires a firm not only
to do research and design the goods, but it also necessitates the production or sourcing of its
components. For each one of these activities a producer must decide whether to undertake the
activity in-house or to purchase the input or service from another firm that may be located
abroad. In my third essay I analyze the offshoring decision of companies for either forming
a joint venture with a local firm, or entering a contractual partnership, with a special focus
on the research and development (R&D) activity. The theoretical model I present underlines
three important factors in this decision: the level of intellectual-property-rights protection in
the destination country, the wage differential between the two countries and the fixed cost
associated with a joint venture. Weak IPRs in the destination country support a joint venture
partnership to reduce the risk of knowledge leakage while large fixed costs of establishing a
joint venture supports a contractual partnership. I test the implications of the model in the
pharmaceutical market for a panel of 89 countries over the period 1990 to 2009 with a binomial
logit estimation.
The estimations presented in the third essay show that international intellectual property
rights protection is a significant factor for companies to consider when engaging in international
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partnerships. When companies find themselves in an environment with less secure intellectual
property rights protection, they tend to choose joint ventures rather than contractual part-
nerships. The wage gap between countries and the cost of doing business have a negative
effect on the preference for international joint ventures and the fixed costs of establishing a
joint venture act as a deterrent to forming a joint venture, as expected. The R&D activity
has a significant influence over the organizational structure of offshoring. Firms engaging in
R&D offshoring have a greater incentive to form joint ventures than firms offshoring other
activities. This can be due to property rights concerns related to leakage of information in
countries with weak IPR protection, or it might be the case that firms choose to form joint ven-
ture in order to take advantage of transfer pricing opportunities in countries with less taxation.
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Chapter 1
IPRs, Innovation, Imitation and Offshoring:
The Case of the Indian Pharmaceutical
Industry
1.1 Introduction
India has a strong pharmaceutical industry historically built upon the ”process patent” pro-
tection of intellectual property rights. A ”process patent” allowed an Indian firm to produce a
good invented by someone else as long as it developed a different production process than the
original innovator. In 1995, the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (hereafter TRIPs) required its signatories, including India, to grant ”product patents”
by 2005 for pharmaceutical innovations as a condition of membership in the World Trade
Organization (WTO). This policy change strengthened intellectual property rights and was
predicted to have significant effects on innovation, imitation and offshoring. Stronger intel-
lectual property rights (hereafter IPRs) protection should encourage innovation and foreign
direct investment (hereafter FDI), as well as discourage imitation1. In this paper I study these
effects based on India’s experience.
A theoretical literature has emerged to address the question of the effects of imposing
stronger intellectual property rights in developing countries. Two successful models used in
1According to the results presented by Lai (1998).
analyzing these effects are the endogenous product cycle models developed by Grossman and
Helpman. Grossman and Helpman (1991a) is a quality ladder model (where innovations are
higher quality levels), and Grossman and Helpman (1991b) is a product-variety model (where
innovations are new varieties). Previous authors who employed the above-mentioned theoreti-
cal models to analyze the effects of stronger IPRs on both developed and developing countries
were more interested in determining the rate of imitation and innovation in the steady state
equilibrium rather than investigating the stability properties of the equilibrium and the tran-
sition to the new equilibrium. An exception is Helpman (1993) who employs a simpler model
with endogenous innovation but exogenous imitation. He shows that a decrease in the ex-
ogenous rate of imitation (stronger IPRs) increases innovation in the short-run but decreases
innovation in the long run (the long-run equilibrium is a saddle point).
The Indian example demands that we examine the path of adjustment to the new steady
state, as well as changes in the steady-states, since it is unlikely to observe the new steady
state only a few years after the actual change in IPRs policy 2. My theoretical contribution is
two-fold. First I derive the impact of stronger IPRs in the transition dynamics of innovation
and imitation between steady-states. I employ the model of Grossman and Helpman (1991b)
to study the effect of stronger IPRs on innovation and imitation. Analyzing this dynamic
model, I find that in the short run stronger Southern IPR protection promotes innovation and
discourages imitation. Both innovation and imitation fall, however, in the long run (steady
state). Second, I analyze the impact of the strengthening of IPRs when there is an announce-
ment that the policy will change prior to it being implemented. I show that following the
announcement, innovation jumps but not as much as in previous situation, and then it keeps
increasing until the time of the policy change when it slowly starts to decrease to the new
steady state. Imitation decreases after the announcement, but less than before, and it con-
tinues to decrease until it approaches its new lower steady state level. In the case with an
announcement, both innovation and imitation approach their new steady-states faster.
I test the above theoretical predictions using firm-level data and a fixed-effects estimation
2According to Sahoo (2006), it can take between 13 - 20 years for a drug to be developed, tested in clinical
trials and be ready for mass production.
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technique. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first such test of the Grossman and
Helpman (1991b) dynamic model. I use a panel of 354 Indian pharmaceutical firms over the
period 1989 to 2008. This firm level dataset is combined with two patent datasets in order
to create the necessary measures for testing the dynamic model. Employing a fixed effects
estimation procedure I find that innovation follows the adjustment path predicted by the
theoretical model while imitation increased. This increase in imitation may be the result of
Indian firms taking advantage of the time left under the old IPRs regime.
In the next section I present a review of the literature. Section 1.3 gives some background
information about the Indian market. Section 1.4 presents the theoretical models. Section 1.5
presents the data. Section 1.6 reviews the statistical findings and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
The theoretical literature on product cycle models has seen a revival in recent years. This
literature is based on the seminal work of Vernon (1966). He presents a model where new
products are first introduced in high income countries, then exported to other high income
countries. Eventually production shifts to low income countries, and finally the original prod-
uct may be exported back to the high income country which first introduced it. Yet while
Vernon’s original vision of the product cycle assigns a central role to foreign direct investment
(FDI), most of the new models capturing his ideas use imitation as the channel of international
technology transfer from an innovating region (the North) to an imitating region (the South).
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) follow the ‘product cycle’ idea that the North is the
only source of innovation (new varieties of products), and the only way the South can ac-
quire technology is through ‘technology transfer’ (imitation) from the North. They study the
determinants of the steady state rates of innovation and imitation (both are endogenously de-
termined). An increase in labor supply in the South or a decrease in the labor requirement for
imitation generates an increase in the steady-state rates of imitation and innovation. Gross-
man and Helpman (1991a) developed a similar model where innovations consist of improving
one quality of an existing good (the quality ladder model). An increase in the Southern labor
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force raises imitation. Innovation in the North may rise or fall. In these models new prod-
ucts are being invented by Northern firms and later directly imitated by Southern firms. In
the Vernon cycle, Northern firms move production to the South by forming subsidiaries there
before imitation shifts ownership but not location of production.
IPR reforms were not explicitly discussed in the above mentioned papers. To analyze
the debate between North and South about the enforcement of stronger IPRs in the South,
Helpman (1993) employs a simplified version of the Grossman and Helpman (1991b) model
with exogenous imitation. His main contribution is his analysis of the transition dynamics
between steady states following strengthened IPRs in the South (modeled as a decrease in
the exogenous imitation intensity). He finds that stronger IPRs initially raise the rate of
innovation, but then it subsequently declines. This and subsequent extensions to Grossman
and Helpman models are summarized in Table 1.1.
Lai (1998) modifies the Grossman and Helpman (1991b) model to consider the effects of
imitation targeting multinational production. He considers two possible channels of production
transfers between the North and the South: FDI and imitation. The effects of stronger IPRs in
the South (modeled as a decrease in the exogenous imitation intensity) depend on the channel
of production transfer. In the case of technology transfer through imitation (without FDI),
stronger IPRs lower the rate of innovation. The effects are opposite if the transfer channel is
FDI, or if both transfer channels coexist and the rate of FDI is large. If the technology transfer
is made through FDI, Southern firms can imitate only after Northern firms transfer production
to the South. Northern firms move production to the South in order to take advantage of lower
relative labor costs. In this case the effect of stronger IPRs does not affect the demand for
Northern labor as production is entirely in the South. Thus, innovation will rise while its cost
remains constant.
Glass and Saggi (2002) question the results of Lai (1998) where stronger Southern IPR
protection encourages FDI and innovation. They employ a quality-ladder model and argue that
stronger Southern IPR protection reduces the aggregate rate of innovation and the flow of FDI
regardless of whether FDI or imitation targeting Northern production serves as the primary
channel of international technology transfers. In their model, stronger IPR protection increases
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the cost of imitation. Glass and Saggi (2002) conclude that the reason for the difference in their
results relative to Lai (1998) appears to be the difference in how IPRs protection is modeled
(as an increase in the cost of imitation rather than as an exogenous decrease in the imitation
intensity). But there is another important difference between the two models: the type of
innovation (creating new varieties versus quality upgrading). Contrary to Lai (1998), Glass
and Wu (2003) employ a model based on the quality-ladder model developed by Grossman and
Helpman (1991a) where imitation is exogenous. They find that stronger IPRs in the South
(a decrease in the imitation intensity) decrease FDI and innovation, an opposite result to the
one found by Lai . They conclude that stronger IPRs protection may shift the composition of
innovation away from improvements in existing products toward development of new products.
The newest extension to the Grossman and Helpman (1991b) model is provided by Branstet-
ter, Fisman, Foley and Saggi (2007). They analyze theoretically and empirically the effects
of strengthening IPRs in developing countries in a product variety model with endogenous
innovation, imitation, and FDI. The model predicts that IPR reform in the South leads to
increased FDI in the North, an increased global rate of innovation and a reduced rate of imita-
tion. Empirically they analyze responses of U.S.-based multinationals and domestic industrial
production to IPR reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. They find that there is an overall expansion
of industrial activity after IPR reform, suggesting that the expansion of multinational activity
more than offsets any decline in the imitative activity of indigenous firms.
My research extends the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and Helpman (1993) by
considering the effects of stronger IPRs in the South (modeled as an increase in the cost of
imitation) on the adjustment paths between the steady-state rates of innovation and imitation
when both innovation and imitation are endogenous. Empirically, I define measures for inno-
vation, imitation and R&D offshoring and I estimate their adjustment following an announced
change in the IPRs regime.
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Table 1.1: Summary of the Extensions to Grossman and Helpman
Results
FDI Innovation
Nature of
innovation
Stronger
IPR
W/FDI W/O
FDI
Helpman
(1993)
Exogenous
w/FDI
Imitation
intensity ↓
↑ - ↓
Lai (1996) New vari-
eties
Imitation
intensity ↓
↑ ↑ ↓
Glass
and Saggi
(2002)
Higher
qualities
Imitation
cost ↑
↓ ↓ ↓
Glass and
Wu (2003)
Higher
qualities
Imitation
intensity ↓
↓ ↓ ↓
Branstetter
et al.
(2007)
New vari-
eties
Imitation
cost ↑
↑ ↑ -
It is difficult to find good proxies for innovation and imitation. Connolly (2003) quantifies
spillovers from high technology imports to domestic imitation and innovation in both developed
and developing countries. She then considers the contribution of foreign and domestic innova-
tion to real per capita GDP growth. Using data for 75 countries from 1965 to 1990 to create
proxies for imitation and innovation, Connolly finds that in conjunction with transportation
and communication infrastructure, quality-adjusted R&D, foreign direct investment, and high
technology imports positively affect both domestic imitation and innovation. She also finds
that IPRs are positively correlated with both innovation and imitation.
One of the first empirical studies regarding the enforcement of product patents for phar-
maceuticals under the TRIPs agreement belongs to Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2003).
They estimate the effects of global patent protection on pharmaceutical products (for the
anti-bacterial category fluoroquinolones) in India. They calculate welfare effects using esti-
mated parameters from retail pharmaceutical audits performed by an Indian market research
firm. Their study not only estimates the losses from monopoly pricing, but also calculates the
potential losses from a reduction in product variety as domestic producers of generic drugs
disappear.
A firm-level study on R&D expenditure before and after TRIPs is presented by Dutta
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and Sharma (2008). They use panel data on Indian firms from 1989 to 2005 to ascertain
whether the IPRs reforms were successful in increasing innovation by firms in India. They find
strong evidence that Indian firms in more innovation-intensive industries increased their R&D
expenditure after TRIPs. They also find that patenting by India in the U.S. increased after
TRIPs, and to a greater extent in more innovation-intensive industries.
In order to provide a better understanding of the general transformation of India’s economic
structure following the implementation of economic reforms, Alfaro and Chari (2009) study
the evolution of industrial concentration, the number, and size of firms across ownership types
and industries. By employing a firm-level dataset covering the period 1988 - 2005 they find
an economy dominated by state-owned firms and traditional private firms (firms incorporated
before 1985) with the exception of the service sector. Alfaro and Chari conclude that this
situation suggests insufficient reform. Privatization efforts were abandoned after a short spell
in the early 2000s and sectors such as manufacturing and financial services remain largely
under state control.
Kyle and McGahan (2009) examine the relationship between patent protection for phar-
maceuticals and investment in new treatments for neglected diseases that disproportionately
affect developing countries. They use a negative binomial regression to examine R&D effort
in the form of the number of new clinical trials over time, at the disease level and across coun-
tries. They relate R&D effort with measures of disease prevalence, availability of substitute
products, dummy variables for neglected diseases, markets with IPRs in place, country level of
income, and year fixed effects. Kyle and McGahan (2009) find that the introduction of patent
protection (in response to TRIPs agreement) is associated with decreased R&D effort in the
developing and least-developed countries.
I start the empirical part of my paper by describing the evolution of domestic and foreign
firms in the Indian Pharmaceutical Market between 1989 and 2008 in a manner similar to Alfaro
and Chari (2009). Then I define measures for innovation, imitation and R&D offshoring and
I estimate their adjustment following an announced change in the IPRs regime. My measures
of innovation and imitation are similar to the ones used by Connolly (2003). By using these
measures I find that both innovation and imitation increase after TRIPs. Dutta and Sharma
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(2008) find similar results in innovation-intensive industries by analyzing the R&D effort of
Indian firms. My paper builds upon the work of Dutta and Sharma by measuring the results
of the R&D effort and separating these results into innovation and imitation. In contrast with
the previous results, Kyle and McGahan (2009) find a decreased R&D effort in the developing
and least-developed countries but they only consider investment in treatments for neglected
diseases.
1.3 The Indian pharmaceutical market as a test case
Lanjouw (1997) pointed out that the general opinion among developing countries regarding
the enforcement of stronger IPRs (or the creation of a patent system, in some cases) is that it
will reduce the well-being of these countries. The effects of such a change will affect countries
differently, based on their initial conditions. In countries where the domestic industry pros-
pered due to government protection (weak IPRs or tariffs) losses are expected to be larger.
This explains why India was reluctant to grant product-patent protection for pharmaceutical
products.
In 1973 the Indian government enacted the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to reduce
foreign ownership in domestic industries: less than 40% equity could be held by foreign firms
(individual consideration was given to firms in areas requiring sophisticated technology and ex-
port oriented industries where foreign ownership could go up to 75%). This measure produced
important changes in the ownership structure of the pharmaceutical industry.3
In 1993 the Indian government allowed 51% equity stakes to be held by foreign companies.
This led foreign firms, which had initially reduced their equity stakes to 40%, to increase their
equity stakes. An example is Glaxo Group which in 1983 reduced its equity in Glaxo India
from 75% to 40%. In 1993 it raised its equity from 40% to 51%. Other policies intended to
foster domestic production were: restrictions on the importation of finished formulations, high
tariffs, price controls and ratio requirements (imports of bulk drugs had to be matched by
domestic purchases at a given ratio). These policies favored domestic pharmaceutical firms
3These facts are drawn from Smith (2002).
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and lowered the interest of multinational companies in the Indian market.
A very important policy intended to develop the domestic industry was the passage of
the Patents Act (1970). Pharmaceutical products (along with other products like food and
agrochemicals) became unpatentable and the lifespan of patents for pharmaceutical processes
was reduced to 5 years. Between 1970 and 1995 India maintained this weak patent protection
system that fostered growth of the domestic pharmaceutical industry and decreased the pres-
ence of multinationals. According to Saranga and Phani (2005), the pharmaceutical industry
in India was based on reverse-engineering of existing drugs developed by the multinational
companies (MNC). Indian firms directed most of their R&D expenditures in that direction.
A smaller part of R&D efforts was used to develop existing formulations such that the final
product will be similar but not identical with the existing patented drugs. Very few Indian
firms (only big companies, some in cooperation with foreign companies) allocated R&D ex-
penditures towards innovating new drugs. This last activity requires more R&D effort and the
uncertainty of success is higher, relative to the other two. Indian firms were able to sell copied
products not only on the domestic market but also in other developing countries that had weak
patent laws. Being able to manufacture and sell (to the domestic market and other developing
countries like the former Soviet Union and Africa) drugs patented by multinational companies
before the patents expired allowed Indian firms to move quickly into the world market once
the patents expired. India proved to be one of the most prolific imitators, building a strong
pharmaceutical industry and becoming an important competitor to MNCs.
In 1995, signatories to the TRIPs agreement including India agreed as a condition of mem-
bership in WTO to grant product patents by 2005 for pharmaceutical innovations. Since 2005,
Indian firms have not been able to sell reverse-engineered (copied) products. Their activity is
limited to developing new products and manufacturing off-patent products or bulk products.
Indian firms were already important players on the bulk drug and off-patent drug markets.
They expand their reach towards other markets by purchasing plants outside India or by form-
ing joint-venture with local foreign firms. 4 For example, Ranbaxy has purchased production
4These facts are drawn from Smith (2002).
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facilities in seven foreign countries (China, Ireland, Malaysia, Nigeria, Romania, U.S.A. and
Vietnam). In South Africa, it formed a subsidiary with a local firm (Adcock Ingram) to pro-
mote sales of their products on the local market. This is a very common strategy for Indian
firms to speed up market approvals and improve customer acceptance of their products. Cipla
formed joint ventures with Eli Lilly (to sell products in U.S.), Novopharm (to sell products
in Canada) and Enaleni Pharmaceuticals Limited (to sell products in South Africa). Lupin
collaborates with Merck Generics (to sell products in U.K.) and McGaw Inc. (to sell products
in U.S.). Collaboration between Indian firms and multinational companies is not limited to
production or marketing. Recent collaboration was targeted towards research and develop-
ment of new products. For example, Ranbaxy has a global alliance with GlaxoSmithKline
Plc. regarding research and development activities and with Eli Lilly regarding clinical trials
of drugs. Smith (2002) opines that forcing Indian firms (pharmaceutical or otherwise) to com-
pete with the best international firms and products in India (after IPR harmonization) will
encourage them to seek MNC status themselves, and to compete outside India. This approach
will bring the Indian firms as significant actors and competitors on the global industrial stage.
A change in the legal basis of patents in India will generate changes in the local phar-
maceutical market depending on the degree of patents enforcement. A good measure for the
enforcement level would have been data on court rulings in cases of patent infringement in
India. Unfortunately these data are not available. However, The Technology Information,
Forecasting and Assessment Council (India) provides firm-level data regarding the number
of patents notified for opposition until 2004. In Figure C.12 I present the number of patent
applications notified for opposition for the 354 Indian pharmaceutical firms in my sample. To
compare the changes in the pharmaceutical industry with the overall changes in all Indian
industries I present the number of patent applications notified for opposition for all industries
in Figure C.13.
Imposing stronger IPRs in India might not affect local sales as most of the drugs sold there
are off-patent drugs and the Indian government can still implement price controls5. Also, it
5For example, in 2005 the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority listed ceiling prices for 72 formulations
and non-ceiling prices (fixed prices) for 120 formulations. In 2008, 73 ceiling prices and 38 non-ceiling prices
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will not affect the exports of off-patent products. For the on-patent drugs, some part will be
produced in India (through licensing or offshoring) while the other part will be replaced by
imports.6 But manufacturing is not the only sector that is affected by stronger IPRs. An
important characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry is that this industry has very high
R&D costs. By imposing a strong IPR regime, India creates a better environment for foreign
firms to outsource R&D activities to India. Domestic innovative activity will also be affected.
According to Smith (2002) Indian firms are aware that in order to be successful in the long
run they should increase their R&D and allocate these efforts towards the development of
new formulas. For example, in 1995, Dr. Reddy’s Group filed its first two product patent
applications for new anti-cancer and anti-diabetes formulations. Cooperative R&D activities
were developed between Indian firms and multinational companies before India decided to
implement stronger IPRs. How did the 1995 decision influence these collaborations? I answer
this question in the following analysis.
1.4 Theoretical considerations
This section is divided into three subsections. In section 1.4.1 the base model developed by
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) is described. In addition to the steady-state analysis presented
in their paper, I describe the transition dynamics between steady states. In section 1.4.2 I
discuss how the transition dynamics change if an announcement about a future policy change
(stronger IPRs in the South) is made before the policy is actually implemented.
1.4.1 The Base Model
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) present a dynamic general equilibrium model of two regions,
North and South. Innovation takes place in the North while the South imitates technologies
that have been invented in the North. The North introduces new products at a rate g = n˙/n,
where n equals the number (measure) of products society knows how to produce and n˙ is
were listed for formulations.
6Sampath (2008), p.21-24
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the first derivative of n with respect to time 7. The South imitates products developed in
the North at rate m = n˙S/nN , where nS represents the number of products that the South
produces while nN represents the number of products that the South has not yet imitated.
The total number of products society knows to produce is nS + nN = n. Stronger IPRs are
modeled as an increase in the labor requirement coefficient for imitation.
Consumers
Preferences are identical in the two regions and a representative consumer has additively
separable intertemporal preferences given by lifetime utility
U =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρt log u(t)dt (1.1)
where ρ is the subjective discount rate.
The instantaneous utility u(t) is given by
u(t) =
[∫ n
0
x(j, t)αdj
]1/α
, 0 < α < 1, (1.2)
where x(j, t) represents consumption of product j at time t.
x(j, t) = p(j, t)−ε · E(t)
P (t)1−ε
, ε =
1
1− α > 1, (1.3)
where E(t) represents aggregate spending on consumer goods at time t, ε the elasticity of
demand, and P (t) is a price index at time t such that:
P (t) =
[∫ n
0
p(j, t)1−εdj
] 1
1−ε
(1.4)
Consumers maximize welfare subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. They choose a
rate of growth of consumption spending that matches the difference between the interest rate
7Throughout, dot notation will be used for time derivatives.
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and their subjective rate of time preference:
E˙(t)/E(t) = r(t)− ρ (1.5)
where r(t) is the interest rate.
From this point on without loss of generality I suppress the time index for all variables.
Research and Development (R&D)
The GH(1991b) model features endogenous and costly R&D. Resources devoted to R&D gen-
erate two sorts of outputs. First, the innovator/imitator develops a blueprint for production
of a particular variety. Second, the R&D activity creates a by-product benefit in the form
of general knowledge that contributes to the productivity of later R&D efforts. The stock of
industrial knowledge is specific to the country in which the knowledge was created. The stock
of knowledge capital in a region is assumed to be proportional to the economy’s cumulative
research experience measured by the number of product designs available in each region.
The cost of R&D is wa/n, where a is the unit labor requirement, w is the wage and n is the
number of products (for each region). As mentioned before, the above formulation assumes
that the cost of R&D falls with the number of products society knows how to produce. The
process of innovation and imitation are similar, but they have different resource requirements:
aN is the unit labor requirement for a Northern firm performing innovation and (1+k)aS the
unit labor requirement for Southern imitation.8
If investment in R&D takes place, the expected reward from this activity, which consists of
a blueprint whose value we denote by vN , must cover R&D costs. The free-entry condition into
R&D requires that the equilibrium value of a blueprint cannot exceed R&D costs. If the value
of a blueprint falls short of R&D costs, however, no firm invests in R&D. It follows that in
an equilibrium with positive innovation R&D costs just equal the present value of a blueprint.
8k is a parameter that measures IPR protection intensity. It takes values between 0 and 1, with 0 describing
no IPR protection
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Given the above specified R&D technology, this condition becomes:
vN = wNaN/n (1.6)
where wN is the Northern wage, aN in the unit labor requirement for innovation and n is the
number of products society knows how to produce.
The free-entry condition for Southern R&D (imitation) is:
vS = wS(1 + k)aS/nS (1.7)
where wS is the Southern wage, (1 + k)aS in the unit labor requirement for imitation and nS
is the number of products the South knows how to produce.
Now assume that the developed region has well-functioning financial markets, including a
stock market. Then the value of a firm (a blueprint) equals the present value of its expected
stream of profits. In fact, the only risk faced by a firm is that its product will be imitated by
the South. In a time interval of length dt the South imitates a proportion mdt of Northern
products. Arbitrage in asset markets implies:
piN/vN + v˙N/vN = r +m (1.8)
where piN represents instantaneous Northern profits, r stands for the interest rate and m is
the rate of imitation.
For the South, the no-arbitrage conditions in asset markets imply:
piS/vS + v˙S/vS = r (1.9)
where piS represents instantaneous Southern profits.
Producers
Goods are manufactured with one unit of labor per unit of output in both regions. A Northern
manufacturer that invents a product can charge a monopoly price as long as its product has
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not been imitated. Given the demand functions, the monopoly price of every product that has
not been imitated equals:
pN =
wN
α
(1.10)
where wN represents the wage rate in the North and equals the manufacturer’s marginal cost.
A Northern firm makes sales xN and has a marginal cost wN . The instantaneous profits
for these firms are:
piN =
(
1
α
wN − wN
)
xN =
(
1
α
− 1
)
wNxN = (1− α)pNxN (1.11)
A Southern manufacturer that imitates a Northern product can charge a monopoly price
pS =
wS
α
(1.12)
where wS is the wage rate in the South.
A Southern firm makes sales xS and has a marginal cost wS . The instantaneous profits for
these firms are:
piS =
(
1
α
wS − wS
)
xS =
(
1
α
− 1
)
wSxS = (1− α)pSxS (1.13)
The resource market (market clearing conditions)
We can express the labor market clearing conditions by:
aN
n˙
n
+ nNxN = LN (1.14)
for Northern companies and
(1 + k)aS
n˙S
nS
+ nSxS = LS (1.15)
for Southern companies.
The first term on the left-hand side represents employment in R&D while the second term
represents employment in manufacturing.
20
Dynamics
Let the fraction of goods that have not been imitated be ζ = nN/n. Starting with the
balanced trade condition, I differentiate it and substitute in for the Northern sales as given by
the Northern labor constraint (1.14), prices (1.10), wages (1.6) and the definition of innovation.
Then I find a second expression, the ratio of profits to the value of the blueprint, by using
equations (1.6), (1.11), (1.14) and the definitions of innovation and the fraction of Northern
products to total products. Combining these two expressions with equation (1.5) allows us to
find equation (1.17). A similar process is performed for the Southern firms to find equation
(1.18). By differentiating the fraction of Northern products to total products and using the
definitions for innovation and imitation I find equation (1.16). Equations (1.16), (1.17) and
(1.18) are the three differential equations that describe the equilibrium. In these equations g
and m are jump variables while ζ is a state variable.
ζ˙ = g − (g +m)ζ (1.16)
g˙ = (LN/aN − g) [ρ+m+ g − (1/α− 1) (LN/aN − g)/ζ] (1.17)
m˙ =
1− ζ
ζ
[
ρ+m
ζ
1− ζ −
1− α
α
1
(1 + k)aS
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ
)]
·
· 1
(1 + k)aS
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ
)
− m
(1− ζ)ζ [g − (m+ g)ζ] (1.18)
In Appendix A, I present the calculations that led to the above differential equations.
The following numerical example will show the transitional dynamics following the impo-
sition of stronger IPRs. Set the unit labor requirement in innovation to aN = 9 and imitation
aS = 8.5, and the discount rate to ρ = .2. Set Northern labor supply LN = 10 and Southern
labor supply LS = 11. The initial IPRs parameter is k = 0.05 which will increase to 0.1 when
stronger IPRs are imposed therefore, the labor requirement coefficient (1+k)aS increases with
stronger IPRs.
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Following the imposition of stronger IPRs, innovation first jumps up and then slowly de-
creases to its new lower steady state. Imitation initially jumps down and it decreases at
diminishing rate until it reaches its new steady state value. The number of Northern prod-
ucts increases slowly after the imposition of stronger IPR. These adjustments are presented in
Figures C.1-C.3.
There are two counteracting effects of enforcing stronger IPRs in the South. First, it
lowers the rate of imitation and prolongs the expected duration of monopoly of each Northern
innovator. This raises the returns to innovation. Second, since firms produce longer in North,
it raises the demand for Northern labor and Northern wage, and hence raises the cost of
innovation. Due to this the profits from innovation decreases. As shown by the previous
example, the the second effect dominates the first one in the long run, and the rate of innovation
declines in steady state.
1.4.2 Introducing an Initial Announcement (before the actual policy change)
Previous authors did not consider a policy change announcement before the implementation.
Given the market I am analyzing (the Indian Pharmaceutical Market), I am interested in
seeing how Indian firms reacted to the 1995 TRIPS Agreement (when India joined WTO and
agreed to implement stronger IPRs starting in 2005). In section 1.6 I will add to the timeline
below the important years for the Indian Market.
The timing of the model is as follows:
Figure 1.1: General Timeline for the Initial Announcement
0 t0 t1 t2 t
The economy begins in the original steady state at time 0. At time t0 firms in the economy
realize (following an announcement made by the Southern authorities) that stronger intellec-
tual property rights will be in effect in the South at a future date t1. If the firms disregard the
announcement, they will remain at the initial steady state until the IPRs will actually change
(and the analysis will be similar with the one in the previous section). However, developing
the new skills required in an economy with stronger IPRs (imitation R&D being different from
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innovation R&D) takes time and it might require different assets so firms will react immedi-
ately to the announcement. Following the announcement, innovation jumps but not as much
as in previous section, and then it keeps increasing until the time of the policy change when
it slowly starts to decrease to the new steady state. Imitation also jumps less than before and
it continues to decrease slower and slower until it reaches the new steady state value. The
number of Northern products increases slowly after the imposition of stronger IPRs. I present
the transitional dynamics with and without an announcement in Figure C.1-C.3. In the case
with no announcement, the endogenous variables approach the steady-state values slower.
A special situation arises when the Southern government doesn’t enforce the existing IPRs
laws between the time of the announcement and the time when stronger IPRs are implemented.
In this case both innovation and imitation decrease after the announcement but then they in-
crease above the initial steady state level before the policy change. This period of lawlessness
when the Southern government doesn’t enforce an IPRs system that is about to become ob-
solete can explain the increase in imitation following the announcement that I find later on in
the data.
1.5 Data
In order to test the conclusions of the theoretical model, in this section I look at the deter-
minants of innovation, imitation and R&D offshoring evolution in 354 Indian pharmaceutical
firms over the period 1989 to 2008. This section provides a general overview of the data, along
with measures for innovation, imitation and R&D offshoring.
The data set used in the paper is from the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy
(CMIE) database. The firm level data constitute an unbalanced panel covering the period
1989-2008. The sample consists of 354 firms. This dataset provides information like: company
information (e.g., name, products, ownership), income and expenditure statement, liabilities
and assets.
The previous data set is appended with firm-level information regarding the number of
Indian and European patents filed in each year. This information was collected from the
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Technology Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council (India) and the European Patent
Office.
Definitions for the variables used in the estimations are presented at the end of the paper
in Table B.1. In what follows I will take a closer look at the main variables.
A recent paper by Alfaro and Chari (2009) analyzes the evolution of firm size, market share
and industry concentration over time in industries that were liberalized. For a better under-
standing of the industry dynamics I present similar statistics for the Indian pharmaceutical
market at the end of my paper in tables B.3- B.11.
The columns in Table B.1 present data on the average number of firms by type of own-
ership. For the full sample the number of firms grew relative to the beginning of the sample
period. But this growth is not reflected in both types of ownership. The number of foreign
firms increased in 1995 - 2000 to 33 from 23 in 1989 - 1994. But this trend didn’t last as the
number of foreign firms decreased in 2001 - 2004 to 26 and it reached 17 in 2005 - 2008. On
the other hand domestic firms steadily increased their number in the Indian pharmaceutical
market. The increase in average number of foreign firms after 1995 can be the result of a pos-
itive signal towards the implementation of stronger intellectual rights and the liberalization of
foreign direct investment. However, over the period 2001 - 2004 the number of both foreign
and domestic firms begins to decline. As the deadline for stronger IPRs implementation ap-
proached, pharmaceutical firms consolidated their market position by acquiring/merging with
other firms and other firms exited the market as their future profits were affected by the new
laws.
Table B.4 presents information on average assets of ownership type (in constant rupees
crore). 9 Average assets have grown across the entire period for both types of ownership. The
table shows high accumulation of assets in domestic and foreign firms between 2001 - 2004 and
2005 - 2008.
Table B.5 presents information on sales (in constant rupees crore). The period 1995 - 2000
shows an unexpected decrease in average total sales for both types of ownership. This is a
91 crore = 10 million rupees.
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period when small firms are active in the market. In contrast, the 2005 - 2008 period presents
substantial growth in average total sales.
Table B.6 shows profits (Net Profits) by ownership. Foreign firms exhibit a sustained
growth across years while domestic firms face a temporary decrease in average profits between
1995 and 2000.
Table B.7 reflects the return on assets. In the period 1995 - 2000 both types of firms
exhibit a decline in the return of assets. However, in the next period foreign firms face an
increase in the return on assets while the return to domestic firms keeps declining. Between
2005 - 2008 both domestic and foreign firms have higher returns on assets, but Indian private
firms experience a larger relative change.
Tables B.8 - B.11 describes the composition of number of firms, assets, sales and prof-
itability as a percentage of the total (by ownership group). Between 1989-1994 domestic firms
accounted for 88% of the total number of firms while foreign firms accounted accounted for
12%. Over time, the percentage of foreign firms keeps decreasing. The share of total assets
accounted by foreign firms between 1989-1994 is 19%, the remaining 81% being held by do-
mestic firms. Similar with the number of firms, the share of total assets accounted for by
foreign firms keeps decreasing. The share of total sales accounted for by foreign firms increases
to 27% between 1995 - 2000 from an initial level of 25%. After 2001, the share of total sales
held by foreign firms sees a significant drop. The most striking change is represented by the
share of total net profits accounted by foreign firms which doubles its value between 1995-2000
only to be reduced by half in the next period (2001 - 2004). Domestic firms are more dynamic
between 2001 - 2004 and 2005 - 2008 and they seem to dominate the Indian market in terms
of number, size (total assets and sales) and profits.
1.5.1 Innovation, imitation and R&D offshoring
Descriptive statistics for these variables (for the full sample or separated between foreign and
domestic firms) are presented in Figures C.4-C.9.
Innovation
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Innovation represents the development of new products. The proxy for innovation is the
number of patents a firm filed in Europe in a certain year. This is considered to be the
”successful” fraction of R&D expenditures. Some Indian firms might not consider the European
Union as a target market for the near future and might not apply for EU patents. This would
lead to an underestimate of the innovation measure for the Indian firms.10 In Figure C.4 the
total number of EU patents follows an ascending path until 2006 when it starts decreasing.
But the behavior of foreign and Indian (domestic) firms is very different. Indian firms do not
acquire EU patents before 1995, and after that you can notice a steady increase in EU patents.
This is presented in Figure C.5.
Imitation
Imitation is the duplication (by manufacturing) of products developed by other firms. The
proxy for imitation is the difference between the number of Indian patents and the number
of EU patents within a year. If the difference is negative then imitation is considered to be
zero.11 This difference is presented in Figure C.6. Based on this figure there is an increase
in imitation in 1995 followed by a decrease after 2003. Looking at the disaggregated graph in
Figure C.7 we can see that most of the variation in the variable of interest comes from the
domestic firms.
R&D offshoring
R&D offshoring is an R&D process (innovation) subcontracted to domestic firms in a foreign
country. It is difficult to find a good measure for R&D offshoring. In this paper I am going to
use revenue from exported services as a proxy for R&D offshoring. Beside the R&D offshoring
10Connolly (2003) quantifies spillovers from high technology imports to domestic imitation and innovation.
An important feature of her paper is that she attempts to distinguish between innovative and imitative activities.
She measures innovation as the number of U.S. patents granted to residents of a given country each year, by
the date of application, as reported by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. This measure is similar to my
measure of innovation.
11Connolly (2003) measures imitation as the number of applications for domestic patents by home residents,
as reported by the World Intellectual Property Organization, minus U.S. patent applications by residents of the
same country. This is based on the idea that imitating firms will patent the products in their home countries
but will not apply for a patent in U.S.. There are drawbacks to this measure as a firm might not intend to
sell its products in U.S. (this overestimates imitative activities) or an imitative firm might not bother to get
domestic patent protection if IPR are weak (this underestimates imitative activities). This measure is similar
to my measure of imitation.
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activity, this measure will include revenues from clinical trials offshoring along with revenues
from other services. The clinical trials are not related to the IPR regime. Their inclusion will
reduce the effect of an IPR change on the R&D offshoring measure.12 In Figure C.8, the years
2000 and 2006 exhibit jumps in the amount of services exported. According to Figure C.9, the
2000 increase in services exported is based on domestic firms while the 2006 increase relies on
both domestic and foreign firms.
1.5.2 Other firm-level-variables (firm experience, assets and wages) and
industry-level-variables (relative price and interest rate)
Experience
The year 1989 is considered the starting point for firms that were already in the market (it
is not possible to distinguish between firms that entered the market in 1989 and firms that
were already on the market). For the first year in the market (1990 for firms that were on the
market in 1989) a firm gets one point experience. For each additional year they get another
point. This proxy is intended to reflect familiarity with the market and research experience.
The individual wage is computed as the ratio of salaries and wages expenses to the number
of employees. Theory suggests that an increase in either innovation or imitation in India,
should put upward pressure on wages.
Relative price
This measures how Northern prices are moving relative to the Indian price. An increase in
the price of pharmaceuticals in the North (where there are strong IPRs) relative to the price
of pharmaceuticals in the South, should provide an increased incentive for Indian firms to
innovate. Imitated products can not be sold in those markets.
Interest rate
12Feenstra and Hanson (1996) define offshoring as the share of imported intermediate inputs in the total
purchase of non-energy materials. Hijzen et al. (2004) calculate the ratio of imported inputs to the value added
of an industry (same measure is employed by Feenstra and Hanson in 1999). Hummels et al. (2001) introduce a
measure that takes account only of those imported intermediates which are used to produce an exported good.
Extrapolating these to measure R&D offshoring in this paper would be difficult as I do not have information
about ”Northern” firms.
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Higher interest rates should reduce the incentive to innovate (a process that requires a signif-
icant higher financial effort compared with imitation) and shift interest towards imitation.
1.6 Descriptive statistics and estimations
The timeline for the data I use is as follows:
Figure 1.2: Timeline with the Doha Ministerial Declaration
0 t0 t1 t2 t
1989 1995 2001 2005 2008 ?
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
︸ ︷︷ ︸
III
︸ ︷︷ ︸
IV
The economy begins in the original steady state at time 0. In my dataset the origin
corresponds to the year 1989. In 1995 (t0), the TRIPs (Trade Related aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights) ended with an agreement in which the developing countries were required to
grant product patents (by 2005) for pharmaceutical innovations as a condition of membership
in World Trade Organization (WTO). An announcement was made at this point about a future
policy change (with a 10 year delay). In November 2001 the Doha Ministerial Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health clarified some details regarding the implementation of stronger IPRs
starting in 2005. This was an important announcement and I will take it into consideration
when I model the dynamic transition. In 2005, stronger IPRs are implemented in India and
in 2008 my dataset ends.
1.6.1 The equations
In this section I look at information about some of the variables employed in the theoretical
model. Changes in the measures for innovation, imitation and R&D offshoring can come from
four sources: time specific effects that reflects industry or macro-level changes (Xt), observed
differences in plant characteristics (Yit), changes in IPR will be reflected by changes in dummy
variables (Zt) and random noise (it).
Using the fixed-effects method I will estimate the following equations:
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Git = αXt + βYit + γZt + it (1.19)
Mit = αXt + βYit + γZt + it (1.20)
Oit = αXt + βYit + γZt + it (1.21)
where:
1. Git is innovation, Mit is imitation and Oit is offshoring;
2. Xt includes:
- Relative price, one year lag (rel pricelag)
- Interest rate, one year lag (rlag)
3. Yit includes wages, total assets, experience in the industry;
- ”individual wagesit”
- ”R&D expensesit”
- ”Total exportsit”
- ”Total assetsit”
- ”experienceit”
- dummy variable for foreign ownershipit
4. Zt includes dummy variables that split the time frame 1989 - 2008 into four intervals;
- 1989 - 1994 (dataset begins - TRIPS Agreement)
- 1995 - 2000 (TRIPS Agreement)
- 2001 - 2004 (Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS, clarifies some conditions of the
TRIPS agreement)
- 2005 - 2008 (IPR changes - end of dataset)
5. noise;
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The equations doesn’t take into consideration some firm-specific effects.
it = µi + νit
Where µi is a time invariant unobservable firm effect (independently distributed across
firms) which might be correlated with the explanatory variables and νit is the part of
the error term uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
The same equations will be tested in loglinear form, where except for dummy variables,
all other variables (dependent or independent) will be in natural logarithms. The estimation
results for these equations will be presented in Table B.12 where the loglinear equations will
be numbered (19’), (20’) and (21’).
1.6.2 Groups of year - specific fixed effects
The time frame is split into four intervals and the dummy variables we considered have the
same coefficient within each interval. The choice of intervals will be 1989 - 94, 1995 - 00,
2001 - 04 and 2005 - 08. The cut-off points are 1995 (when India joined WTO and agreed to
comply with the TRIPS condition), 2001 (Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health clarified the application of ”compulsory licensing”) and 2005 (when IPRs legislation
was changed in India).
Figure 1.3: Timeline explaining the four time intervals used in estimations
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1989 1995 2001 2005 2008 ?
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
︸ ︷︷ ︸
III
︸ ︷︷ ︸
IV
Innovation
The results for the fixed effects estimation for innovation (measured as the number of EU
patent applications within a year) are presented in Table B.12. For the 1995 - 2000 interval
the coefficients show a significant (at 95% level) increase in innovation (relative to the 1989 -
1994 period), followed by a slower growth in the intervals 2001 - 2004 and 2005 - 2008. This
is an expected increase in innovation following the imposition of stronger IPRs in India. A
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strengthening of Southern IPR protection makes imitation less attractive and increases the
rate of offshoring freeing up resources in the North for innovation. The coefficient for the
relative price is also significant at the 95% level. Higher Northern prices provide a higher
incentive for innovation. A higher markup might make it profitable for Indian firms to develop
new products and acquire monopoly power on the Northern markets. The coefficient on the
interest rate has an unexpected sign, but it is not significant. Higher interest rates should
provide a lower incentive for innovation. Developing new products is an expensive activity
and it requires resources to support it. If the interest rate is too high one would expect
the Indian firms to forego expensive plans (for example, developing new products) in favor
of cheaper ones (manufacturing soon to go off - patent drugs). The relationship between
individual wages and innovation is positive and significant at the 95% level. In the theoretical
model everybody gets the same wage in the South. However one would expect innovating
firms to reward their employees better than imitative firms as the potential to sell original
products is bigger (they can also export them in developed countries). An increase in Southern
individual wages should make imitation less profitable and increase the incentive to innovate
in the South. Although the sign of the coefficient for the individual wages is as expected
(and the coefficient is also significant at the 95% level), the magnitude of the coefficient is
too big. One possible explanation for this is that the individual wage is much smaller than
any other variables included in the estimation. Being an exporter has a negative influence on
innovation (significant at the 95% level). One would expect only Indian innovators to be able
to export their products but this is not true. Many Indian firms export their products in other
developing countries where IPR protection is weak, or they export soon to go off - patent drugs
and bulk drugs to the North. Experience is positively correlated with the explanatory variable
and significant. The assets and R&D skills in this market are concentrated in the hands of
incumbents (either private or foreign firms). Having foreign ownership also provides a base
for innovation. Foreign subsidiaries benefit from the assistance of their parent company. The
number of observations is 4254 and the adjusted R-squared for this estimation is .9004. One
possible reason for such a high value is the high number of dummy variables (one for each
company).
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When using the loglinear specification, some of the coefficients change sign. The individual
wage remains significant and it has a big effect on innovation. Total exports are significant and
become positive. A 1 percent increase in total exports will increase innovation by .08 percent.
A 1 percent increase in total R&D increases innovation by .34 percent. Experience changes
signs and a 1 percent increase in experience decreases innovation by .06 percent. Foreign
ownership fosters innovation.
Imitation
The results for the fixed-effects estimation for imitation are presented in Table B.12. The
coefficients for the year dummies are positive except in 2005 - 2008 which is negative as
expected (and significant). Implementing the TRIPS Agreement in 2005 resulted in lower
imitation. It turns out that imitation increased between 1995 and 2000, following the policy
change announcement, and it increased less within the next period of time (2001 - 2004). A
possible reason for the increase in imitation after the announcement is that new imitators might
have entered the market to take advantage of the time left before the policy is implemented.
Also, Southern imitating firms have developed a set of skills that might not be adapted easily
to innovation. Until Southern firms manage to reeducate their workers they will continue to
do what they now how to do. The coefficient for relative prices became negative (and still
significant), as expected. Higher relative prices discourage imitation (shift resources towards
innovation). The interest rate becomes significant. Higher interest rates discourage innovation
and promote imitation. The size of the firm (total assets) is negatively related with the
measure for imitation, but the size of the coefficient is small. A higher individual wage in
India reduces imitation. The size of the coefficient is big again. R&D expenditure is also
positively correlated with imitation (as it was with innovation). R&D expenditure represent
the effort while innovation/imitation represent the results. Old incumbents are prolific at both
innovation and imitation. Foreign ownership acts as a deterrent to imitation.
As before, when using the loglinear specification some of the coefficients change sign. The
coefficients for the year dummies are significant and keep their sign. Relative price negatively
influences imitation (decrease by .27 percent). High interest rates discourage innovation and
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promote imitation. Total R&D and experience are both significant and lead to more imitation.
The foreign firm dummy is significant and has a negative sign.
R&D offshoring
R&D offshoring is measured by the services exported. The results for the fixed-effects esti-
mation for R&D offshoring are presented in Table B.12. The coefficients for time dummies
show a negative influence on R&D offshoring. This supports the idea that stronger IPR might
decrease offshoring. However, none of the coefficients is significant. The relative price has a
negative influence of R&D offshoring, but higher prices at home should not deter cost - saving
offshoring. The coefficient in front of the relative price is not significant. The interest rate has
a positive sign, and the coefficient is significant. Total exports increase the amount of R&D
offshoring, and the coefficient is significant at the 95% level. Experience provides a boost to the
export services. Foreign firms perform less R&D offshoring than Indian firms (the coefficient
is not significant). This would mean that there is less intra-firm offshoring than offshoring at
arms length.
In the loglinear specification the time dummies change sign and become significant at the
95% level. This supports the idea that stronger IPR might increase offshoring to India. A
1 percent increase in the interest rate fosters R&D offsoring by .03 percent. Total exports
increase offshoring by .1 percent. A 1 percent increase in total assets increases R&D offshoring
by .04 percent.
1.6.3 From imitation to innovation
Imitation can be a stepping stone for innovation.13 The skills acquired by the Indian firms in
the process of reverse-engineering Northern products can prove to be an advantage in adapting
to the new IPR system. Indian firms can use their R&D experience in order to develop new
products and become multinationals. In this section I run a panel data logit (fixed effects)
estimation having as dependent variable the firm-level ratio of EU patents to Indian patents.
Higher values of this ratio denote higher probability of being an innovator, lower values signal
13This statement is drawn from Glass & Saggi (2002).
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imitation. Table B.13 presents the impact of firm characteristics on the ratio (EU/Indian)
patent applications. Experience and higher interest rates increase the odds of becoming an
innovator. On the other, a counterintuitive result says that export activity reduces the odds of
becoming an innovator. But this result is not strictly counterintuitive because India exports
imitated products to developing markets. As more countries around the globe adopt stronger
IPRs, it will be difficult to find an export destination for imitated products and innovation
will become a requirement for exports.
Harmonization of IPRs legislation in India relative to the rest of the world and liberalization
of trade and capital mobility are bringing Northern and Southern firms closer together in terms
of their characteristics. To support this idea Figure C.10 presents the evolution of EU to total
patent applications for foreign firms over the years (1989 - 2008). Total patent applications
is the summation of EU patents and Indian patents applications. Starting in 1989 we notice
the Northern firms had many European patents and very few Indian patents. As time passes
we notice a slight movement towards the 45 degree line, where the Northern firm will hold an
equal number of EU and Indian patents. But this movement is more obvious for the Indian
firms. In Figure C.11 we can observe the evolution of EU and Indian patent applications for
domestic firms over the years (1989 - 2008). Before 1994 Indian firms didn’t hold any EU
patents (or very few). Starting in 1994 we can see a steady increase in the Indian interest
towards acquiring European patents. After 2005, the Indian firms are much closer to the 45
degree line than the foreign firms.
Fixed designation of firm’s profile
My previous definitions of innovation and imitation allow a firm to switch its designation from
imitator to innovator to imitator again year by year. In the following paragraphs I discuss
the possibility of defining a firm as an innovator or imitator for the whole sample. First, I
define the variable TOTAL Patents as the summation of all patents (EU and Indian) for each
firm for the entire sample. Then, I calculate the ratio of EU Patents to TOTAL Patents for
each firm for the entire sample. Firms without patents will receive a missing value for this
ratio. Firms that have at least one patent will receive a value between zero and one. Based on
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the ratio of EU Patents to TOTAL Patents I separate the firms into four categories: ”generic
producers” (for firms without patents), ”imitators” (for firms with a ratio below .1), ”switch
firms” (imitators with the potential to become innovators; with a ratio between .1 and .8)
and innovators (with a ratio above .8). Given this separation there are 221 firms in the first
category, 43 firms in the second, 80 in the third and 10 in the last one. In the end I use
these categories to determine if the designation of a firm into one of these types influences its
decision to innovate or imitate.
The fixed-effects estimation results, including dummy variables for the last three categories
defined above, are presented in Table B.14. The inclusion of these dummy variables does not
affect too much the coefficients found before. As expected, innovators have the biggest influence
on innovation. However, the second biggest influence comes from imitators, not from switch
firms. Looking at imitation we can see that the switch firms have the biggest positive influence
on imitation, while innovators have a negative impact on imitation. Imitators, switch firms
and innovators have a similar influence on offshoring.
Model misspecification with respect to the average wage by firm
The estimations presented in Table B.12 include the variable ”individual wage” which reflects
both supply and demand conditions in the Indian pharmaceutical market. Given that other
variables reflecting the market conditions are included in the estimations the question arises
whether or not there is collinearity between the individual wage and the other explanatory
variables. To assess the relevance of the individual wage for my estimations, I excluded the
variable from the estimations to see whether other variables become significant and I com-
pared the new adjusted R-squared with the old values. The results are presented in Table
B.15. When the individual wage is excluded from the estimations the coefficients keep their
significance.
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1.7 Conclusions
In this essay, I analyzed the transition dynamics of imposing stronger intellectual rights in a
model with endogenous innovation and imitation based on Grossman and Helpman (1991b).
Previous authors who employed the Grossman and Helpman model in order to analyze the
effects of stronger IPRs were more interested in determining the rate of imitation and innova-
tion in the steady state equilibrium without investigating the transition to a new equilibrium.
My first contribution is to derive the theoretical transition dynamics for the Grossman and
Helpman model (1991b). Innovation increases in the short run, while in the long-run stronger
IPRs will reduce innovations. Imitation falls in the short run and keeps decreasing slowly
until it reaches the new steady state. Given the nature of the market I study, my second con-
tribution is to analyze the situation when the Southern government announces its intentions
prior to the policy implementation of stronger IPRs. Following the announcement of imposing
stronger IPR in the South, innovation increases (jumps) but not as much as when there is no
announcement, and then it keeps increasing until the time of the policy change when it slowly
starts to decrease to the new steady state. Imitation decreases (jumps) less than before and
it continues to decrease at a diminishing rate until it reaches the new steady state value. In
the case with announcement, the endogenous variables approach the new steady-states faster.
On the empirical side I employ a rich firm-level panel data of 354 Indian pharmaceutical
firms over the period 1989 to 2008. Combining this dataset with Indian and EU patent data
allows me to analyze the predictions based on the theoretical model. Following the empirical
estimation I find that innovation follows the adjustment path predicted by the theoretical
model while imitation follows an opposite adjustment (India’s announcement regarding the
TRIPS agreement resulted in an increase in imitation). This unexpected increase in imitation
may be the result of Indian firms trying to take advantage of the time left under the old IPR
regime. This can be explained in the theoretical model as a temporary slackening in IPRs
enforcement. To model this situation I can reduce the labor coefficient for imitation in the
theoretical model between the years 1995 and 2005.
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According to the Pharmaceutical Drug Manufacturer Association there were approximately
20,000 registered drug manufacturers in India in 2005. These manufacturers sold 9 billion
dollars worth of formulations and bulk drugs. 85% of these formulations were sold in India
while over 60% of the bulk drugs were exported, mostly to the United States and Russia. Most
of the firms in the market are small-to-medium companies; 250 of the largest companies control
70% of the Indian market. Following the 1970 Patent Act, multinationals represent only 35%
of the market, down from 70% thirty five years ago. My sample has data on the 354 major
Indian pharmaceutical firms out of a total of 20,000. These 354 companies are either traded on
India’s major stock exchanges or they represent the central public sector companies. According
to the Pharmaceutical Drug Manufacturer Association the rest of the Indian pharmaceutical
firms account for approximately 30% of the Indian market. Without measuring the patenting
activity of these firms (either Indian patents, EU patents or no patents) my measures of
innovation and/or imitation are understated.
Following the 1970 Patent Act the number of multinationals present in the Indian market
decreased. However the trend should have changed in 2005 when stronger IPR were imple-
mented in India. Looking at table B.3. we notice that the number of foreign firms continued
to decrease after 2005. A possible explanation comes from the refusal of some foreign firms to
provide information to the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy(CMIE). Foreign firms,
as opposed to their Indian counterparts, are not required by law to report information to
CMIE.
Following the theoretical model, my empirical estimations analyze the effect of stronger
IPR on innovation and imitation. However the empirical work is not limited to innovation
and imitation. I am also interested on how stronger IPR regimes in developing countries in-
fluence the R&D offshoring decision to those countries. When I defined my R&D offshoring
variable I used revenue from exported services as my proxy for R&D offshoring. Beside the
R&D offshoring activity, this measure will include revenues from clinical trials offshoring along
with revenues from other services. The clinical trials are not related to the IPR regime. Their
inclusion will reduce the effect of an IPR change on the R&D offshoring measure. My future
work will include finding a stronger measure for R&D offshoring. A second change will affect
37
my measure for experience. I will replace experience with firm age. The dataset includes infor-
mation regarding the year of incorporation for each firm. I will use this information to create
my ”age” measure. To investigate if the variable age has a non-linear influence on innova-
tion/imitation I will include the ”age squared” variable. The Central Bank of India maintains
a dataset on new firms that can be used to verify whether or not my sample is representative.
From a spatial point of view, the innovative firms in India are clustered around seven
centers: Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai, Pune, Hyderabad, Bangalore, and Cennai. One of the factors
that led to concentration of pharmaceutical firms in these clusters is the positive externality
created by each innovative firm. My next step is to gather information about the spatial
distribution of non-innovative firms and see if they are clustered more that innovative firms.
Do non-innovative firms cluster around other cities? Can we find dynamic formation of new
clusters as Indian firms move from imitation to innovation? This information will shed light
on the role of spatial externalities as a source of economic growth.
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Chapter 2
The Transitional Dynamics of Innovation
and Imitation Following the Imposition of
Stronger Intellectual Property Rights in
Developing Countries
2.1 Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is the subject of heated debate in international
policy negotiations. Many developing countries feel that the Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property (TRIPs) agreement signed in the Uruguay Round benefits rich countries
at the expense of the poor. A major argument in favor of tighter IPRs has been that they
encourage innovation from which all the regions of the world benefit. A number of countries
do not find this argument convincing, however. The counter argument has been that tighter
intellectual property rights only strengthen the monopoly power of large companies that are
based in industrial countries, to the detriment of the less developed countries.1
Stronger IPR protection is claimed to encourage not only innovation but also foreign direct
investment, and to discourage imitation. Based on this idea, developing countries need to
1According to the discussion presented by Branstetter et al. (2007).
have stronger IPR protection to attract foreign direct investment.2 But what are the effects
of imposing stronger intellectual property rights in developing countries? Are the short-run
effects different from the long-run effects?
A literature has emerged to address the question of the effects of imposing stronger intellec-
tual property rights in developing countries. Two of the models used in analyzing these effects
are the endogenous product cycles models developed by Grossman and Helpman. Grossman
and Helpman (1991a) is a quality ladder model (when innovations are higher quality levels),
and Grossman and Helpman (1991b) is a product-variety model (when innovations are new
varieties).
These models developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991a and 1991b) are based on the
influential idea of Vernon (1966) regarding the international product cycle. A developed group
of countries, called the North, first invents new products and supplies them in the interna-
tional market. The developing countries, called the South, follow up through imitation and
gradually specialize in the production of these goods over time. Explaining product cycles is
important for understanding the effects of stronger IPRs in developed and developing coun-
tries. These two models look at how innovation and imitation respond to changes in policy.
They provide a framework for undertaking a wide range of extensions, such as introducing
tariff policies, migration, stronger intellectual property rights, etc. However, the models are
highly complicated and so the effects of alternative policies are typically derived only in the
steady state. Evaluating the effects of policies requires to account for the transition to a new
steady state. Grossman and Helpman assumed the existence of a steady state equilibrium
of the global economy and did not analyze the stability properties of that equilibrium or the
transitional dynamics in their papers.
Lai (1998), Glass and Saggi (2002) and Glass and Wu (2007) are some of the authors
who employed the above-mentioned models in order to analyze the effects of stronger IPRs
on both developed and developing countries (in terms of innovation, foreign direct investment
and imitation). These authors were more interested in determining the rate of imitation
2Argument presented by Lai (1998).
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and innovation in the steady state equilibrium without investigating the transition to a new
equilibrium. An exception from this rule is made by Helpman (1993) who employs a simpler
model with endogenous innovation but exogenous imitation. He shows that a decrease in the
exogenous rate of imitation (stronger IPRs) increases innovation in the short-run and decreases
innovation in the long run.
The task of the present essay is to explain transitional dynamics of imposing stronger
intellectual property rights in these two types of endogenous product-cycle models: when
innovations are new varieties and when innovations are higher quality levels. In order to analyze
the short-run and long-run effects of stronger IPRs I start with a simpler case of endogenous
innovation and exogenous imitation (for both new varieties and higher quality levels). Then, I
analyze the more complex case when both innovation and imitation are endogenous (for both
cases). I find a few important relationships between exogenous changes in the parameter of the
model and the transition path to the new steady state. The larger the Northern labor force, the
longer the time necessary to reach the new steady state in the case with endogenous imitation
(but the shorter the time in the case with exogenous imitation). The opposite is true for larger
Southern labor force and the transition to the new steady state becomes longer. Looking at
the unit labor requirement in innovation we can say that for larger value the recovery time will
be shorter when imitation is endogenous (but the opposite is true in the case with exogenous
imitation). Increasing the labor requirement in imitation will prolong the transition. Changes
in the subjective discount rate generate the biggest variations in the return and recovery times.
An important contribution of this essay is a full characterization of the dynamic path of
the economy. I not only investigate the steady state equilibrium, I verify that the steady state
in the economy is a saddle point. Given that the economy is a dynamic system, the paper
has yielded some results with respect to the short-run effects of a change in the intellectual
property rights. Many existing studies compromise such analysis by only drawing conclusions
about the long-run effects (the steady states), whereas this dynamic analysis enables us to
determine both the short-run and the long-run effects.
Why are transitional dynamics important? In 1995, the TRIPs (Trade Related aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights) ended with an agreement in which the developing countries were
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required to grant product patents (by 2005) for pharmaceutical innovations as a condition of
membership in World Trade Organization (WTO). At that time around fifty developing coun-
tries were not granting product patent protection for pharmaceutical products. India was one
of these countries that agreed with this requirement. Before that India was granting patents
based on the production process. This allowed imitation from the domestic Indian firms of
the products introduced to the market by multinational corporations (MNC).3 India proved
to be one of the most prolific imitators, building a strong pharmaceutical industry and becom-
ing an important competitor to multinational corporations. Indian pharmaceutical industry
development relied upon reverse engineering of patented products, and Indian firms directed
most of their R&D expenditures in that direction. Very few Indian firms (big companies,
some in cooperation with foreign companies) allocated R&D expenditures towards innovat-
ing new drugs. This last activity requires more R&D effort and the uncertainty of success is
higher, when compared with reverse engineering. After 2005, Indian firms were not able to sell
reverse-engineered products (developed after 2005).4 What changes should we expect in the
Indian pharmaceutical market? Most of the literature is interested in determining the rate of
imitation and innovation in the steady state equilibrium (before and after the policy change).
But the economy doesn’t adjust immediately to the new steady state. The transition can be a
slow process and even though the policymakers in India might prefer the new steady state to
the initial situation, the transition to the new steady state can have a negative impact on the
Indian economy. In my first essay (”IPRs, Innovation, Imitation and Offshoring: The Case
of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry”), using a panel of 354 Indian pharmaceutical firms
over the period 1989 to 2008 I present the adjustments of the rates of innovation, imitation
following a change in the intellectual property rights policy in India. Based on the work of
Grossman and Helpman (1991a and 1991b) and the other authors who employed their models,
one would expect a swift shift in the rates of innovation and imitation to the new steady state
after the policy change. The empirical results presented in my first essay suggest a smoother
3These facts are drawn from Saranga and Phani (2005).
4These facts are drawn from Smith (2002).
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transition.
The literature review is presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 describes the Helpman (1993)
paper: the transitional dynamics of stronger IPR in the new variety model with exogenous
imitation. The calculations for this section are presented in Appendix D. Section 2.4 analyzes
the new variety model with endogenous imitation and the corresponding calculations are pre-
sented in Appendix E. Concluding remarks are made in Section 2.5. In order to compare the
transition dynamics for the two types of innovation (new varieties versus higher quality levels)
I expanded Helpman’s (1993) work to the correspondent model of innovations in higher quality
levels and exogenous imitation in Appendix F. Appendix G applies the same reasoning for the
quality ladder model with endogenous imitation.
2.2 Literature review
This section will provide a general overview of the literature. However, the details encompassed
in the models developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991a and 1991b) along with the analysis
performed by Helpman (1993) will be presented in the next sections.
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) follow the ”product cycle” idea that the North is the only
source of innovation of new varieties of products, and the only way the South can acquire
technology is through ”technology transfer” (imitation) from the North. They study the
determinants of the steady state rate of innovation and imitation (both are endogenously
determined). An increase in labor supply in the South or a decrease in the labor requirement for
imitation generates an increase in the steady-state rates of imitation and innovation. Grossman
and Helpman (1991a) developed a similar model where innovations consists of improving one
quality of an existing good (the quality ladder model). An increase in the Southern labor
force raises imitation. Innovation in the North may rise or fall. In these models new products
are being invented by Northern firms and later directly imitated by Southern firms. In the
Vernon cycle, Northern firms move production to the South by forming subsidiaries there
before imitation shifts ownership but not location of production.
IPR reforms were not explicitly discussed in the above mentioned papers. To analyze
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the debate between North and South about the enforcement of stronger IPRs in the South,
Helpman (1993) employs a simplified version of the Grossman and Helpman (1991b) model
with exogenous imitation. His main contribution is his analysis of the transition dynamics
between steady states following strengthened IPRs in the South (modeled as a decrease in
the exogenous imitation intensity). He finds that stronger IPRs initially raise the rate of
innovation, but then it subsequently declines. The next section of the paper will present his
findings.
Lai (1998) modifies the Grossman and Helpman (1991b) model to consider the effects of
imitation targeting multinational production. He considers two possible channels of production
transfers between the North and the South: FDI and imitation. The effects of stronger IPRs in
the South (modeled as a decrease in the exogenous imitation intensity) depend on the channel
of production transfer. In the case of technology transfer through imitation (without FDI),
stronger IPRs lower the rate of innovation. The effects are opposite if the transfer channel is
FDI, or if both transfer channels coexist and the rate of FDI is large. If the technology transfer
is made through FDI, Southern firms can imitate only after Northern firms transfer production
to the South. Northern firms move production to the South in order to take advantage of lower
relative labor costs. In this case the effect of stronger IPRs does not affect the demand for
Northern labor as production is entirely in the South. Thus, innovation will rise while its cost
remains constant.
Glass and Saggi (2002) question the results of Lai (1998) where stronger Southern IPR
protection encourage FDI and innovation. They employ a quality-ladder model and argue that
stronger Southern IPR protection reduces the aggregate rate of innovation and the flow of FDI
regardless of whether FDI or imitation targeting Northern production serves as the primary
channel of international technology transfers. In their model, stronger IPR protection increases
the cost of imitation. Glass and Saggi (2002) conclude that the reason for the difference in their
results relative to Lai (1998) appears to be the difference in how IPRs protection is modeled
(as an increase in the cost of imitation rather than as an exogenous decrease in the imitation
intensity). But there is another important difference between the two models: the type of
innovation (creating new varieties versus quality upgrading). Contrary to Lai (1998), Glass
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and Wu (2007) employ a model based on the quality-ladder model developed by Grossman and
Helpman (1991a) where imitation is exogenous. They find that stronger IPRs in the South
(a decrease in the imitation intensity) decrease FDI and innovation, an opposite result to the
one found by Lai . They conclude that stronger IPRs protection may shift the composition of
innovation away from improvements in existing products toward development of new products.
There are some important differences between the “new varieties” and “quality ladder
models”. When innovation is targeting new varieties we talk about horizontal product dif-
ferentiation. In this setup successful innovation enable Northern firms to earn profits until
imitation occurs. At that point Northern firms need to develop new products in order to re-
sume earning profits. In the “quality ladder models” there is vertical product differentiation.
Successful innovation earns profits for the Northern firms until imitation occurs. Then, North-
ern firms need to improve on the quality of Southern imitations in order to resume earning
profits. Consumers maximize a different instantaneous utility function resulting in different
instantaneous demands for goods. In the “new varieties” model firms charge a fixed markup
over the marginal cost. In the “quality ladder models” Northern firms set price equal to the
quality increment over the marginal cost. As a last difference, in the “new varieties” model the
R&D process depends on the cumulative R&D experience in the region. My contribution is
to explain transitional dynamics of imposing stronger intellectual property rights in these two
types of endogenous product cycles models and to find the conditions that lead to different
adjustment paths.
2.3 Helpman (1993) - endogenous innovation (new varieties)
and exogenous imitation
In his paper Helpman develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of two regions, North
and South. Innovation takes place in the North while the South imitates technologies that
have been invented in the North. The model builds on the theory of endogenous growth
and international trade that has been developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991b). Its
main contribution is the analysis of the transition dynamics between steady states following
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strengthened IPRs in the South (modeled as a decrease in the exogenous imitation intensity)
The North introduces new products at a rate g = n˙/n, where n equals the number (mea-
sure) of products society knows how to produce. The South imitates Northern products at
the exogenous rate m = n˙S/nN , where nS represents the number of products that the South
knows how to produce while nN represents the number of products that the South has not yet
imitated. The number of products society knows to produce is nS + nN = n.
The number of products available at time t can be defined:
n(t) = n(0)egt (2.1)
Let the fraction of goods that have not been imitated be ξ = nN/n. Given that ξ˙/ξ =
n˙N/nN − n˙/n, and n˙N = n˙− n˙S, the following law of motion can be derived:
ξ˙ = g − (g +m)ξ (2.2)
Consumers
A consumer has additively separable intertemporal preferences given by lifetime utility
U =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρt log u(t) dt (2.3)
where ρ is the subjective discount rate and u(t) is the instantaneous utility.
The flow of utility depends on consumption of the above mentioned n products via a
constant elasticity of substitution preference structure:
u(t) =
[∫ n
0
x(j, t)α dj
]1/α
, 0 < α < 1 (2.4)
where x(j, t) represents consumption of product j at time t.
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Consumers allocate spending only across the available products. With homothetic prefer-
ences, demand functions can be derived directly from individual preferences:
x(j, t) = p(j, t)−ε
E(t)
P (t)1−ε
, ε =
1
1− α > 1 (2.5)
where E(t) represents aggregate spending on consumer goods at time t, ε the elasticity of
demand, and P (t) a price index at time t such that:
P (t) =
[∫ n
0
p(j, t)1−εdj
]1/1−ε
(2.6)
Substituting the demand functions (2.5) into (2.4), and taking account of (2.6), we obtain the
indirect utility function:
log u(t) = logE(t)− logP (t) (2.7)
Consumer maximize welfare subject to an intertemporal budget constrain. They choose a rate
of growth of consumption spending that matches the difference between the interest rate and
his subjective rate of time preference:
E˙(t)/E(t) = r(t)− ρ (2.8)
From this point on I suppress the time index for all variables.
Research and Development (R&D)
Innovation is costly, requiring labor input. Let the invention of new products per unit time n˙
equal lKn/a, where a represents a productivity parameter in innovation, l is labor employed
in R&D, and Kn is the cumulative stock of knowledge in the inventive activity. Assume that
Kn equals n. Therefore the rate of innovation becomes g = l/a.
If investment in R&D takes place, the expected reward from this activity, which consists
of a blueprint whose value we denote by vN , must cover R&D costs. The equilibrium value of
a blueprint cannot exceed these costs, because otherwise the demand for labor by innovators
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becomes unbounded (free entry into innovation). If the value of a blueprint falls short of
R&D costs, however, no firm invests in R&D. It follows that in an equilibrium with positive
innovation R&D costs just equal the value of a blueprint. Given the above specified R&D
technology, this condition becomes
E(vN) = wNa/n (2.9)
where wN is the Northern wage.
Now assume that the developed region has well functioning financial markets, including a
stock market. Then the value of a firm (a blueprint) equals the present value of its expected
stream of profits, because firms face idiosyncratic risks that can be diversified away via portfolio
holdings. In fact, the only risk faced by a firm is that its product will be imitated by the South.
In a time interval of length dt the South imitates a proportion m dt of northern products. Every
product that has not previously been imitated faces the probability mdt of being imitated in
the next time interval of length dt. Arbitrage in asset markets implies:
piN
vN
+
v˙N
vN
= r +m (2.10)
where piN represents instantaneous profits and r stands for the nominal interest rate. This
condition states that the profit rate (the first term on the left-hand side) plus the rate of
capital gain on equity holdings equals the risk adjusted (by the probability of being imitated)
interest rate.
Producers
Goods are manufactured with one unit of labor per unit output in both regions. A Northern
manufacturer that invents a product can charge a monopoly price as long as his product has
not been imitated. Given the demand functions (2.5), the monopoly price of every product
that has not been imitated equals
pN =
1
α
wN (2.11)
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where wN represents the wage rate in the North (and equals the manufacturer’s marginal cost).
It follows that the nN products that have not been imitated are priced with a markup
above Northern wages. The technology of a product that has been imitated by the South
becomes available to all Southern manufacturers. In that event, competition leads to marginal
cost pricing of the remaining nS products:
pS = wS (2.12)
where wS is the wage rate in the South. It is assumed that the wage is higher in the North.
Therefore the price of goods manufactured in the North is also higher. Taking account of the
pricing practices (2.11) and (2.12), the price index P from equation (2.6) can be represented
by:
P = n
1/1−ε
N ·
[
ζ · p1−εN + (1− ζ) · p1−εS
]1/1−ε
(2.13)
A Northern firm charges a price pN =
1
αwN , makes sales xN and has a marginal cost wN . The
instantaneous profits for these firms are:
piN =
(
1
α
wN − wN
)
· xN =
(
1
α
− 1
)
· wN · xN = (1− α) · pN · xN (2.14)
The resource market (market clearing conditions)
Define Li as the labor force of region i, where i = N,S. Then we can express the labor market
clearing conditions by: In the South:
nSxS = LS (2.15)
In the North:
ag + nNxN = LN (2.16)
where the first term on the left-hand side of (2.16) represents employment in R&D while the
second term represents employment in manufacturing.
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Using the resource constraint (2.16) it follows from (2.14) that:
piN = (1− α) · pN · LN − ag
nN
Substituting this together with (2.11) and (2.9) into (2.10) implies:
1− α
α
· LN − ag
aζ
+
˙vN
vN
= r +m (2.17)
Assume that there are no financial capital flows between the two regions, so that the North
finances investment in R&D entirely with domestic savings. The lack of international capital
mobility implies that the trade account is balanced at every point in time:
EN = pN nN xN
Using this relationship together with (2.11) and (2.16),
E˙N = p˙N (LN − ag)− a pN g˙
E˙N
EN
= − ag˙
LN − ag +
p˙N
pN
From the valuation of firms on the supply side given by (2.9), and the pricing of goods (2.11),
the rate of increase in the price of Northern products equals the rate of appreciation of a firm
plus the rate of innovation. Substituting this relationship together with the previous equation
into (2.8), we obtain an expression for the interest rate:
r = ρ+ g − ag˙
(LN − ag) +
v˙N
vN
(2.18)
From (2.9), (2.17), and (2.8), we obtain a differential equation for the rate of innovation:
g˙ = (LN/a− g) [ρ+m+ g − (1/α− 1) (LN/a− g) /ζ] (2.19)
Equation (2.19) together with the differential equation (2.2) for the fraction of goods that have
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not been imitated:
ζ˙ = g − (g +m)ζ (2.2)
form an autonomous system of two differential equations in (g, ζ). In this system, ζ is a state
variable while g is a jump variable. When g˙ = 0 equation (2.19) becomes
ζ = (1/α− 1) (LN/a− g) /(ρ+m+ g) (2.20)
When ζ˙ = 0, equation (2.2) becomes:
ζ =
g
g +m
(2.21)
Stronger intellectual property rights are modeled as a decline in the rate of imitation. Let
m = m˜−µ, where the initial value of µ is zero. An increase in µ is the effect of stronger IPRs.
In Figure 2.1 below, the intersection of the two curves described by the equations (2.20)
and (2.21) at point A describes the steady-state long-run equilibrium. It follows from (2.20)
and (2.21) that a reduction in the rate of imitation shifts both curves g˙ = 0 and ζ˙ = 0 to
the right, with the latter shifting by proportionately more. The result is that the long-run
equilibrium point shifts down and to the right, implying that the long-run rate of innovation
g declines and the long-run fraction of products that have not been imitated ζ increases.
Figure 2.1: Phase diagram for long run equilibrium
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A proper evaluation of the effects of tighter IPRs will not focus only on the steady state
values (of g and ζ) but also on the entire trajectory of g and ζ. The analysis is restricted to
economies that are initially in steady state (ζ(0) = ζ¯ ). In this case we can calculate the first
order response of (ζ, g) to a tightening of intellectual property rights from a linearized version
of the differential equations (2.19) and (2.2) around their steady state values.
More details about the linearized version are provided in appendix D.
Taking into account the initial conditions ζ(0) = ζ¯ Helpman gets:
dζ(t)
dµ
=
(
1− e−λt
) dζ¯
dµ
(2.22)
dg(t)
dµ
=
dg¯
dµ
+ Λe−λt
dζ¯
dµ
(2.23)
where λ and Λ are positive. It follows from these equations that the fraction of goods that
have not been imitated rises at each point in time following a tightening of IPRs (except for
t = 0). On the other hand, although the rate of innovation declines in the long run, (2.23)
suggests that it may increase in the short run.
Can the rate of innovation rise temporarily as a result of tighter IPRs? The long-run
equilibrium point A shifts horizontally to B. The new equilibrium trajectory passes through
B and slopes downward. Therefore initially the system jumps from A to A′ and subsequently
follows the saddle path to B.
dζ¯
dµ
=
g¯[
mρ+ 1α(m+ g¯)
]2
α
dg¯
dµ
= − g¯ρ[
mρ+ 1α(m+ g¯)
]2
Together with (2.21) these expressions imply:
dg(0)
dµ
=
g¯(Λ− αρ)[
mρ+ 1α(m+ g¯)
]2
α
(2.24)
It results that the rate of innovation rises on impact. A tightening of intellectual property rights
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initially raises the rate of innovation, but then the rate of innovation subsequently declines.
This movement is presented in Figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2: Phase diagram for short run changes
A numerical simulation
To better understand the model described by Helpman (1993) I employ a numerical simulation
to see the effects of different parameters on the transition path. The following numerical
example will show the transitional dynamics following the imposition of stronger IPR. Set the
unit labor requirement in innovation to aN = 5, the discount rate to r = 0.2, Northern labor
supply LN = 10 and the initial imitation intensity m = 0.3 (which will decrease to 0.2 when
stronger IPR are imposed).
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Figure 2.3: Transition path for the innovation rate when imitation is exogenous
Figure 2.4: Transition path for the fraction of products not imitated when imitation is exoge-
nous
The effects of imposing stronger intellectual property rights on the transition dynamics
for the innovation and imitation rates depend on the parameters of the economy in question.
The following tables shows how the transition paths are affected: for all cases in the following
tables, the initial IPR parameter k = 0 will increase to 0.1 when stronger IPR are imposed such
that the labor requirement coefficient (1 + k)aS increases with stronger IPR. Then I analyze
how changes in the Northern labor supply, the unit labor requirement in innovation, and other
parameters affect the initial jumps (the jump amplitudes), the time it takes for the rate of
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Table 2.1: Changes in Northern labor supply LN - Exogenous imitation
Jump Return Recovery
LN aN α ρ m0 µ in g time time
0.02 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.000904515 1.75375 14.5841
0.03 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.00134579 1.75854 14.5927
0.04 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.00177988 1.76316 14.5989
0.05 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.00220692 1.76761 14.6027
0.1 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.00424025 1.78746 14.5863
0.15 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.00611439 1.80336 14.5154
0.2 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.00784353 1.81555 14.396
0.25 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.00944111 1.82428 14.235
0.3 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0109196 1.82985 14.0393
0.35 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0122902 1.83258 13.8155
0.36 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0125523 1.83281 13.7679
0.38 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0130651 1.83298 13.6704
0.4 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0135633 1.83276 13.5699
0.45 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0147478 1.8307 13.3079
0.5 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0158521 1.82666 13.0345
0.55 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0168832 1.82092 12.7537
0.6 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0178476 1.8137 12.4691
0.65 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0187511 1.80522 12.1835
0.68 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0192661 1.7996 12.0126
0.7 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0195988 1.79566 11.8992
0.72 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0199233 1.79158 11.7862
0.75 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0203953 1.78521 11.618
0.8 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0208504 1.77857 11.4514
0.85 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0218509 1.76217 11.0704
0.9 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.022517 1.74983 10.8058
0.95 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0231461 1.73709 10.5482
2 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0311333 1.46084 6.74069
4 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0363877 1.10162 3.8447
innovation to return to the initial value in its way to the new steady state (return time) and
the recovery time (the time required to go 99% of the distance between the initial steady state
and the new steady state).
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Table 2.2: Changes in the unit labor requirement in innovation aN - Exogenous imitation
Jump Return Recovery
LN aN α ρ m0 µ in g time time
0.7 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0390184 0.81802 2.31515
0.7 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0355616 1.17272 4.31491
0.7 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0325113 1.38511 6.0045
0.7 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0298472 1.52252 7.41024
0.7 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0275283 1.61508 8.56882
0.7 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0255078 1.67904 9.51922
0.7 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0237411 1.72402 10.298
0.7 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0221887 1.75606 10.9373
0.7 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0208172 1.77907 11.4637
0.7 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0195988 1.79566 11.8992
0.7 1.1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0185104 1.80764 12.2613
0.7 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0175332 1.81626 12.5642
0.7 1.3 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0166514 1.82238 12.8189
0.7 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0158521 1.82666 13.0345
0.7 1.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0151245 1.82956 13.2178
0.7 1.6 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0144595 1.83141 13.3746
0.7 1.7 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0138496 1.83247 13.5095
0.7 1.8 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0132883 1.83293 13.626
0.7 1.85 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0130241 1.83298 13.6784
0.7 1.9 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0127701 1.83293 13.7272
0.7 2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0122902 1.83258 13.8155
0.7 5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.00575161 1.80048 14.5337
0.7 6 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.00488194 1.79318 14.5685
0.7 15 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.00206535 1.76615 14.6017
0.7 20 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.00156373 1.76087 14.5961
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Table 2.3: Changes in the subjective discount rate ρ - Exogenous imitation
Jump Return Recovery
LN aN α ρ m0 µ in g time time
0.7 1 0.6 0.01 0.3 0.1 0.0233071 6.38736 11.977
0.7 1 0.6 0.02 0.3 0.1 0.0230907 5.22673 11.9901
0.7 1 0.6 0.03 0.3 0.1 0.0228766 4.56235 12.0012
0.7 1 0.6 0.04 0.3 0.1 0.0226649 4.10053 12.0106
0.7 1 0.6 0.05 0.3 0.1 0.0224555 3.74933 12.018
0.7 1 0.6 0.06 0.3 0.1 0.0222485 3.46783 12.0235
0.7 1 0.6 0.07 0.3 0.1 0.0220438 3.23425 12.0272
0.7 1 0.6 0.08 0.3 0.1 0.0218415 3.0356 12.0289
0.7 1 0.6 0.09 0.3 0.1 0.0216416 2.86351 12.0287
0.7 1 0.6 0.10 0.3 0.1 0.021444 2.71227 12.0265
0.7 1 0.6 0.11 0.3 0.1 0.0212488 2.57783 12.0224
0.7 1 0.6 0.12 0.3 0.1 0.0210561 2.45719 12.0164
0.7 1 0.6 0.13 0.3 0.1 0.0208656 2.34808 12.0084
0.7 1 0.6 0.14 0.3 0.1 0.0206776 2.24874 11.9985
0.7 1 0.6 0.15 0.3 0.1 0.0204919 2.15778 11.9867
0.7 1 0.6 0.16 0.3 0.1 0.0203086 2.07407 11.9729
0.7 1 0.6 0.17 0.3 0.1 0.0201277 1.9967 11.9573
0.7 1 0.6 0.18 0.3 0.1 0.019949 1.92491 11.9398
0.7 1 0.6 0.19 0.3 0.1 0.0197728 1.85808 11.9204
0.7 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0195988 1.79566 11.8992
0.7 1 0.6 0.21 0.3 0.1 0.0194272 1.73721 11.8761
0.7 1 0.6 0.22 0.3 0.1 0.0192578 1.68233 11.8513
0.7 1 0.6 0.23 0.3 0.1 0.0190907 1.63069 11.8246
0.7 1 0.6 0.25 0.3 0.1 0.0187633 1.53598 11.7662
0.7 1 0.6 0.30 0.3 0.1 0.0179832 1.33915 11.5918
0.7 1 0.6 0.40 0.3 0.1 0.0165777 1.05927 11.1386
0.7 1 0.6 0.42 0.3 0.1 0.0163196 1.01573 11.0345
0.7 1 0.6 0.45 0.3 0.1 0.0159456 0.956177 10.8717
0.7 1 0.6 0.48 0.3 0.1 0.0155868 0.902614 10.7022
0.7 1 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0153557 0.869815 10.5861
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Table 2.4: Changes in the measure of substitutability α - Exogenous imitation
Jump Return Recovery
LN aN α ρ m0 µ in g time time
0.7 1 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0133635 1.5981 10.6699
0.7 1 0.45 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0150235 1.6502 11.0637
0.7 1 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0166322 1.70165 11.4213
0.7 1 0.55 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0181665 1.7509 11.7132
0.7 1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0195988 1.79566 11.8992
0.7 1 0.62 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.020136 1.81163 11.9325
0.7 1 0.63 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0203957 1.81908 11.9386
0.7 1 0.65 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0208958 1.83272 11.9267
0.7 1 0.67 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0213676 1.8444 11.8793
0.7 1 0.69 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0218077 1.85376 11.7917
0.7 1 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0220146 1.85743 11.7314
0.7 1 0.75 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0228938 1.86323 11.2406
0.7 1 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0234336 1.84046 10.3802
0.7 1 0.82 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0235175 1.82026 9.91705
0.7 1 0.85 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0234471 1.77407 9.08227
0.7 1 0.88 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0230517 1.70294 8.06701
0.7 1 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0225273 1.63676 7.28104
0.7 1 0.92 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0216972 1.5499 6.39754
0.7 1 0.95 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.019507 1.35982 4.84731
0.7 1 0.98 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0146914 1.01405 2.84352
These calculations confirm a few important relationships. When the size of the Northern
labor force is larger, the time necessary to reach the new steady state is shorter. Looking
at the unit labor requirement in innovation we can say that an increase in this value will
decrease the recovery time. Increasing the labor requirement in imitation will prolong the
transition. Changes in the subjective discount rate generate a peak in the recovery time when
the subjective discount rate is 0.08. If the world consumers have this subjective discount rate,
they will face the longest transition possible to the new steady state.
In Appendix F (page 120) I present transitional dynamics for a similar model developed
by Grossman and Helpman (1991a) where innovations are higher quality levels of products.
The path to the new steady state is similar with the one presented in this section. The rate
of innovation rises temporarily as a result of tighter IPRs and subsequently follows the saddle
path to the new steady state.
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2.4 Endogenous innovation (new varieties) and imitation
This model was developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991b) in order to determine the rate
of innovation and imitation in the steady state equilibrium. My contribution to the model
is to explain the transition dynamics of innovation and imitation when imposing stronger
intellectual property rights. Innovation takes place in the North while the South imitates
technologies that have been invented in the North. The North introduces new products at a
constant rate g = n˙/n, where n equals the number (measure) of products society knows how
to produce. The South imitates Northern products at rate m = n˙S/nN , where nS represents
the number of products that the South knows how to produce while nN represents the number
of products that the South has not yet imitated. The number of products society knows how
to produce is nS + nN = n.
Consumers
This part is identical with the situation presented in Section 2.3 (page 46).
Research and Development (R&D)
The rate of innovation is defined as g =
n˙
n
. The rate of imitation is defined as m =
n˙S
nN
. If
investment in Southern R&D (imitation) takes place, the reward from this activity, denoted
by vS, must cover R&D costs:
vS = wS(1 + k)
aS
nS
(2.25)
where an increase in parameter k represents the imposition of stronger IPR The no-arbitrage
conditions in asset markets imply for the South:
piS
vS
+
v˙S
vS
= ρ (2.26)
where piS represents instantaneous profits and ρ stands for the subjective discount rate.
For the North, the free entry condition (2.9) and the no-arbitrage condition (2.10) in asset
markets are presented in Section 2.3 (page 48).
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Producers
The pricing decisions for a Northern manufacturer (2.11) and the Northern profits (2.14) are
presented in Section 2.3 (page 49).
A Southern manufacturer that imitated a Northern product can charge a monopoly price
pS =
wS
α
(2.27)
where wS is the wage rate in the South (and equals the manufacturer’s marginal cost).
A Southern firm charges a price pS =
1
αwS , makes sales xS and has a marginal cost wS.
The instantaneous profits for these firms are:
piS =
(
1
α
wS − wS
)
xS =
(
1
α
− 1
)
wSxS = (1− α)pSxS (2.28)
The resource market (market clearing conditions)
We can express the labor market clearing conditions for the South by:
(1 + k) aS
n˙S
nS
+ nS xS = LS (2.29)
where first term on the left-hand side represents employment in R&D while the second term
represents employment in manufacturing. By definition
n˙S
nN
= m. The market clearing condi-
tion for the North (2.16) is presented in Section 2.3 (page 49).
Equilibrium conditions:
The three differential equations that describe the equilibrium are (2.30), (2.31) and (2.32). In
these equations g and m are jump variables while ζ is a state variable:
ζ˙ = g − (m+ g)ζ (2.30)
g˙ =
(
LN
aN
− g
)
·
ρ+m+ g − ( 1α − 1)
(
LN
aN
− g
)
ζ
 (2.31)
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m˙ =
1− ζ
ζ
ρ+ mζ
1− ζ −
1− α
α
·
LS − m(1+k)aSζ1−ζ
(1 + k)aS
 · LS − m(1+k)aSζ1−ζ
(1 + k)aS
−
− m
ζ(1− ζ) [g − (m+ g)ζ] (2.32)
Calculations deriving the above mentioned differential equations are presented in Appendix E.
The following numerical example will show the transitional dynamics following the impo-
sition of stronger IPR. Set the unit labor requirement in innovation to aN = 9 and imitation
aS = 8.5, and the discount rate to r = .2. Northern labor supply LN = 10, Southern labor
supply LS = 11 and the initial IPR parameter k = 0 (which will increase to 0.1 when stronger
IPR are imposed such that the labor requirement coefficient (1 + k)aS increases with stronger
IPR). The rate of innovation rise temporarily as a result of tighter IPRs, but then it decreases
below the initial steady-state. Imitation falls abruptly and then it continues to decrease to the
new steady state. The fraction of goods that have not been imitated grows smoothly.
Figure 2.5: Transition path for the innovation rate when imitation is endogenous
The effects of imposing stronger intellectual property rights on the transition dynamics
for the innovation and imitation rates depend on the parameters of the economy in question.
The following tables shows how the transition paths are affected: for all cases in the following
tables, the initial IPR parameter k = 0 will increase to 0.1 when stronger IPR are imposed
such that the labor requirement coefficient (1 + k)aS increases with stronger IPR. Then I
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Figure 2.6: Transition path for the imitation rate when imitation is endogenous
Figure 2.7: Transition path for the fraction of products not imitated when imitation is en-
dogenous
analyze how changes in the Northern and Southern labor supply, the unit labor requirement in
innovation and imitation, and other parameters affect the initial jumps (the jump amplitudes),
the time it takes for the rate of innovation to return to the initial value on its way to the new
steady state (return time) and the recovery time (the time required to go 99% of the distance
between the initial steady state and the new steady state).
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Table 2.5: Changes in the Northern labor supply LN - Endogenous imitation
Jump amplitudes Return Recovery
LN LS aN aS α ρ in g in m time time
0.45 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.01072 -0.38043 3.31804 65.1995
0.47 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.00899 -0.21439 3.35867 76.7137
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.00680 -0.11195 3.42568 99.9421
0.55 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.00386 -0.04933 3.55213 173.605
0.57 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.00286 -0.03708 3.6072 233.931
Table 2.6: Changes in the Southern labor supply LS - Endogenous imitation
Jump amplitudes Return Recovery
LN LS aN aS α ρ in g in m time time
0.5 0.62 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.00233 -0.02502 3.50026 245.969
0.5 0.67 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.00482 -0.06090 3.45349 132.158
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.00680 -0.11195 3.42568 99.9421
0.5 0.72 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.00839 -0.17969 3.40657 84.6135
0.5 0.75 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.01133 -0.44137 3.37568 67.0983
Table 2.7: Changes in unit labor requirement in innovation aN - Endogenous imitation
Jump amplitudes Return Recovery
LN LS aN aS α ρ in g in m time time
0.5 0.7 0.85 1 0.6 0.2 0.002010 -0.028802 3.659320 332.556000
0.5 0.7 0.87 1 0.6 0.2 0.002636 -0.034722 3.620500 253.832000
0.5 0.7 0.9 1 0.6 0.2 0.003578 -0.045507 3.567200 187.374000
0.5 0.7 0.95 1 0.6 0.2 0.005167 -0.070864 3.490100 130.446000
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.006800 -0.111953 3.425680 99.9421
Table 2.8: Changes in unit labor requirement in imitation aS - Endogenous imitation
Jump amplitudes Return Recovery
LN LS aN aS α ρ in g in m time time
0.5 0.7 1 0.98 0.6 0.2 0.00791324 -0.155804 3.412110 88.628300
0.5 0.7 1 0.99 0.6 0.2 0.007336 -0.131295 3.419010 94.0952
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.006800 -0.111953 3.425680 99.9421
0.5 0.7 1 1.01 0.6 0.2 0.006303 -0.096422 3.432160 106.214
0.5 0.7 1 1.015 0.6 0.2 0.006067 -0.089781 3.435330 109.526
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Table 2.9: Changes in the subjective discount rate ρ - Endogenous imitation
Jump amplitudes Return Recovery
LN LS aN aS α ρ in g in m time time
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.14 0.01294 -3.18386 4.99619 83.9553
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.15 0.01133 -0.96697 4.67188 87.625
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.17 0.00901 -0.29606 4.10438 93.5233
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.00680 -0.11195 3.42568 99.9421
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.21 0.00626 -0.08895 3.23681 101.633
Table 2.10: Changes in the measure of substitutability α - Endogenous imitation
Jump amplitudes Return Recovery
LN LS aN aS α ρ in g in m time time
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.55 0.2 0.00933 -0.46513 3.46589 84.9132
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.58 0.2 0.00772 -0.18374 3.43975 93.5702
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.6 0.2 0.00680 -0.11195 3.42568 99.9421
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.62 0.2 0.00597 -0.07245 3.41605 106.903
0.5 0.7 1 1 0.66 0.2 0.00456 -0.03410 3.40555 123.067
These calculations confirm a few important relationships. When the size of the Northern
labor force is larger, the time necessary to reach the new steady state increases. This result is
different from the case with exogenous imitation. The opposite is true when the Southern labor
force increases and the transition to the new steady state is longer. Looking at the unit labor
requirement in innovation we can say that an increase in this value will decrease the recovery
time (yielding a different result from the case with exogenous imitation). Increasing the labor
requirement in imitation will prolong the transition. Changes in the subjective discount rate
generate the biggest variations in the return and recovery times.
In Appendix G (page 139) I present transitional dynamics for a similar model developed
by Grossman and Helpman (1991a) where innovations are higher quality levels of products.
The path to the new steady state is relatively similar with the one presented in this section,
with the exception of the imitation rate. The rate of innovation rises temporarily as a result
of tighter IPRs and subsequently follows the saddle path to the new steady state, like before.
Imitation however falls abruptly and than it starts increasing slowly reaching a new steady
state below the initial one. The amount of products produced in the North grows smoothly.
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2.5 Conclusions
An example to support the importance of transitional dynamics analysis is the imposition
of product patent protection for pharmaceutical products in India following the 1995 TRIPs
agreement. In 2005 India implemented product patent protection, preventing Indian firms
from selling reverse-engineered products (developed after 2005). What changes should we
expect in the Indian pharmaceutical market? In my first essay (”IPRs, Innovation, Imitation
and Offshoring: The Case of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry”), using a panel of 354
Indian pharmaceutical firms over the period 1989 to 2008, I present the adjustments of the
rates of innovation, imitation following the change in the intellectual property rights policy
in India. Based on the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991a and 1991b) and the other
authors who employed their models, one would expect a swift shift in the rates of innovation
and imitation to the new steady state after the policy change. The empirical results presented
in my first essay suggest gradual transitions to the new steady states as the economy doesn’t
adjust immediately to the new steady state.
At the beginning of this chapter I presented the work of Helpman (1993) in analyzing
the short-run and long-run effects of stronger IPRs on innovation in a simpler model with
exogenous imitation. He finds that a reduction in the rate of imitation results in a long run
decline in the rate of innovation and an increase in the fraction of products that have not been
imitated. In the short run though, innovation rises temporarily. Using the framework employed
by Helpman (1993) I analyze in Section 2.3 how the transition between steady states (in terms
of initial jump size and transition time to the new steady state) depends on parameters of
the model. I employ numerical simulations to see how changes in the Northern labor supply,
the unit labor requirement, the subjective discount rate, and the elasticity of demand affect
the transition path. In Appendix F, I analyzed the transition dynamics of imposing stronger
intellectual rights in a similar model with endogenous innovation (quality improvement) and
exogenous imitation based on the Grossman and Helpman (1991b) model. I have shown that
the steady state equilibrium of this model is saddle point stable. The path to the new steady
state is similar with the one when innovations are new varieties. The rate of innovation rises
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temporarily as a result of tighter IPRs and subsequently follows the saddle path to the new
steady state.
Based on the analysis presented in Section 2.4 (when innovations are new varieties) and Ap-
pendix G (when innovations are higher quality levels), a decrease in imitation due to stronger
Southern IPR protection (an increase in the labor requirement for imitation, k) always shifts
production from the South to the North and hence takes Northern labor away from innovation.
Both innovation and imitation fall in the long run (steady state) regardless of the innovation
type. In the short run, stronger Southern IPR protection promotes innovation and discour-
ages imitation for both types of models. In the case of new varieties development, imitation
decreases in the short run followed by a further decrease towards the new steady state. In the
case of quality improvements, imitation decreases in the short run and then increases while
adjusting to the new steady state. At the end of Section 2.4 I show how the transition between
steady states depends on parameters of the model. I employ numerical simulations to see how
changes in the Northern and Southern labor supply, the unit labor requirement in innovation
and imitation, the subjective discount rate, and the elasticity of demand affect the transition
path. When the size of the Northern labor force is large, the time necessary to reach the
new steady state is longer. This result is different from the case with exogenous imitation.
The opposite is true when the Southern labor force is large and the transition to the new
steady state increases. Looking at the unit labor requirement in innovation we can say that
an increase in this value will decrease the recovery time (yielding a different result from the
case with exogenous imitation). Increasing the labor requirement in imitation will prolong
the transition. Changes in the subjective discount rate generate the biggest variations in the
return and recovery times.
In this essay I discussed how changes in the size of the North to the South affect the
transition dynamics of innovation and imitation. In real life both countries experience increases
in their labor force. My next estimations will include an equi- proportional increase in both
countries’ labor supply. Would they cancel each other?
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Chapter 3
Intellectual Property Rights Regimes and
the Choice of Offshoring in the
Pharmaceutical Market
3.1 Introduction
The ”make-or-buy” decision is fundamental to industrial organization. Making a new finished
product requires a firm not only to research and design the good, but it also necessitates the
production or sourcing of its components. For each one of these activities a producer must
decide whether to undertake the activity in-house or to purchase the input or service from
another firm that may be located abroad. This decision of whether to produce in-house or
purchase the good (either the final good or intermediate goods) from lower-cost countries or
countries with better legal institutions can best be understood through the expansion of trade
models to include concepts from industrial organization and contract theory that explain the
vertical organization of production. The combination of trade literature with the industrial
organization literature (regarding the choice of organizational form) represents an important
new area for both theoretical and empirical research. A firm can purchase an input/activity
from a vertically integrated supplier located abroad or can purchase it from an independent
firm located abroad, so-called arm’s length contracting. In this chapter I analyze the choice
of a domestic firm between performing R&D at home, forming a joint venture abroad with an
existing foreign firm and purchasing R&D from abroad. The trade-offs between these three
organizational choices are modeled in Section 3.3.
The theoretical papers analyzing the choice between vertical integration and arm’s length
contracting can be grouped into two categories based how the tradeoff between the two or-
ganizational choices is modeled. An incentive-system approach employed by Grossman and
Helpman (2002, 2004) involves optimal incentive contracts designed by a principal to induce
investment or effort by managers. The property rights approach is employed by Antras (2003)
and Antras and Helpman (2004). This approach emphasizes that ownership and control should
be allocated so as to minimize the loss in surplus due to investment distortions. My work be-
longs to this second strand. The previous author’s work and the connection to my chapter is
presented in the next section of the chapter.
Several papers have observed that offshoring is evolving from manufacturing inputs to busi-
ness services and research and development.1 The R&D offshoring decision of firms represents
an important new area of research. The process of creating knowledge can be the result of
a single firm effort or the result of cooperation between firms. As technology becomes more
advanced it becomes more difficult for individual firms to develop new technologies based on
their own abilities, and the importance of cooperation increases. In the last years, there has
been a significant increase in the number as well as in the forms of cooperative R&D projects.2
Most of the papers on cooperative R&D analyze its main advantages and its potential disad-
vantages. Among the advantages are the internalization of spillovers, the capture of economies
of scale, the diffusion of know-how and R&D output between the partners, or avoidance of the
duplication of efforts. One potential disadvantage pointed out by some authors is that firms
could use cooperation to reduce the competition in the product market, resulting in a wel-
fare loss. Among the authors who contributed to this literature we can mention Katz (1986),
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), and Kamien et al.(1992).
This cooperation is not limited to firms within a country. Firms from different countries
1Campa and Goldberg [1997], and Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi [1998] are a few examples.
2Hagedoorn et al. (2005).
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now join forces in order to develop new products or new technologies of production. Effective
protection of intellectual property rights, through patent laws and their enforcement, reduces
the risk for companies when they engage in various international R&D activities. In general,
any international transaction with a company from a country with a well-established intel-
lectual property rights regime is less likely to be subject to substantial misuse of information
(R&D) than transactions with companies from countries that offer little or no protection. With
R&D cooperation, there is always the risk of unanticipated knowledge leakage and IPR pro-
tection can be expected to be even more important in these than in other international trans-
actions and investments. Pharmaceutical firms are confronted with higher knowledge leakage
hazards and potentially higher subsequent costs when they engage in contractual agreements
with companies from countries with relatively weaker IPR institutions.3 Pisano (1989), Hage-
doorn (2002) and Hagedoorn et al. (2005) argue that the choice of intellectual property rights
protection not only affects the decision of firms to perform cooperative R&D abroad, but also
affects the type of partnership (contracting out R&D or creating joint ventures abroad). Based
on their empirical studies they conclude that joint ventures are expected to be reserved for
circumstances with greater knowledge leakage hazards because they offer managerial and orga-
nizational control and increase the possibilities for adequate monitoring and oversight. Their
work is presented in the next section of the paper.
This chapter brings three important contributions to the literature. First, it provides
theoretical support to the idea that the level of intellectual property rights protection, the
wage gap between the two countries and the fixed cost of establishing a joint venture influence
the type of offshoring. Second, it investigates the role of R&D offshoring over the choice of
organizational structure in international collaboration. When a firm decides to offshore part
of its R&D activity to a different country, the IPR protection in the destination country is
an important concern and firms might choose to form joint ventures in order to have more
control over the collaboration and prevent leakage of information. But the property-rights
aspect of the R&D activity is not the only element that might influence the organizational
3Oxley, Joanne E. (1999).
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choice of an offshoring firm. It has been suggested in the literature4 that firms choose to form
joint ventures in order to take advantage of transfer-pricing opportunities in countries with
less taxation. This is especially true in the case of R&D activity when government authorities
would have a hard time to find a similar arm’s length contract to compare with the joint venture
contract and decide whether or not the price paid for a certain R&D service was overinflated.
In this paper I look at the overall effect of R&D offshoring over the choice of organizational
structure. Third, I analyze data from the pharmaceutical market and find three regularities
that support my theoretical model. The first finding is that the strength of IPRs protection
in the home country has a significant influence over the decision to form a joint venture or to
sign a contractual partnership. Also, the preference of a company for extra control (forming a
joint venture) is inversely related with the wage gap between the two countries. Lastly, I find
that the fixed cost of establishing a joint venture acts as a deterrent to forming a joint venture
while the nature of the R&D process promotes the formation of joint ventures.
In the model presented below I study the joint effect of different regimes of intellectual
property rights protection, the wage gap and the fixed cost of starting a business on the
preference of companies for particular forms of international R&D partnership. In particular,
I look at the choice for either international joint ventures or contractual international sourcing,
also known as contract research and manufacturing services(CRAMS). In this context, I pay
attention to a number of specific issues that refer to the international differences in intellectual
property rights protection and the different forms of international partnership.
According to the model, lower wages in the South and higher wages in the North are
important incentives for offshoring but these are not the only factors that influence a company’s
offshoring decision. For a given wage gap between the two countries, weaker IPR (a higher
probability of imitation) in the destination country and a higher fixed cost required by the
participation (in the case of joint venture) will provide a lower incentive for international
collaboration. When choosing between the two offshoring strategies, a Northern firm will face
a tradeoff between the benefits of lower imitation risks associated with creating a joint venture
4Antras, Pol and Helpman, Elhanan (2004).
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and the local costs of establishing the joint venture.
I test these predictions using country-level data and a binomial logit estimation technique.
I use partnership data regarding the pharmaceutical industry for a panel of 89 countries over
the period 1990 to 2009. These data are part of the SDC Platinum dataset. I combine this
information with the Ginarte-Park index as a measure for IPR protection, wage data from the
Yearbook of Labour Statistics (at 3 digit industry level, where available) and the number of
days it takes to start a business from the World Bank Group.
The pharmaceutical industry provides an interesting example given the importance that
IPR protection has in this sector and the changes that took place in the last twenty years in
terms of IPR protection across the world. In 1995, signatories to the TRIPs agreement agreed
as a condition of membership in WTO to grant product patents by 2005 for pharmaceutical
innovations. Since 2005, firms from signatory countries have not been able to sell reverse-
engineered (copied) products under patent protection. Their activity is limited to developing
new products, producing under licence and manufacturing off-patent products or bulk prod-
ucts. Firms in developing countries expand their reach towards other markets by purchasing
plants abroad or by forming joint-venture with local foreign firms. 5 For example, Ranbaxy of
India has purchased production facilities in seven foreign countries (China, Ireland, Malaysia,
Nigeria, Romania, U.S.A. and Vietnam). In South Africa, it formed a subsidiary with a local
firm (Adcock Ingram) to promote sales of their products on the local market. This is a very
common strategy for Indian firms to speed up market approvals and improve customer accep-
tance of their products. Cipla of India formed joint ventures with Eli Lilly (to sell products in
U.S.), Novopharm (to sell products in Canada) and Enaleni Pharmaceuticals Limited (to sell
products in South Africa). Lupin of India collaborates with Merck Generics (to sell products
in U.K.) and McGaw Inc. (to sell products in U.S.). Collaboration between local firms and
multinational companies is not limited to production or marketing. Recent collaboration was
targeted towards research and development of new products. For example, Ranbaxy has a
global alliance with GlaxoSmithKline Plc. regarding research and development activities and
5These facts are drawn from Smith (2002)
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with Eli Lilly regarding clinical trials of drugs. Although the 1995 changes in IPR protection
across the world should have increased the international cooperation between firms, data pre-
sented in the SDC Platinum database depicts a different situation. After 1995 the number of
international agreements sharply decreased reflecting the idea that some firms postponed their
cooperation plans until the new legislation is implemented in 2005. In 2005 the number of
international agreements increases but it doesn’t reach the previous level because of the global
economic crisis that followed. The figure below shows a relative constant fraction of R&D
contracts in the total number of international agreements suggesting that the change was not
skewed towards R&D contracts.
Figure 3.1: International agreements
The literature review is presented in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 describes the model.
Section 3.4 presents data and a discussion the estimation results. Concluding remarks are
made in Section 3.5. In the Appendix H I present a special case of demand which allows me to
to pinpoint the analytical relationship between the choice of organizational structure and the
IPR protection, the wage gap between countries and the cost of starting a business. Tables
describing the variables and the estimation results are shown in Appendix I.
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3.2 Literature review
In the recent years there is a growing role for multinational corporations in the global economy
and these multinational firms explore more complex integration strategies. These developments
generated an increased interest in new theoretical approaches designed to better understand
how firms organize production on a global scale. In developing these complex offshoring
strategies firms decide where to locate the production of different parts of their value chains
and also on the extent of their control over these activities. Which activities should they locate
in the home country and which should they offshore? If they choose to offshore, should they
engage in an equity-based international partnership and import intermediate inputs within
their firm boundaries or should they offshore the production to independent foreign suppliers?
This paper studies the effect of different regimes of intellectual property rights protection
on the preference of companies for particular forms of international R&D collaborations. It
particularly looks at the choice for either equity-based international R&D joint ventures or
contractual international R&D activities. In this context, I should focus my attention to a
number of specific issues that refer to the international differences in intellectual property
rights protection and the differences between these two forms of international R&D activities.
As mentioned before the literature analyzing the choice between vertical integration and
arm’s length contracting can be grouped in two categories based on how the tradeoff between
the two organizational choices is modeled. The first group models the tradeoff within the
context of a principal-agent model while the second group models the tradeoff as a function of
property rights. As part of the first group, Grossman and Helpman (2002) address the choice
between outsourcing and integration in a one-input general equilibrium framework, assuming
that all firms of a given type are equally productive. Firms face the friction of incomplete
contracts in arm’s-length relationships, which they weigh against the less efficient production
of inputs in integrated companies. As a result, some sectors have only vertically integrated
firms whereas others have only ”arm’s-lenght” agreements. Grossman and Helpman (2004)
extend upon their previous paper by connecting it with previous research on the organization
of the firm and optimal design of contracts for managers. In this paper principals are unable
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to monitor all of the actions undertaken by their agents and the ability to monitor varies with
proximity. The principal faces the choice of whether to engage the agent as manager or supplier
in its home country or to seek to import the intermediate inputs from a subsidiary or supplier
located in a foreign land. The manager receives a non-negative wage provided that he performs
satisfactorily on tasks that the principal can monitor and a bonus that he receives if the project
succeeds. In an outsourcing relationship (either domestic or international), the agent receives
a payment from the principal that will be paid no matter how the project turns out and an
amount that will be paid in return for delivery of acceptable components. They conclude
that a principal may benefit from engaging an external supplier to manufacture components
because this agent has more at stake (he bears the cost of the inputs needed to manufacture
components) and the cost to the principal to induce very high level of effort is less than for
an employee. The advantage of in-house production stems from the greater opportunity for
the principal to monitor the actions of the agent. In my chapter I consider the idea that
weak intellectual property rights protection in a country is the source of possible information
leakage and loss of profits rather than an agent performing poorly due to the inability of the
principal to monitor its actions due to proximity issues like in Grossman and Helpman (2002,
2004). In my essay a firm benefits from having an arm’s-length supplier by avoiding the fixed
costs of creating a joint venture but faces a higher risk of information leakage if there is weak
protection of IPRs in the destination country. The advantage of forming a joint venture with
a foreign firm stems from the greater opportunity for the firm to monitor the actions of the
joint venture.
As part of the second group of organizational choice literature, Antras (2003) focuses on
the tradeoff between vertical integration and offshoring when relationship-specific investments
are distorted because enforceable agreements take place only ex-post or after investment is
sunk. The surplus or economic rent created by the relationship is distributed through ex-post
Nash bargaining. The ownership of assets is fundamental for each party’s incentive to invest,
since it determines the residual rights of control and hence the outside option or threat point
of each party. Antras (2003) develops a property-rights model of the boundaries of the firm
and embeds it into a general equilibrium monopolistic competition model of trade in which
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countries differ in their endowments of labor and capital. The model explains trade based
on differences in endowments of factors across countries and monopolistic competition arising
from consumer demand for variety. He provides evidence that capital-intensive intermediate
goods, such as chemical products, tend to be imported into the US within the boundaries of
multinational firms, while labor intensive goods, such as textiles, are imported from unaffiliated
parties. Also, the capital-labor ratio in the exporting country is a positive function of the share
of intrafirm imports by multinationals as a proportion of total U.S. imports. Thus U.S. imports
from capital abundant countries, such as Switzerland, tend to involve multinationals, whereas
imports from capital scarce countries, such as Egypt, occur mostly at arms length. To explain
these results, Antras (2003) assumes a continuum of varieties of final goods in each of two
sectors, which differ by capital intensity due to a requirement for a specialized intermediate
input produced with both capital and labor. The opening of trade leads to an integrated
world economy in which factor prices are equalized, but since final goods are assumed to be
non-tradeable, the entire volume of world trade is in intermediate inputs.
In order to address the question of why multinational firms engage in different integration
strategies Antras and Helpman (2004) developed a two-country model of international trade.
Firms in the North develop differentiated products and they decide whether to integrate the
production of intermediates or outsource them. In either case firms have to decide in which
country to source these inputs, in the high-cost North or the low-cost South. In choosing
between a domestic and a foreign supplier of parts, a final good producer faces a tradeoff
between the benefits of lower variable costs in the South and the benefits of lower fixed costs
in the North. On the other hand, in choosing between vertical integration and outsourcing
(either domestic or international), the final good producer has to decide between the benefits
of ownership advantage from vertical integration and the benefits of better incentives for the
independent supplier of parts. These tradeoffs induce firms with different productivity levels
to sort by organizational form. They find that high productivity firms acquire intermediate
inputs in the South whereas low productivity firms acquire them in the North. Among firms
that source their inputs in the same country, the low productivity firms outsource whereas
the high productivity firms insource. The cost structure of my chapter is similar to the model
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presented by Antras and Helpman (2004): Northern firms face lower variable costs in the
South. However, they only face fixed costs if they decide to form a joint venture rather
than contracting out their activities. When choosing between forming a joint venture and
contracting out, the Northern firms weighs the benefits of better monitoring advantage due
to ownership in the joint ventures agasint the benefits of no fixed costs for the arm’s-length
contracts. These tradeoffs induce firms to offshore their activities if the wage gap between
North and South is large enough. Firms that offshore their activities choose to organize as
joint ventures if there is weak protection of IPRs in the destination country or to contract
activities at arm’s-length if the costs of forming joint venture are high or there is strong
protection of IPRs in the destination country.
On the empirical side this paper builds on a number of previous studies, such as Ginarte
and Park (1997), Briggs (2007), Pisano (1989), Oxley (1999) and Hagedoorn et al. (2005).
Ginarte and Park (1997) construct an index of patent rights for 110 countries for the period
1960–1990. The index is used to examine what factors or characteristics of economies de-
termine how strongly patent rights will be protected. The evidence does indicate that more
developed economies tend to provide stronger protection. But the underlying factors which
influence patent protection levels are the country’s level of research and development (R&D)
activity, market environment, and international integration, which are correlated with its level
of development. Building on the index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997), Briggs (2007)
investigates the validity of a previous conclusion in the IPRs literature that the optimal choice
of IPRs will first decrease as a country develops before it increases. She concludes that the
known U-shape is a result of cross-country differences originating in the year that each country
first chooses to implement IPRs, rather than a result of a longitudinal trend. Countries usually
maintain or increase IPRs over time as they progress through stages of development. In my
paper I employ the Ginarte and Park index to account for differences across countries that
might influence the offshoring decision of pharmaceutical firms.
Pisano’s (1989) study considered intellectual property rights protection and the preference
for particular forms of inter-firm partnership in the US biotechnology industry. His study sug-
gests that companies prefer equity-based partnerships to contractual agreements when they
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are confronted with higher levels of specific knowledge transfer, when uncertainty surrounding
partnerships increases. Oxley’s (1999) study on a set of questions similar to the ones I have
presented gives an analysis of the choice between equity and contractual partnerships from
the perspective of US companies within a limited number of high-tech sectors. Her study in-
dicates that in international partnerships established during the 1980s both the nature of the
actual transactions within a partnership and the ’quality’ of the institutional environment for
intellectual property rights protection affect the preference for equity or contractual partner-
ships. When US companies were partnering companies from countries with weaker intellectual
property rights protection standards, they preferred to enter into an equity-based partnership
rather than engage in a contractual agreement.
Following the direction of Oxley (1999), I analyze intellectual property rights protection
and the preference of companies for particular forms of international partnerships for the phar-
maceutical industry for companies from a large number of countries. This study contains over
11,000 international partnerships from 89 countries. My research focuses on the period from
the 1990 to the end of 2009 when intellectual property rights protection, and in particular
patent-related property rights protection, appeared to diverge substantially between many
countries at different levels of economic and technological development. My contribution high-
lights a number of important aspects of the international strategic behavior of companies and
their choices with regard to the form of international partnering in the context of intellectual
property rights protection.
Hagedoorn et al.(2005) extended the work of Oxley (1999). They categorize the R&D
cooperation activities as two forms of partnership: joint ventures and contractual R&D part-
nerships. Joint ventures are separate organizational units created and controlled by a parent
company. Joint ventures represent a relatively high level of hierarchical control, as parent
companies share formal control over the joint venture through equity sharing. In general, the
ownership structure of joint ventures is determined by equity participation through the ex-ante
allocation of ownership shares to the parent companies. This generates a governance structure
where the sponsoring companies can monitor the activities of the joint venture as they are
represented on the board of directors. Contractual R&D activities, such as joint R&D pacts
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and R&D purchases, cover R&D activities of one or more companies on a project basis. Such
undertakings imply the temporary sharing of some R&D resources in R&D projects or R&D
programs for which companies agree on the shared input of human resources, technologies, lab-
oratories and equipment. Compared with R&D joint ventures, contractual R&D partnerships
are characterized by a lower level of hierarchical control.
Hagedoorn et al.(2005) analyze a sample of 2,005 international R&D partnerships, taken
from the MERIT-CATI databank6 These 2,005 partnerships are sponsored by 1956 companies
from 53 countries. Of these international R&D partnerships, 35% are joint ventures and 65%
are contractual R&D partnerships. They test the hypotheses that differences in the regime of
intellectual property rights protection in the home countries of partnering companies and the
sectoral level of technological change influence the preference for an equity R&D joint venture
or a contractual R&D partnership. The estimation method is a binomial logit analysis. They
find that international differences in intellectual property rights protection are a significant
factor in the choice of R&D cooperation: with less secure protection, firms choose R&D joint
ventures rather than contractual partnerships. The level of technological change in industries
has an inverse effect on the preference for international R&D joint ventures.
Following Hagedoorn et al. (2005) I employ a theoretical model to study the joint effect
of different regimes of intellectual property rights protection, the wage gap and the fixed cost
of starting a business on the preference of companies for particular forms of international
R&D partnership. In particular, I look at the choice for either international joint ventures or
contractual international sourcing. In this context, I pay attention to a number of specific issues
that refer to the international differences in intellectual property rights protection and the
different forms of international partnership. In order to test the conclusions of the theoretical
model, in this section I look at the determinants of international partnership in 89 countries
over the period 1990 to 2009.
6The MERIT-CATI database is a literature-based database that draws on sources such as newspapers,
journal articles, books, and specialized journals that report on business events. The MERIT-CATI databank
contains information on thousands of technology-related inter-firm partnerships in various sectors, ranging from
high-technology sectors such as pharmaceutical biotechnology to less technology-intensive sectors such as food
and beverages. This database includes business alliances with an R&D or technology component such as joint
research or development agreements, R&D contracts, and equity joint ventures.
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3.3 The Model
Pharmaceutical firms, in an attempt to reduce operating costs, are turning towards different
R&D offshoring strategies that take advantage of less expensive skilled labor in countries like
India. Intellectual property protection plays an important role in determining the conditions
under which a certain type of R&D offshoring will take place. We consider two models of R&D
offshoring: joint ventures and purchased R&D (CRAMS - contract research and manufacturing
services). In this section we assume that firms choose the price that will maximize their profits
for each one of the three alternatives: perform R&D at home, buy R&D from a Southern firm,
or form a joint venture with a Southern firm.
Northern firms can perform R&D in the North or they can offshore the activity in the South
in order to take advantage of lower labor costs. If offshoring is attractive, then the Northern
firm has to choose between a joint venture and purchased R&D. If the Northern firm will keep
R&D at home, there will be no risks but the costs (wages) will be higher. When creating a joint
venture, the Northern firm will have to pay a fixed cost and will face the probability µ that
imitation will occur and that the research results will be available to at least one competitor
(given that firms compete in prices, this will drive the rent associated with this research to
zero). If the Northern firm decides to purchase R&D from a Southern firm, it will face the
risk of being imitated (γ) and will not have to pay the fixed costs. In this case, the risk of
imitation can be thought as the Southern firm selling the R&D to a competitor. The profits
associated with these activities will depend on prices charged, quantity sold (products based
on that technology), risks and costs.
The two imitation probabilities are decreasing functions of IPR strength. Considering a
simple linear functional form we assume that:
γ = 1− ρ IPR (3.1)
µ = 1− η IPR, where IPR ≥ 0, and ρ, η ∈ [0, 1] (3.2)
When the two offshoring strategies face the same risk of imitation, the Northern firm will
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prefer to buy the R&D from the South (if it gives higher profits than doing research at home)
because it avoids paying the fixed costs associated with joint venture. If the inequality holds
as equality, then the Northern Firm is indifferent between creating a joint venture and buying
R&D from the South. In order for joint venture to exist, the risk of imitation when buying
the R&D (γ) has to be bigger than the risk of imitation when creating a joint venture (µ).
To overcome the advantage that buying R&D has over forming a joint venture (the fixed
costs), we can assume that firms will be better able to better avoid imitation for a weak level
of IPR in the case of joint ventures as opposed to buying R&D from the South. Considering
the functional form for the two types of imitation (γ = 1 − ρ IPR, and µ = 1 − η IPR), the
above assumption can be seen as µ having a steeper slope than γ (meaning that η > ρ, where
ρ, η ∈ [0, 1]). This relationship corresponds to the idea that in a joint venture the Northern
firm has a better control over the R&D process for any given level of intellectual property
rights. 7 As the protection of intellectual property rights strengthens, the risk of imitation
decreases for both types of offshoring but the change is faster in the case of a joint venture.
This relationship is depicted in figure 3.2 below.
Figure 3.2: IPRs and the risk of imitation
7Hagedoorn et al. (2005).
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A firm that successfully performed R&D resulting in an innovation chooses the price that
will maximize its profits. A Northern firm that successfully performed R&D at home, will earn
the following profits:
piH = (pN − wN )xN (3.3)
Consider that there is uncertainty about the demand for the firm‘s product such that the
demand is given by xN = α−βpN + ε. This linear demand has an independent and identically
distributed error term ε that takes on a normal distribution: ε ∼ N(0, σ)
Substituting in the demand, we can rewrite the profits as
piH = (pN − wN )(α− βpN + ε) (3.4)
Firms maximize their expected profits by choosing the optimal price. The first order
conditions for the home production choice are:
∂E(piH)
∂pN
= α− β · 2pN + wNβ = 0 (3.5)
2βpN = α+ wNβ =⇒ pN = α+ wNβ
2β
(3.6)
Therefore, by substituting the optimal price back into the profit function we find that
piH =
(
α+ wNβ
2β
− wN
)(
α− βα+ wNβ
2β
+ ε
)
=
(
α
2β
+
wN
2
− wN
)(
α− α
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=
=
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=
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=
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+
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2β
+
wN
2β
4
− wNε
2
(3.7)
Similar calculations can be done for the joint venture alternative. The profit function in
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this case is
piJV = (1− µ)(pN − wS)xN − F (3.8)
As before, there is uncertainty about the firm‘s demand xN = α − βpN + ε. Taking into
account the demand function we can rewrite the profits of a joint venture as
piJV = (1− µ)(pN − wS)(α− βpN + ε)− F (3.9)
Firms maximize their expected profits by choosing the optimal price. The first order
conditions for the joint venture production choice are:
∂E(piJV )
∂pN
= (1− µ) (α− β · 2pN + wSβ) = 0 (3.10)
2βpN = α+ wSβ =⇒ pN = α+ wSβ
2β
(3.11)
Therefore, by substituting back into the profit function the optimal price we find that
piJV = (1− µ)
(
α+ wSβ
2β
− wS
)(
α− βα+ wSβ
2β
+ ε
)
− F
= (1− µ)
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)
− F =
= (1− µ)
(
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− αwS
2
+
αε
2β
+
wS
2β
4
− wSε
2
)
− F (3.12)
The last alternative is buying R&D from the South. The profit function in this case is
piBUY = (1− γ)(pN − wS)xN (3.13)
As before, there is uncertainty about the firm‘s demand xN = α − βpN + ε. Taking into
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account the demand function we can rewrite the profits of a firm buying R&D as
piBUY = (1− γ)(pN − wS)(α− βpN + ε) (3.14)
Firms maximize their expected profits by choosing the optimal price. The first order
conditions are:
∂E(piBUY )
∂pN
= (1− γ) (α− β · 2pN + wSβ) = 0 (3.15)
2βpN = α+ wSβ =⇒ pN = α+ wSβ
2β
(3.16)
Therefore, by substituting back into the profit function the optimal price we find that
piBUY = (1− γ)
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(3.17)
A Northern Firm will choose to create a joint venture over performing R&D at home if:
piJV > piH
(1− µ)
(
α2
4β
− αwS
2
+
αε
2β
+
wS
2β
4
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α
2
+ ε) + (
α+ ε
2
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4
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2 − wS2) + µwS2) > F (3.18)
Lower wages in the South and higher wages in the North are an important cause for
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offshoring but these are not the only decision factors when it comes to offshoring. For a given
wage gap between the two countries, weaker IPR (a higher probability of imitation µ) in the
destination country and a higher fixed cost required by the participation in the joint venture
will provide a lower incentive for collaboration. If the inequality holds as equality, then the
Northern Firm is indifferent between creating a joint venture and performing R&D at home.
A Northern Firm will choose to buy R&D from the South over performing R&D at home
if:
piBUY > piH
(1− γ)
(
α2
4β
− αwS
2
+
αε
2β
+
wS
2β
4
− wSε
2
)
>
>
α2
4β
− αwN
2
+
αε
2β
+
wN
2β
4
− wNε
2
−γα
2β
(
α
2
+ ε) + (
α+ ε
2
)((wN − wS) + γwS)−
−β
4
((wN
2 − wS2) + γwS2) > 0 (3.19)
Buying R&D from the South allows the Northern firm to avoid paying the fixed cost of a
joint venture, but the firm will face a higher risk of imitation. For a given wage gap between
the two countries, weaker IPR (a higher probability of imitation γ) in the destination country
will provide a lower incentive for collaboration. If the inequality holds as equality, then the
Northern Firm is indifferent between buying R&D from the South and performing R&D at
home.
A Northern Firm will choose to create a joint venture over buying R&D from the South if:
piJV > piBUY
(1− µ)
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When the two offshoring strategies face the same risk of imitation, the Northern firm will
prefer to buy the R&D from the South (if it gives higher profits than doing research at home)
because it avoids paying the fixed costs associated with joint venture. If the inequality holds
as equality, then the Northern Firm is indifferent between creating a joint venture and buying
R&D from the South. In order for a joint venture to exist, the risk of imitation when buying
the R&D (γ) has to be bigger than the risk of imitation when creating a joint venture (µ).
To illustrate the connection between the theoretical model and the estimations we rewrite
the profits of each one of the three alternatives (perform R&D at home, buy R&D from a
Southern firm or form a joint venture with a Southern firm) in the following form:
piH =
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4β
− αwN
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4
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=
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α2
4β
− α
2
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β
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Z2H + εH =
= ZHΦH + εH (3.21)
Where ZH = (Z0H , Z1H , Z2H , Z3H) = (1,wN , wN
2, F) and ΦH = (
α2
4β ,−α2 , β4 , 0)
Likewise, the profits of a Northern firm forming a joint venture with a Southern firm can
be written:
piJV = (1− µ)(α
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αε
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+
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β
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Z2JV − FZ3JV + εJV =
= ZJV ΦJV + εJV (3.22)
Where ZJV = (Z0JV , Z1JV , Z2JV , Z3JV ) = (1− µ,wS(1− µ), wS2(1− µ), F) and ΦJV =
(α
2
4β ,−α2 , β4 , -1)
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At last, in the case of buying R&D from a Southern firm the Northern profits can be
written:
piBUY = (1− γ)(α
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− αwS
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αε
2β
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wS
2β
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− wSε
2
) =
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4β
(1− γ)− α
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Where ZBUY = (Z0BUY , Z1BUY , Z2BUY , Z3BUY ) = (1− γ,wS(1− γ), wS2(1− γ), F) and
ΦBUY = (
α2
4β ,−α2 , β4 , 0)
Given the above-mentioned profit functions, a Northern firm’s choice probability for form-
ing a joint venture is:
qJV = Pr[ZJV ΦJV + εJV > ZjΦj + εj ; j 6= JV ] (3.24)
When a Northern firm chooses to form a joint venture, this probability is higher than the
probability of any other alternative.
If we assume that the error term are distributed with the extreme value distribution, the
choice probability to form a joint venture is:
qJV =
eZJV ΦJV
eZHΦH + eZBUY ΦBUY + eZJV ΦJV
(3.25)
Applying the log-odds transformation relative to the alternative of buying R&D from a
Southern firm yields:
ln
(
qJV
qBUY
)
= ln
(
eZJV ΦJV
eZBUY ΦBUY
)
= (ZJV ΦJV − ZBUY ΦBUY ) + u (3.26)
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where u = εJV − εBUY .
Assuming that
E(u|ZJV , ZBUY ) = 0 (3.27)
the log-odds transformation becomes the linear mean regression model
E
(
ln
(
qJV
qBUY
)
|ZJV , ZBUY
)
= ZJV ΦJV − ZBUY ΦBUY (3.28)
Likewise, the log-odds transformation of the probability to form a joint venture relative to
the alternative of home production yields:
E
(
ln
(
qJV
qH
)
|ZJV , ZH
)
= ZJV ΦJV − ZHΦH (3.29)
And last, the log-odds transformation of buying R&D from a Southern firm relative to the
alternative of home production yields:
E
(
ln
(
qBUY
qH
)
|ZBUY , ZH
)
= ZBUY ΦBUY − ZHΦH (3.30)
The choice between each one of the three alternatives (perform R&D at home, buy R&D
from a Southern firm or form a joint venture with a Southern firm) depends on the Northern
wage, Southern wage, the fixed cost of establishing a joint venture and the demand for the
product. In the empirical part I only observe the two offshoring strategies. Given how the risk
of imitation was defined in this paper and if we ignore the fixed cost of establishing a joint
venture, a Northern firm will always prefer to form a joint venture over buying R&D from
the South. Once we take into account the fixed cost, a Northern firm might prefer to buy the
R&D from the South because it avoids paying the fixed costs associated with joint venture.
3.4 Data and Estimation
In order to test the conclusions of the theoretical model, in this section I look at the deter-
minants of international partnership in 89 countries over the period 1990 to 2009. The data
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set used in the paper is from the SDC Platinum database. This dataset provides partnership
information like: company information (e.g., name, nationality, ownership), a description of
the purpose of partnership, nationality and ownership stake in the new entity (in the case
of a joint venture). The previous data set is appended with information about wages. This
information was collected from the Yearbook of Labour Statistics and The International Year-
book of Industrial Statistics. The Ginarte and Park index is used to measured the strength
of intellectual property rights protection across countries. The exchange rates and the GDP
deflator came from the IMF database. The cost of doing business is a measure of the fixed
costs required to start a business in a certain country, and it is reported by The World Bank
Group starting in 2004.
Each partnership has one or more of the following objectives: - manufacturing services
(27%); - marketing services (26%); - licensing services (7%); - research & development services
(20%); - funding services (2%); - software development services (0%); - advertising services
(1%); - retail & wholesale services (14%); - health& development service (3%);
The dependent variable represents the choice of the partnership type. It was defined as
follows:
=1 if the relationship involved equity participation (joint venture)
=0 if there was no equity involved (pure contracts)
The estimation method is a binomial logit analysis where the independent variables are
defined as follows:
IPR protection in the destination country. The measure of a country intellectual property
rights protection is based on the information found in Ginarte and Park (1997).
Wage gap. This ratio measures the difference in the hourly wages (denominated in USD)
across participating countries in a partnership.
Wage gap squared. Based on the model presented in Section 3.3, the wage gap affects a
firm’s organizational decision nonlinearly. A negative sign means that the effect of additional
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units of wage gap on firm’s decision to form a joint venture become increasingly smaller.
Cost of doing business. This measures the number of days required in order to start a business
in a country in a certain year. This index is reported by The World Bank Group starting in
2004. For the first part of the estimations, the 2004 value for each country is considered to be
the value for the previous years as well.
Two of the above mentioned variables are not a perfect fit for what I want to describe. The
Yearbook of Labour Statistics and the International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics collected
data on wages from different types of sources: labor-related establishment census, administra-
tive records, industrial or commercial survey, insurance records, etc. These sources were not
always disaggregated enough to measure only the wages in the pharmaceutical industry. The
second variable in question is the cost of doing business. The number of days required in order
to start a business is not the best measure for the fixed cost of establishing a new business in
a country.
Not all the above explanatory variables are included in each Z’s. But when we calculate the
log-odds transformation of the probability to form a joint venture relative to the alternative
of buying R&D from a Southern firm, they all appear as explanatory variables.
The first hypothesis of the theoretical model was that the preference of a company for extra
control (forming a joint venture rather than a contractual collaboration) is inversely related
with the level of IPR protection. Consistent with this hypothesis, the results presented in
Table I.3 column (1) indicate that the preference of companies for extra control, through a joint
venture mode for international partnering, is inversely related to the strength of intellectual
property rights protection in the home country of their partner. A large IPR measure denotes
strong IPR protection in the destination country. In this case the company will opt for a
contract. Looking at the size of the coefficient for the constant term and comparing it to the
coefficient for the IPR protection it seems that the level of IPR protection has a significant
influence over the decision to form a joint venture or to sign a contractual partnership. In the
case of logit estimation it is difficult to interpret the coefficients (except for the sign). To get
a better understanding of the effects of IPR protection on the form of partnership I calculated
89
the marginal effects.
In the logit regression models, the marginal effect is the slope of the probability curve relat-
ing changes in one independent variable to Pr(JV=1;Z), holding all other variables constant.
Marginal effects provide a good approximation to the amount of change in the dependent
variable that will be produced by a 1-unit change in a specific independent variable. In this
case a 1-unit increase in the level of IPR protection leads to a .2 decrease in the probability of
forming a joint venture.
A second hypothesis of the theoretical model was that the preference of a company for extra
control (forming a joint venture rather than a contractual collaboration) is inversely related
with the wage gap between the two countries. The results indicate a smaller but significant
effect on the decision of firms to have more control and create a joint venture. Looking at the
marginal effect, a 1-dollar increase in the wage gap leads to a .01 decrease in the probability
of forming a joint venture.
A third hypothesis of the model is that the fixed costs of establishing a joint venture act as
a deterrent to forming a joint venture. I employ the index called ”the cost of doing business”
as a proxy for this fixed cost. Unfortunately the data covering this index starts in 2004. To
keep the previous years in my analysis I assumed that the 2004 value is the correct value for
the previous years. The results are presented in Table I.3 column (2). The results indicate
a significant effect on the decision of firms to have more control and create a joint venture.
This result supports the third hypothesis of the theoretical model was that the preference of
a company for extra control (forming a joint venture rather than a contractual collaboration)
is inverse related with the fixed cost of establishing a business in that country. Looking at the
marginal effect, a 1-day increase in the number of days required to start a new business leads
to a .004 decrease in the probability of forming a joint venture. The wage gap kept its sign.
To account for other country specific elements that might influence the decision to form a
joint venture I introduce dummy variables for each country. The results of this estimation are
presented in Table I.3 column (3). Out of the total 11718 observations, 33 observations are
dropped because they perfectly predict success or failure (this is the case for small countries
that have one observation). The international wage ratio becomes statistically insignificant
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but the sign stays the same. The influence of IPR protection and the Cost of doing business
in the destination remain significant but with a lower magnitude. For the next estimation I
introduce dummy variables for each year along with the country dummies. The results of this
estimation are presented in Table I.3 column (4).
To further assess the fit of the most complete model (the specification which includes the
cost of doing business variable and the dummy variables for countries and years) I assigned to
each observation one of the two outcomes of the dependent variable. A positive outcome was
assigned when the model predicted a probability of more than 0.5, and a negative outcome
was assigned if the probability was less than 0.5. The results presented in Table I.4 show a
relatively good fit of the model. In Table I.4, the first row within a cell measures frequency,
the second row column percentage and the third cell percentage.
International collaboration is not limited to manufacturing or marketing but it also includes
research and development. When a firm decides to offshore part of its R&D activity to a
different country, the IPR protection in the destination country is an important concern (which
might not be the situation in the case of marketing offshoring). But the property rights aspect
of the R&D activity is not the only element that might influence the organizational choice of an
offshoring firm. In a recent paper by Pol Antras (2003) it has been suggested that firms choose
to form joint ventures in order to take advantage of transfer-pricing opportunities in countries
with less taxation. This is especially true in the case of R&D activity when government
authorities would have a hard time to find a similar arm’s length contract to compare with the
joint venture contract and decide whether or not the price paid for a certain R&D service was
overinflated. To see whether or not this hypothesis is important I included an R&D dummy
in my estimations.
Table I.5 presents the results of the previous estimations, now including an R&D dummy.
Across the four specifications, the results are consistent with the first hypothesis of the the-
oretical model, that the preference of a company for extra control (forming a joint venture
rather than a contractual collaboration) is inversely related with the level of IPR protection.
The second hypothesis of the theoretical model (that the preference of a company for extra
control is inversely related with the wage gap between the two countries) is also consistent with
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the results from the first two specifications. The results in Table I.5, column (2) support the
third hypothesis of the theoretical model, that the preference of a company for extra control
is inversely related with the fixed cost of establishing a business in that country.
Looking at the size of the coefficient for the R&D dummy it seems that the nature of the
collaboration has a significant influence over the decision to form a joint venture or to sign a
contractual partnership. For a given level of intellectual protection in the destination country,
firms that offshore the R&D activity have a stronger incentive to form a joint venture and
maintain a certain control over the operation than firms that offshore other types of collabora-
tion. This result confirms the importance of the type of collaboration over the organizational
structure of offshoring whether it is because of property rights concerns or transfer-pricing
opportunities.
To account for other country-specific elements that might influence the decision to form
a joint venture I introduce dummy variables for each country. The results of this estimation
are presented in Table I.5 column (3). The international wage ratio becomes statistically
insignificant. The influence of IPR protection and the Cost of doing business in the destination
remain significant but with a lower magnitude. For the next estimation I introduce dummy
variables for each year along with the country dummies. The results of this estimation are
presented in Table I.5 column (4). The results are very similar with the previous estimation.
To assess further the fit of the most complete model I assigned to each observation one
of the two outcomes of the dependant variable. A positive outcome was assigned when the
model predicted a probability of more than 0.5, and a negative outcome was assigned if the
probability was less than 0.5. The results presented in Table I.6 show a relatively good fit of
the model.
The Model presented in Section 3.3 includes the variable ”Wage Gap squared”. To see
whether the wage gap affects a firm’s organizational decision nonlinearly I should have included
the wage gap squared as an independent variable in my regression. The high correlation
(.915) between the variables ”Wage Gap” and ”Wage Gap squared” is the reason why I didn’t
introduce the variable ”Wage Gap squared” in my previous estimations. In order to test the
opportunity of introducing the ”Wage Gap squared” in my estimations I included this variable
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in Table I.7 and I.8. According to the results presented in Table I.7 column (1), the effect
of IPR protection remains significant at a 5% level while wages keep the same sign but their
significance decreased to a 15% level. The negative sign for the coefficient of wage gap squared
means that the effect of additional units of wage gap on firm’s decision to form a joint venture
become increasingly smaller. For nested models (in my case the specification in Table I.7
column 1 is the full specification while the null specification is presented in Table I.3 column
1) we can use the likelihood ratio test to determine whether the addition of more independent
variables achieves a significant increase in the explanatory power compared with a null model
with fewer independent variables. The chi-squared test statistic is small (LR chi2(1)=2.48)
indicating only a very small increase in the explanatory power. The probability of receiving a
χ2 value of 2.48 or higher in the sample is relatively big when the Wage Gap squared coefficient
is zero. In this case we can be fairly certain that the Wage Gap squared coefficient is zero.
Using the likelihood ratio test to compare the full specification in Table I.7 column 2 with
the null specification from Table I.3 column 2, we find a small chi-squared test statistic (LR
χ2 (1)=17.30) but the probability of receiving this value or higher is very small. In this case
we can say that the Wage Gap squared coefficient is not zero. Locking at the results in Table
I.7 column 1, the introduction of the Wage Gap squared variable results in a change of sign
for the coefficient on the Wage Gap. The introduction of country dummies (Table I.7 column
3) and time dummies (column 4) reverts the sign for the coefficient on the Wage Gap to
negative. However the effect is not statistically significant. The likelihood ratio test for the
models presented in Table I.7 column 3 and 4 (compared with the results in Table I.3) show
very small test statistics (LR chi2(1)=.27 and .19 respectively) which indicates a very small
increase in the explanatory power following the introduction of the Wage Gap squared variable.
The results presented in Table I.8 followed the pattern discuss for the Table I.7. The
introduction of both the Wage gap squared and the Cost of doing results in a change of sign
for the coefficient on the Wage Gap.
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3.5 Conclusions
In exploring the conditions leading to international offshoring under incomplete contracts, new
models explained trade based on differences in endowments of factors across countries and mo-
nopolistic competition arising from consumer demand for variety. Some of the papers analyzing
the choice between vertical integration and arm’s length contracting used a property rights
approach (like Antras (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004)) that emphasizes that ownership
and control should be allocated so as to minimize the loss in surplus due to investment dis-
tortions. Thus if two agents each make an investment relevant to a different dimension of the
business, ownership should be given to just one of the agents (vertical integration), or the two
dimensions of the business should be separated (non-integration or outsourcing), depending
on which arrangement minimizes the loss in surplus. Another approach was the incentive sys-
tems employed by the Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2004). This approach involves optimal
incentive contracts designed by a principal to induce investment or effort by managers. My
paper looks at how institutions (the property rights protection in a country), the enforcement
of contracts in a foreign country, the cost of doing business in that country and the wage gap
between countries are explanations for different international offshoring strategies.
Regarding the choice of offshoring strategy, the outcomes vary based on differences between
the intensity of intellectual property rights, the cost of starting a business in a country and the
wage gap between North and South. The theoretical model shows how weak IPR protection
in the destination country provides incentive to form a joint venture and maintain a better
control over the collaboration. Stronger IPR combined with lower costs of establishing a joint
venture stimulate contracts at arm’s - length. A big wage gap between North and South might
offset the risk of imitation and provide sufficient incentives for firms investing in countries
with weak IPR protection to forgo the option of joint ventures and pursue contracts at arm’s
- length.
On the empirical side, the estimation shows that international intellectual property rights
protection is a significant factor for companies to consider when engaging in international
partnerships. When companies find themselves in an environment with less secure intellectual
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property rights protection, they tend to choose joint ventures rather than contractual partner-
ships. The wage gap between countries and the cost of doing business have a negative effect
on the preference for international joint ventures and the fixed costs of establishing a joint
venture act as a deterent to forming a joint venture, as expected. The R&D activity has a
significant influence over the organizational structure of offshoring. Firms engaging in R&D
offshoring have a greater incentive to form joint ventures than firms offshoring other activities.
This can be due to property rights concerns related to leakage of information in countries with
weak IPR protection or it might be the case that firms choose to form joint venture in order
to take advantage of transfer pricing opportunities in countries with less taxation.
In looking to the future, first I would be focusing on improving my measures for wages
and the costs of doing business. I would also be interested in paying greater attention to the
types of transaction costs observed in international arms length contracts, including the costs
of ensuring payment across international borders. The second direction would be to extend
my analysis to other types of international cooperations: mergers and acquisitions. The SDC
Platinum database has a collection on mergers and acquisitions that wold complement perfectly
my data on joint-ventures and arm’s-length contracts. The third direction would be to do a
two-stage estimation that would account for the anticipated willingness of firms to do R&D in
a joint venture.
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Appendix A
Calculations for Chapter 1
In this annex, I present the calculations behind the differential equations describing the
equilibrium.
Let ζ = nNn .
ζ˙/ζ =
n˙N
nN
− n˙
n
=
n˙− n˙s
nN
− n˙
n
=
n˙
nN
− n˙s
nN
− n˙
n
=
g
ζ
−m− g
ζ˙ = g − (g +m)ζ
In the North: EN = pNnNxN
E˙N
EN
= − aN g˙
LN − aNg + g +
v˙N
vN
piN
vN
=
1− α
αaN
LN − aNg
ζ
g˙ = [(LN/aN − g)] [ρ+m+ g − (1/α− 1)(LN/aN − g)/ζ]
In the South:
n˙S
nS
= m
ζ
1− ζ
The resource constraint becomes:
nSxS = LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ
Since pS =
wS
α and vS = wS(1 + k)aS/nS, then
pS =
vSnS
α(1 + k)aS
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and therefore
p˙S =
1
α(1 + k)aS
(v˙SnS + vSn˙S)
p˙S
pS
=
v˙S
vS
+
n˙S
nS
=
v˙S
vS
+m
ζ
1− ζ
ES = pSnSxS = pS(LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ )
E˙S = p˙S
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ
)
− pSm˙(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ −
pSm(1 + k)aS ζ˙
(1− ζ)2 =
= p˙S
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ
)
− pSm˙(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ −
pSm(1 + k)aS[g − (g +m)ζ]
(1− ζ)2 =
E˙S
ES
=
p˙S
pS
−
m˙(1 + k)aS
ζ
1−ζ
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
− m(1 + k)aS[g − (g +m)ζ]
ζ(1− ζ)
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
)
E˙S
ES
=
v˙S
vS
+m
ζ
1− ζ −
m˙(1 + k)aS
ζ
1−ζ
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
− m(1 + k)aS[g − (g +m)ζ]
ζ(1− ζ)
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
)
r − ρ = v˙S
vS
+m
ζ
1− ζ −
m˙(1 + k)aS
ζ
1−ζ
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
− m(1 + k)aS[g − (g +m)ζ]
ζ(1− ζ)
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
)
piS =
(
1
α
− 1
)
wSxS =
(
1
α
− 1
)
vSnSxS
(1 + k)aS
=
=
1− α
α
vSnS
(1 + k)aS
1
nS
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ
)
piS/vS + v˙S/vS = r
1− α
α
1
(1 + k)aS
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ
)
v˙S
vS
= r
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It follows that:
1− α
α
1
(1 + k)aS
(
LS − m(1 + k)aSζ
1− ζ
)
v˙S
vS
− ρ =
=
v˙S
vS
+m
ζ
1− ζ −
m˙(1 + k)aS
ζ
1−ζ
LS − m(1+k)aSζ1−ζ
− m(1 + k)aS[g − (g +m)ζ]
ζ(1− ζ)
(
LS − m(1+k)aSζ1−ζ
)
m˙ =
1− ζ
ζ
[
ρ+m
ζ
1− ζ −
1− α
α
1
(1 + k)aS
(
LS − m(1 + k)aSζ
1− ζ
)]
LS − m(1+k)aSζ1−ζ
(1 + k)aS
−
− m
(1− ζ)ζ [g − (m+ g)ζ]
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Appendix B
Tables for Chapter 1
Table B.1: Description of variables
Variables Definition
EU patents The number of patent applications filled in the European
Union (based on a dataset maintained by the European Patent
Office). My innovation measure.
Indian patents The number of patent applications filled in India (based on
a dataset maintained by the Technology Information,
Forecasting and Assessment Council)
Indian - EU patents The difference between the number of patent applications filled
in India and the number of EU patent applications. My imitation
measure
Experience This is the previous number of years for which data was
reported.
Employees The total number of employees employed in a company is
reported here.
Wages This includes total expenses incurred by an enterprise on
all employees, including the management. Besides salaries and
wages, items such as payment of bonus, contribution to
employee’s provident fund and staff welfare expenses are also
included under wages.
Individual wages This is the ratio of wages to employees.
R&D These are the revenue and capital expenses incurred by companies
on research and development.
Export services This includes those export earnings which are through the sale
of services outside the country. My offshoring measure.
Total exports This is the total revenue earned from exports of goods and
services. Income earned in foreign currency by way of
interest, dividend, royalties, and consultancy fees is also
included here. Foreign exchange earnings from tourism/air
services are also included in the total export earnings.
Exports of goods are usually in free on board value.
Deemed export sales are included in total exports.
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Import capital This is value of imported capital goods like plant and
machinery, goods etc.
Sales Sales generated by a firm from its main business activity
measured by charges to customers for goods supplied and
services rendered. Excludes income from activities not
related to main business, such as dividends, interest, and
rents in the case of industrial firms, as well as
non-recurring income.
Assets Gross fixed assets of a firm, which includes movable and
immovable assets as well as assets which are in the process
of being installed.
Net profits This is the excess amount of income over all expenses.
Return on Assets Ratio of Net Profits to Assets in a firm, averaged across
firms in that industry.
Private firms Firms majority-owned by a business group and private firms.
Foreign firms Firms incorporated overseas.
Foreign This is a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm was
incorporated overseas.
Relative price The relative price is a weighted average of the top eight
Northern export destinations for Indian products divided
by the Indian price. These are Industrial Product Price Index
for Drugs and pharmaceuticals (SIC 3-digit level) from U.S.A.,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, U.K., Sweden and
Switzerland.The weights are calculated as exports towards an
individual destination relative to all eight destinations, for
each year. Prices are also converted to Indian Rupees.
Interest rate The interest rate on Central State (India) dated securities is
used as a measure for the interest rate.
Data is in constant Rs. Crore (10 Million Rupees), deflated by Wholesale Price
Index (for all goods) from the Office of The Economic Advisor (base year 1997).
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Table B.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Innovation 3.970621 25.22654 0 328
(EU patents)
Indian patents 2.041243 6.823693 0 143
Imitation .9786723 3.155789 0 52
(Indian - EU patents)
R&D Offshoring .4320454 3.452941 0 99.61184
(Services exported)
Relative price 19.55 3.024697 14 27
Interest rate 10.609 2.363711 5.71 13.75
Total Assets 82.78826 224.1568 .0068823 3688.787
Individual wages .0042063 .0043981 .0001070 .0339108
Total Exports 17.66706 79.25586 0 1500.5
Total R&D 2.94509 11.50069 0 327.023
Imported capital 2.663106 7.32123 0 93.99259
Sales 70.36692 166.8117 0 3276
Net profits 6.486414 30.65071 -233.7302 660.54
Experience 3.771455 4.822738 0 19
Foreign dummy .0960452 .294673 0 1
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Table B.3: Industrial Composition - Average Number of Firms
I II III IV
1989 - 1994 1995 - 2000 2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008
Domestic 169 291 283 220
Foreign 23 33 26 17
Full sample 192 324 309 237
Table B.4: Industrial Composition - Average Total Assets
I II III IV
1989 - 1994 1995 - 2000 2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008
Domestic 45.17886 55.97186 75.50408 151.9184
Foreign 76.02136 85.13052 125.4428 273.2017
Full sample 51.08994 58.5602 79.5278 161.6565
Table B.5: Industrial Composition - Average Total Sales
I II III IV
1989 - 1994 1995 - 2000 2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008
Domestic 53.24281 41.14832 63.37358 105.6982
Foreign 137.0886 135.3756 147.4721 213.9474
Full sample 69.28436 49.4707 70.12548 114.3792
Table B.6: Industrial Composition - Average Profits (Net Profits)
I II III IV
1989 - 1994 1995 - 2000 2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008
Domestic 2.339798 1.943105 5.623154 15.04067
Foreign 5.062124 11.16114 16.27654 42.6501
Full sample 2.860738 2.757346 6.47846 17.15138
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Table B.7: Industrial Composition - Return on Assets
I II III IV
1989 - 1994 1995 - 2000 2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008
Domestic 5.37089 .51007 .21011 7.91716
Foreign 8.06275 1.56736 10.94584 11.90998
Full sample 5.80 1.4593 1.07912 8.22891
Table B.8: Industrial Composition - Fraction of Total Number of Firms
I II III IV
1989 - 1994 1995 - 2000 2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008
Domestic 88% 90% 92% 93%
Foreign 12% 10% 8% 7%
Table B.9: Industrial Composition - Fraction of Total Assets
I II III IV
1989 - 1994 1995 - 2000 2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008
Domestic 81% 85% 87% 88%
Foreign 19% 15% 13% 12%
Table B.10: Industrial Composition - Fraction of Total Sales
I II III IV
1989 - 1994 1995 - 2000 2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008
Domestic 74% 73% 82% 86%
Foreign 25% 27% 18% 14%
Table B.11: Industrial Composition - Fraction of Total Net Profits
I II III IV
1989 - 1994 1995 - 2000 2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008
Domestic 77% 61% 79% 82%
Foreign 23% 39% 21% 18%
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Table B.12: Fixed Effects Estimation Results
Innovation Imitation R&D offshoring
(EU patents) (Indian-EU pat.) (exp. serv.)
(19) (19’) (20) (20’) (21) (21’)
Year 1995-2000 2.287748** .2367076** .156781 .1339665** -.1873866 .0447108**
(dummy) (.7914169) (.0216222) (.1991568) (.0271944) (.1769639) (.0178409)
Year 2001-2004 1.643543 .3422859** .0312482 .129913** -.2386413 .0987572**
(dummy) (1.221752) (.0302257) (.3074488) (.038015) (.2731875) (.0249097)
Year 2005-2008 .2815808 .4883179** -1.949215** -.1580306** -.0841127 .1820645**
(dummy) (1.68335) (.0415451) (.423608) (.0522514) (.376389) (.034183)
Rel. price .1950361** .0428999 -.0574432** -.2735137** -.0058506 .015541
(1 year lag) (.0673185) (.0456215) (.0169404) (.0573784) (.0150523) (.0376727)
Interest rate .132504 -.0927159* .1522988 .1422935** .0717238** .0297309
(1 year lag) (.1485588) (.0469895) (.0373842) (.0590989) (.0332144) (.0388003)
Total Assets -.00645** .0318248** -.000978** .0320612** -.0038842** .0428884**
(.0019833) (.01174) (.0004991) (.0147655) (.000437) (.0096703)
Individual wage 795.5617** 38.94711** -36.30721 -2.345278 -4.001243 39.10331**
(119.4741) (3.78737) (30.06516) (4.763391) (26.60948) (3.064134)
Total exports -.0180426** .0785909** -.0013805 .05016** .0439668** .1049378**
(.0055343) (.0089031) (.0013927) (.0111975) (.0010897) (.0071572)
Total R&D .4849346** .3427687** .0880225** .0129023
(.0294069) (.019406) (.0074001) (.0244069)
Experience .3889495** -.0644516** .2130052 .10943** .0475079* -.0464485**
(.1143942) (.0132565) (.0287868) (.0166727) (.0255785) (.0109217)
Foreign firm 2.34255 2.583548** -4.20778** -1.613139** -1.211653 -.8441382**
(dummy) (6.946752) (.336376) (1.748122) (.4230615) (2.410489) (.2774447)
Number of obs. 4254 4253 4254 4253 4253 4253
Adj R-squared 0.9004 0.9147 0.5862 0.7639 0.5781 0.6247
Notes:
*=significant at 10 percent
**=significant at 5 percent
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table B.14: Fixed Effects Estimation Results with fixed firm designation
Innovation Imitation R&D offshoring
(EU patents) (Indian-EU pat.) (exp. serv.)
(19) (19’) (20) (20’) (21) (21’)
Year 1995-2000 2.287748** .2367076 .156781 .1339665** -.1873866 .0447108**
(dummy) (.7914169) (.0216222) (.1991568) (.0271944) (.1769639) (.0178409)
Year 2001-2004 1.643543 .3422859** .0312482 .129913** -.2386413 .0987572**
(dummy) (1.221752) (.0302257) (.3074488) (.038015) (.2731875) (.0249097)
Year 2005-2008 .2815808 .4883179** -1.949215** -.1580306** -.0841127 .1820645**
(dummy) (1.68335) (.0415451) (.423608) (.0522514) (.376389) (.034183)
Rel. price .1950361** .0428999 -.0574432** -.2735137** -.0058506 .015541
(1 year lag) (.0673185) (.0456215) (.0169404) (.0573784) (.0150523) (.0376727)
Interest rate .132504 -.0927159** .1522988** .1422935** .0717238** .0297309
(1 year lag) (.1485588) (.0469895) (.0373842) (.0590989) (.0332144) (.0388003)
Total Assets -.00645** .0318248** -.000978** .0320612** -.0038842 .0428884**
(.0019833) (.01174) (.0004991) (.0147655) (.000437) (.0096703)
Individual wage 795.5617** 38.94711** -36.30721 -2.345278 -4.001243 39.10331**
(119.4741) (3.78737) (30.06516) (4.763391) (26.60948) (3.064134)
Total exports -.0180426** .0785909 -.0013805 .05016 .0439668** .1049378**
(.0055343) (.0089031) (.0013927) (.0111975) (.0010897) (.0071572)
Total R&D .4849346** .3427687 .0880225** .0129023
(.0294069) (.019406) (.0074001) (.0244069)
Experience .3889495** -.0644516** .2130052** .10943** .0475079* -.0464485**
(.1143942) (.0132565) (.0287868) (.0166727) (.0255785) (.0109217)
Foreign firm 29.1058** 1.8489 -4.12485 .1236368 .8689168 1.874231**
(dummy) (10.78201) (.3796388) (2.713248) (.4774733) (2.718789) (.312058)
Imitator 27.36115** 2.000471** 1.009848 1.088741** .8329102 1.826617**
(dummy) (12.24264) (.3701542) (3.080809) (.4655444) (2.675897) (.304263)
Switch firm 22.03448* 1.940606** 3.123761 1.528688** 1.056727 1.866868
(dummy) (11.34781) (.3510905) (2.855629) (.4415679) (2.536691) (.2883776)
Innovator 93.77743** 5.725144** -1.958092 .0011659 1.454485 1.949723**
(dummy) (11.21997) (.3474384) (2.823459) (.4369747) (2.508198) (.2852031)
Number of obs. 4254 4253 4254 4253 4253 4253
Adj R-squared 0.9004 0.9147 0.5862 0.7639 0.5781 0.6247
Notes:
*=significant at 10 percent
**=significant at 5 percent
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table B.15: Fixed Effects Estimation Results without Individual Wages
Innovation Imitation R&D offshoring
(EU patents) (Indian-EU pat.) (exp. serv.)
(19) (19’) (20) (20’) (21) (21’)
Year 1995-2000 2.216552** .2541275** .1600302 .1329175** -.1870402 .064802**
(dummy) (.7957352) (.0218438) (.1991503) (.0271082) (.1769267) (.0181368 )
Year 2001-2004 1.461388 .3823757** .0395613 .1274989** -.2377343 .1448216**
(dummy) (1.228222) (.0303737) (.3073899) (.0376938) (.2730867) (.0251537)
Year 2005-2008 .0991272 .5499022** -1.940888** -.1617391** -.0832436 .2540963**
(dummy) (1.692465) (.0416605) (.4235768) (.0517007) (.3762974) (.0344072)
Rel. price .203128** .0613475 -.0578125** -.2746246** -.0058933 .0354873
(1 year lag) (.067681) (.0461953) (.0169387) (.0573284) (.0150478) ( .0384144)
Interest rate .1459012 -.1011872** .1516874** .1428036** .0716631** .0221133
(1 year lag) (.1493694) (.04761) (.037383) (.059084) (.0332077) (.0395936)
Total Assets -.0040528** .0630428** -.0010874** .0301813** -.0038975** .0773362**
(.0019611) (.0114923) (.0004908) (.0142619) (.000428) (.0094769)
Total exports -.0190063** .0833918** -.0013365 .0498709** .04396358* .1143483**
(.0055631) (.0090097) (.0013923) (.011181) (.0010893) (.0072655)
Total R&D .5030505** .3827524** .0871957** .0104946
(.0294433) (.0192665) (.0073688) (.0239097)
Experience .5281621** -.0663407** .2066519** .1095438** .0467969* -.0503672**
(.1130916) (.0134323) (.0283037) (.0166695) (.0251345) (.0111419)
Foreign firm 2.116113 2.683946** -4.197446** -1.619184** -1.22855 -.7744257**
(dummy) (6.98521) (.3407266) (1.748203) (.4228421) (2.407567) (.2830958)
Number of obs. 4254 4253 4254 4253 4253 4253
Adj R-squared 0.8993 0.9124 0.5862 0.7640 0.5782 0.6091
Notes:
*=significant at 10 percent
**=significant at 5 percent
Standard errors in parentheses
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Appendix C
Figures for Chapter 1
Figure C.1: Transition path for the innovation rate
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Figure C.2: Transition path for the imitation rate
Figure C.3: Transition path for the fraction of goods that have not been imitated
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Figure C.4: The number of EU patent applications per year (for all the firms in the sample)
Figure C.5: The number of EU patent applications per year (domestic vs. foreign firms)
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Figure C.6: The difference between the number of Indian and EU patent applications per year
(where negative is set equal to zero)
Figure C.7: The difference between the number of Indian and EU patent applications per year
(domestic vs. foreign firms)
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Figure C.8: Services Exported (full sample)
Figure C.9: Services Exported (domestic vs. foreign firms)
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Figure C.10: Average ratio of EU to TOTAL number of patents (foreign firms)
Figure C.11: Average ratio of EU to TOTAL number of patents (domestic firms)
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Figure C.12: Patent applications notified for opposition (pharma)
Figure C.13: Patent applications notified for opposition (all industries)
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Appendix D
Appendix for Chapter 2 Section 2.3
These are the calculations that Helpman (1993) used to describe the effect of a decrease
in m on innovation, and the fraction of goods that have not been imitated yet in the short
run and long run. To do so, he first computes the negative eigenvalue and the corresponding
eigenvector of the system.
ζ˙ = g − (g +m)ζ (2.2)
g˙ = (LN − ag) [ρ+m+ g − (1/α− 1) (LN − ag) /ζ] (2.19)
The linearized system of (2.2)-(2.19) is:
 ζ˙
g˙
 =
 a11 a12
a21 a22
 ·
 ζ − ζ¯
g − g¯
 (D.1)
where
a11 = −(m+ g)
a12 = m(m+ g)
a21 =
α
1− α · (ρ+m+ g)
2
a22 = (ρ+m+ g)
(
α
1− α ·
g
g +m
+ 1
)
The solution is:
ζ(t) = ζ¯ + [ζ(0)− ζ]e−λt
g(t) = g¯ − [ζ(0)− ζ]Λe−λt
where −λ equals the negative characteristic root and [1,−Λ]T represents the characteristic
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vector associated with the negative characteristic root, with Λ > 0. By definition A[1,−Λ]T =
−λ[1,−Λ]T , where A is the matrix on the right hand side of (D.1). Since the second row of
the matrix is positive, we have Λ > 0. Helpman (1993) provides explicit formulas for λ and Λ.
The characteristic equation associated with the matrix on the right hand side of (D.1) is:
x2 − (a11 + a22)x+ (a11a22 − a12a21) = 0
Solving for the solution:
x1,2 = (a11 + a22)± [(a11 − a22) + 4a12a21]1/2
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Appendix E
Appendix for Chapter 2 Section 2.4
In this annex, I present the calculations behind the differential equations describing the
equilibrium. Let ζ = nNn .
ζ˙
ζ
=
n˙N
nN
− n˙
n
=
n˙− n˙S
nN
− n˙
n
=
g
ζ
−m− g
ζ˙ = g − (m+ g)ζ (2.30)
In the North:
EN = pNnNxN
Using (2.9), (2.11) and (2.16) we get:
E˙N
EN
= − aN g˙
LN − aNg + g +
v˙N
vN
(E.1)
Using (2.9), (2.14) and (2.16) we get:
piN
vN
=
1− α
αaN
· LN − aNg
ζ
(E.2)
Re-write equation (E.1) using (8), (2.10) and (E.2):
g˙ = (LN/aN − g)
[
ρ+m+ g − (1/α− 1) (LN/aN − g)
ζ
]
(2.31)
In the South:
n˙S
nS
= m
ζ
1− ζ
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The resource constraint becomes:
nSxS = LS −m(1 + k) ζ
1− ζ
Since pS =
wS
α and vS =
wS(1+k)
aS
nS we get:
pS =
vSnS
α(1 + k)aS
p˙S =
1
α(1 + k)aS
(v˙SnS + vSn˙S
p˙S
pS
=
v˙S
vS
+
n˙S
nS
=
v˙S
vS
+m
ζ
1− ζ
Also
ES = pSnSxS = pS
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ
)
E˙S = p˙S
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ
)
− pSm˙(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ −
pSm(1 + k)aS ζ˙
(1− ζ)2 =
= p˙S
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ
)
− pSm˙(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ −
pSm(1 + k)aS [g − (g +m)ζ]
(1− ζ)2
We get
E˙S
ES
=
p˙S
pS
−
m˙(1 + k)aS
ζ
1−ζ
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
− m(1 + k)aS [g − (g +m)ζ]
(1− ζ)2
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
)
=
v˙S
vS
+m
ζ
1− ζ −
m˙(1 + k)aS
ζ
1−ζ
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
− m(1 + k)aS [g − (g +m)ζ]
(1− ζ)2
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
)
But
E˙S
ES
= r − ρ, which implies
r − ρ = v˙S
vS
+m
ζ
1− ζ −
m˙(1 + k)aS
ζ
1−ζ
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
− m(1 + k)aS [g − (g +m)ζ]
(1− ζ)2
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
) (E.3)
(E.4)
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piS =
(
1
α
− 1
)
wSxS =
(
1
α
− 1
)
wSxS
vS
=
1− α
α
vSnS
(1 + k)aS
1
nS
(
LS − ζm(1 + k)aS
1− ζ
)
Since
piS
vS
+
v˙S
vS
= r we get:
1− α
α
· 1
(1 + k)aS
·
(
LS −m(k + 1)aS ζ
1− ζ
)
+
v˙S
vS
= r (E.5)
From (2.25) and (E.5) we get:
1− α
α
· 1
(1 + k)aS
·
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ
1− ζ
)
+
v˙S
vS
− ρ =
=
v˙S
vS
+m
ζ
1− ζ −
m˙(1 + k)aS
ζ
1−ζ
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
− m(1 + k)aS [g − (g +m)ζ]
(1− ζ)2
(
LS −m(1 + k)aS ζ1−ζ
)
m˙ =
1− ζ
ζ
·
ρ+m · ζ
1− ζ −
1− α
α
·
(
LS − ζm(1+k)aS1−ζ
)
(1 + k)aS
 ·
(
LS − ζm(1+k)aS1−ζ
)
(1 + k)aS
− m
ζ(1− ζ) [g − (m+ g)ζ]
(2.32)
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Appendix F
Appendix for Chapter 2 (the Quality
ladder model with exogenous imitation)
This Appendixis based on the quality ladder model developed by Grossman and Helpman
(1991a). The main features of the model are presented in the first part of the section, but the
actual solving method will be different from the original paper in order to allow for analysis
of transitional dynamics.
There are two countries, North and South. Each has a representative consumer (identical
in both countries) and many firms. The Northern firms supply nN goods, while the Southern
firms supply nS goods (nN + nS = 1).
Consumers
Consider an economy with a continuum of goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each good potentially
can be improved an infinite number of times (indexed by qualities ω = 0, 1, 2, . . .). The
increments to quality are common to all products and exogenously given by a parameter
λ > 1. Each good may be supplied in all discovered quality levels.
Higher quality level of products gives more utility. A consumer has additively separable
intertemporal preferences given by lifetime utility
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt log u(t) dt (F.1)
The instantaneous utility is given by the formula:
log u(t) =
∫ 1
0
log
[∑
ω
qω(i)xω(i, t)
]
di (F.2)
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where xω(i, t) is the consumption of quality level ω of product i ∈ [0, 1] at time t, and qω(i) = λω
(at time t = 0, the lowest quality of each product is offered: q0(i) = 1). Although the
summation is over the set of qualities of product i that is available at time t, utility maximizing
consumers will purchase only the product with the lowest price per unit of quality.
Every consumer maximizes discounted utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint
∫ ∞
0
e−R(t)E(t) dt = A(0) +
∫ ∞
0
e−R(t)Y (t) dt (F.3)
where R(t) is the cumulative interest factor up to time t, R(t) =
∫ t
0 r(s) ds, and A(0) is the
value of initial asset holdings. Individuals hold assets in the form of ownership in firms, but
with a diverse portfolio, any capital losses appear as capital gains elsewhere, so only the initial
asset holdings remain. Aggregate labor income of all consumers is Y (t) = LNwN(t) +LSwS(t),
where LNwN(t) is total labor income in the North at time t.
The expenditure flow for consumers at time t is given by
E(t) =
∫ 1
0
[∑
ω
pω(i, t)xω(i, t)
]
di (F.4)
where pω(i, t) is the price of a product i of quality ω at time t.
The consumer’s utility maximization problem can be broken into three stages. In the first
stage, he optimally allocates lifetime wealth across time. In the second stage, he optimally
allocates expenditure at each point in time across products. In the last stage, he allocates
expenditure at each instant for each product across available quality levels. Starting with the
last stage, a consumer will allocate expenditure for each product to the quality level offering
the lowest quality-adjusted price pω(i, t)/λ
ω. He will be indifferent between quality level ω
and quality level ω − 1 if the relative price equals the quality difference pω(i, t)/pω−1(i, t) = λ
(when indifferent he will go for the higher quality level). In the equilibrium only the highest
quality will be sold.
In the second stage, consumers evenly spread expenditure across all products E(i, t) = E(t)
as the elasticity of substitution between any two products is constant at unity. The demand
121
for each good is:
x(i, t) =
E(t)
p(i, t)
(F.5)
where E(t) represents total expenditure at time t and p(i, t) is the lowest quality adjusted
price.
In the first stage, consumers evenly spread lifetime expenditure across time, E(t) = E, as
the utility function for each consumer is time separable and the aggregate prices do not vary
across time. Consumers can borrow at a riskless rate of return (r) determined in equilibrium.
Consumers maximize their utility given the budget constraint. The solution is the standard
differential equation:
E˙(t)
E(t)
= r(t)− ρ (F.6)
where r is the market interest rate and ρ is the common subjective discount rate.
At the steady state, r(t) = ρ , for all t.
Research and Development (R&D)
The model features endogenous and costly R&D. Consumers are willing to pay a premium for
quality which provides an incentive for firms to perform R&D. The R&D success is modeled
as a continuous Poisson process at each point in time, firms are paying a cost for a chance at
winning a payoff. If a firms performs R&D at an intensity ι for an time interval dt, this will
require aιdt units of labor at a cost of waιdt and leads to success with probability ιdt. The
rate of innovation is denoted by g (g ≡ ιnS). The process of imitation is exogenous at rate m.
Consumers are also investors. They solve a portfolio allocation problem. They choose
between shares in profit earning firms and interest bearing bonds with rate of return r. Shares
in firms are risky assets but it is a idiosyncratic risk; there will be a sure return if they diversify
the portfolio shares. In equilibrium, the consumers will be indifferent between different assets
and interest bearing bonds.
The values of typical Northern firms are given by:
vN(t) =
∫ ∞
0
piN(t)e
−R(t) dt (F.7)
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A Northern firm with product that has been copied by the South can expect a gain of
vNιNdt at cost WNaNιNdt by undertaking R&D (innovation) at intensity ιN , where vN is the
value of a typical Northern firm with domestic innovation, and piN is the Northerns firm profit.
This firm chooses its intensity of innovation ιN to maximize its expected gain from R&D:
max
iN≥0
(vN(t)− aNwN)ιN (F.8)
where vN is the reward to successful R&D for a typical Northern firm with domestic innovation
and wNaN is the cost of R&D.
To generate finite rates of innovation, the expected reward for a successful R&D (innova-
tion) should equal the expected R&D cost for each firm:
E(vN) = wNaN (F.9)
Consumers diversify their portfolio such that the expected reward to successful is the average
valuation.
From this point on I suppress the time subscripts for all variables.
Producers
Only Northern firms can innovate. Southern firms imitate at an exogenous rate m. A Northern
firm can sell a newly designed good until a Southern firm imitates it. A Southern firm that
successfully imitates a Northern good can sell the good until another innovation occurs.
All firms are choosing price p to maximize their profits pi = (p−c)x, where c is the marginal
cost and x is sales. Firms are charging monopoly prices (a markup over the marginal cost).
Northern firm always win the price competition until an imitation succeeds.
A Northern firm charges a price λwN , makes sales xN = E/(λwN) and has a marginal cost
wN . The instantaneous profits for these firms are:
piN =
(λwN − wN)E
λwN
= (1− 1/λ)E (F.10)
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Equating the sums of the profit rates and the expected rates of capital gain/loss to the
opportunity cost of funds in each region we derive the no arbitrage conditions (using equation
F.6 and the comments that follow it).
A Northern firm with domestic R&D earns the reward:
piN
vN
+
v˙N
vN
−m = ρ (F.11)
where piN is instantaneous profits for the Northern firm with domestic R&D, vN is its
value, piN/vN is the dividend from holding shares in that firm, v˙N/vN is the rate of appre-
ciation/depreciation of the shares, m is the rate of imitation and ρ is the subjective discount
rate.
The resource market (market clearing conditions)
Northern firms allocate their resources between domestic innovation (R&D) and production
of Northern goods, where LN is the exogenous supply of labor in the North.
aNg + nNxN = LN (F.12)
Southern firms use their resources for the production of imitated goods (where LS is the
exogenous supply of labor in the South).
nSxS = LS (F.13)
Calculations
From (F.12) we can find: xN = (LN − aNg)/nN . Northern firms are charging pN = λwN , so
wN = pN/λ. We can re-write the instantaneous profits:
piN = (pN − wN)xN = (pN − pN/λ)xN = (1− 1/λ)pN(LN − aNg)/nN (F.14)
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From F.9, F.11, F.14 we get:
(λ− 1)(LN − aNg)
nNaN
+
v˙N
vN
= r +m (F.15)
Assume that there are no financial capital flows between the two regions, so that the North
finances investment in R&D entirely with domestic savings. The lack of international capital
mobility implies that the trade account is balanced at every point in time:
EN = pNnNxN = pNnN(LN − aNg)/nN = pN(LN − aNg)
E˙N = p˙N(LN − aNg)− aNpN g˙
E˙N
EN
=
p˙N(LN − aNg)− aNpN g˙
pN(LN − aNg) = −
aN g˙
(LN − aNg) +
p˙N
pN
(F.16)
From F.6, F.16 we get −(aN g˙)/(LN − aNg) + p˙N/pN = r − ρ, and therefore:
r = ρ− (aN g˙)/(LN − aNg) + p˙N/pN (F.17)
We know that pN = λwN , so wN = pN/λ and vN = wNaN , and so pN = λvN/aN and p˙N/pN =
v˙N/vN . Then (F.17) becomes:
r = ρ− (aN g˙)
(LN − aNg) +
v˙N
vN
(F.18)
From F.15 and F.18 we get:
(λ− 1)(LN − aNg)
nNaN
+
v˙N
vN
= ρ− (aN g˙)
(LN − aNg) +
v˙N
vN
+m
g˙ =
(LN − aNg)
aN
·
[
ρ+m− (λ− 1)(LN − aNg)
nNaN
]
(F.19)
We know that nN + nS = 1
n˙N = gnS −mnN = g(1− nN)−mnN = g − (g +m)nN (F.20)
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Equilibrium/ steady state:
The coordinates of the steady state (n¯N , g¯) are solutions of the system:
n˙N = 0
g˙ = 0
The first equation, n˙N = 0, implies:
g − (g +m)nN = 0
nN =
g
g +m
nN = 1− m
g +m
This means that nN is a rational function of g , therefore the graph of nN as a function of g is
a hyperbola with the following asymptotes:
• horizontal asymptote g = −m (which is outside our domain, since −m is negative, and
we consider only at g > 0
• vertical asymptote nN = 1 (which is a natural limit for nN since nN + nS = 1.
The second equation, g˙ = 0, implies:
(LN − aNg)
aN
·
[
ρ+m− (λ− 1)(LN − aNg)
nNaN
]
= 0
Since (LN − aNg) > 0, this gives
ρ+m = (λ− 1)(
LN
aN
− g)
nN
nN = (λ− 1)
(LNaN − g)
ρ+m
This means that nN is a linear function of g , therefore the graph of nN as a function of g
is a straight line which crosses the axes as follows:
• intersects g-axis at g = LN/aN (which is outside our domain)
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• intersects nN -axis at nN = (λ− 1)(LN/aN)/(ρ+m)
Figure F.1: Phase diagram for long run equilibrium - Quality Ladder
The equations of the steady state are:
n¯N =
g¯
g¯ +m
(F.21)
n¯N =
(λ− 1)(LN/aN − g¯)
(ρ+m)
(F.22)
Solve for g¯:
g¯
g¯ +m
=
(λ− 1)(LN/aN − g¯)
(ρ+m)
g¯ · (ρ+m) = (λ− 1)(LN/aN − g¯) · (g¯ +m)
This leads to a quadratic equation in g¯:
(λ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
·g¯2 + [ρ+m+ (λ− 1) · (m− LN/aN)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
·g¯ + [−(λ− 1) ·m · LN/aN ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
= 0
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The discriminant is strictly positive:
∆ = B2 − 4 ·A · C =
=
[
ρ+m+ (λ− 1) ·
(
m− LN
aN
)]2
− 4(λ− 1) ·
[
−(λ− 1) ·m · LN
aN
]
=
=
[
ρ+m+ (λ− 1) ·
(
m− LN
aN
)]2
+ 4 · (λ− 1)2 ·m · LN
aN
> 0
This gives two distinct solutions:
g¯1 =
−B +√∆
2A
g¯2 =
−B −√∆
2A
Note that g¯2 < 0 (even if B < 0, since 4 · A · C > 0 and so |B| <
√
∆): Hence this solution is
irrelevant. We obtain only one relevant solution (g¯1 ), which from here onwards will be called
g¯:
g¯ = g¯1 =
−B +√∆
2A
=
−
[
ρ+m+ (λ− 1)(m− LNaN )
]
2(λ− 1) +
+
√[
ρ+m+ (λ− 1)(m− LNaN )
]2
+ 4 (λ−1)
2mLN
aN
2(λ− 1)
To quantify the effects of an increase in m on the coordinates of the steady state, we compute
∂n¯N
∂m
and
∂g¯
∂m
. We set
∂g¯
∂m
=
∂
√
∆
∂m − ∂B∂m
2(λ− 1) =
1
2
√
∆
∂∆
∂m − ∂B∂m
2(λ− 1) =
∂∆
∂m − 2 ·
√
∆ · ∂B∂m
4(λ− 1)√∆
Since A does not depend on m:
∂∆
∂m
=
∂
∂m
(
B2 − 4 ·A · C) = 2 ·B · ∂B
∂m
− 4 ·A · ∂C
∂m
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Since ∂B∂m = 1 + (λ− 1) · 1 = λ, and ∂C∂m = −(λ− 1) · 1 · LN/aN , we get
∂∆
∂m
= 2Bλ− 4A [−(λ− 1) · LN/aN ] = 2Bλ+ 4(λ− 1)2LN/aN
Therefore
∂g¯
∂m
=
∂∆
∂m − 2 ·
√
∆ · ∂B∂m
4(λ− 1)√∆ =
2Bλ+ 4(λ− 1)2LN/aN − 2 ·
√
∆ · λ
4(λ− 1)√∆ =
=
−2 · (√∆−B) · λ
4(λ− 1)√∆ +
4(λ− 1)2LN/aN
4(λ− 1)√∆ =
−λ√
∆
·
√
∆−B
2(λ− 1) +
(λ− 1)LN/aN√
∆
=
= − λ√
∆
· g¯ + (λ− 1)LN/aN√
∆
=
1√
∆
[(λ− 1)LN/aN − λg¯]
We have obtained an expression for
∂g¯
∂m
:
∂g¯
∂m
=
1√
∆
[
(λ− 1)LN
aN
− λg¯
]
(F.23)
Now compute
∂n¯N
∂m
from (??):
∂n¯N
∂m
=
∂g¯
∂m · (g¯ +m)− g¯
(
∂g¯
∂m + 1
)
(g¯ +m)2
=
m · ∂g¯∂m − g¯
(g¯ +m)2
Use equation (F.23):
∂n¯N
∂m
=
m · 1√
∆
[
(λ− 1)LNaN − λg¯
]
− g¯
(g¯ +m)2
=
m ·
[
(λ− 1)LNaN − λg¯
]
− g¯√∆
(g¯ +m)2
√
∆
=
=
(λ− 1) ·m · LNaN − (λ ·m+
√
∆)g¯
(g¯ +m)2
√
∆
We have obtained an expression for
∂n¯N
∂m
:
∂n¯N
∂m
=
(λ− 1) ·m · LNaN − (λ ·m+
√
∆)g¯
(g¯ +m)2
√
∆
(F.24)
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In equation (F.23) use first equation (F.22), and then equation (F.21):
∂g¯
∂m
=
1√
∆
[
(λ− 1)LN
aN
− λg¯
]
=
(λ− 1)
(
LN
aN
− g¯
)
− g¯
√
∆
=
n¯N(ρ+m)− g¯√
∆
=
=
g¯
g¯+m · (ρ+m)− g¯√
∆
=
g¯ · (ρ+m)− g¯(g¯ +m)
(g¯ +m)
√
∆
=
g¯ · (ρ− g¯)
(g¯ +m)
√
∆
(F.25)
If we write m = m˜− µ with m˜ constant, then a decrease in m is the same as an increase in µ.
Since µ = m˜−m, we see that:
∂g¯
∂µ
=
∂g¯
∂m
· ∂m
∂µ
= − ∂g¯
∂m
This means that when m decreases ( µ increases) there will be an increase in g¯ (the coordinate
of the new steady state) if and only if g¯ > ρ. But we have an equation for g¯:
g¯ = g¯1 =
−B +√∆
2A
=
−
[
ρ+m+ (λ− 1)(m− LNaN )
]
2(λ− 1) +
+
√[
ρ+m+ (λ− 1)(m− LNaN )
]2
+ 4 (λ−1)
2mLN
aN
2(λ− 1)
So given concrete numerical values for the parameters it is an easy computation to determine
whether g¯ > ρ.
Now use this to find
∂n¯N
∂m
from (F.21), by use of equation (F.25):
∂n¯N
∂m
=
∂
∂m
(
g¯
g¯ +m
)
=
∂g¯
∂m · (g¯ +m)− g¯
(
∂g¯
∂m + 1
)
(g¯ +m)2
=
∂g¯
∂m ·m− g¯
(g¯ +m)2
=
=
1
(g¯ +m)2
·
(
g¯ · (ρ− g¯)
(g¯ +m)
√
∆
·m− g¯
)
=
1
(g¯ +m)2
·
(
n¯N · (ρ− g¯)√
∆
·m− g¯
)
=
=
m · n¯N · (ρ− g¯)−
√
∆ · g¯√
∆(g¯ +m)2
=
m · n¯N · (ρ− g¯)−
√
∆ · n¯N(g¯ +m)√
∆(g¯ +m)2
=
=
n¯N√
∆(g¯ +m)
[
m
(g¯ +m)
· (ρ− g¯)−
√
∆
]
=
=
n¯N√
∆(g¯ +m)
[
(1− n¯N) · (ρ− g¯)−
√
∆
]
(F.26)
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Linearization n˙N = g − (g +m) · nNg˙ = (LN/aN − g) · [ρ+m− (λ− 1) · (LN/aN − g)/nN ]
(F.20)
(F.19)
We linearize the system (F.19)-(F.20) around the steady state (n¯N , g¯):
 n˙N
g˙
 =
 a11 a12
a21 a22
 ·
 nN − n¯N
g − g¯

Calculate partial derivatives of the functions on right hand side and evaluate them at steady
state:
a11 =
∂n˙N
∂nN
(n¯N , g¯) = −(g¯ +m)
a12 =
∂n˙N
∂g
(n¯N , g¯) = 1− n¯N = 1− g¯
g¯ +m
=
m
g¯ +m
a21 =
∂g˙
∂nN
(n¯N , g¯) =
(λ− 1)
(
LN
aN
− g¯
)2
n¯2N
=
(ρ+m)2(λ− 1)
(
LN
aN
− g¯
)2
(λ− 1)2 (LN/aN − g¯)2
=
=
(ρ+m)2
(λ− 1)
a22 =
∂g˙
∂g
(n¯N , g¯) = −1 ·
ρ+m− (λ− 1)
(
LN
aN
− g¯
)
n¯N
+ (λ− 1)
(
LN
aN
− g¯
)
n¯N
=
= − ((ρ+m)− (ρ+m)) + (ρ+m) = (ρ+m)
The linearized system becomes:
 n˙N
g˙
 =
 −(g¯ +m) mg¯+m
(ρ+m)2
(λ−1) (ρ+m)
 ·
 nN − n¯N
g − g¯

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We compute:
tr(A) = a11 + a22 = −(g¯ +m) + (ρ+m) = ρ− g¯
det(A) = a11 · a22 − a12 · a21 =
= −(g¯ +m) · (ρ+m)− m
g¯ +m
· (ρ+m)
2
(λ− 1) =
= −(ρ+m) ·
[
(g¯ +m) +
m
g¯ +m
· ρ+m
(λ− 1)
]
The determinant is negative, since each parenthesis is positive. However we simplify further
the expression of the determinant in order to obtain a simpler expression for the eigenvalues
of the matrix. Use the equations of the steady state (F.21) and (F.22):
det(A) = −(ρ+m) ·
[
(g¯ +m) +m · 1
g¯ +m
· ρ+m
(λ− 1)
]
=
= −(ρ+m) ·
[
(g¯ +m) +m · n¯N
g¯
· LN/aN − g¯
n¯N
]
=
= −(ρ+m) ·
[
(g¯ +m) +m · LN/aN − g¯
g¯
]
=
= −(ρ+m) · g¯
2 +m · g¯ +m · LN/aN −m · g¯
g¯
=
= −(ρ+m) · g¯
2 +m · LN/aN
g¯
< 0
The product of the two eigenvalues is det(A) < 0. We conclude that the linearized system has
two real eigenvalues, one positive and one negative. They are solutions of the characteristic
equation:
α2 − tr(A) · α+ det(A) = 0
α2 − (ρ− g¯) · α− (ρ+m) · g¯
2 +m · LN/aN
g¯
= 0
α2 + (g¯ − ρ) · α− (ρ+m) · g¯
2 +m · LN/aN
g¯
= 0
The solutions of the characteristic equation are:
α1,2 =
ρ− g¯
2
±
√
(ρ− g¯)2 + 4 · (ρ+m) · g¯2+m·LN/aNg¯
2
=
=
ρ− g¯
2
±
√(
ρ− g¯
2
)2
+ ·(ρ+m) · g¯
2 +m · LN/aN
g¯
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We can see which solution is positive:
α1 =
ρ− g¯
2
+
√(
ρ− g¯
2
)2
+ ·(ρ+m) · g¯
2 +m · LN/aN
g¯
> 0
The other solution will have to be negative:
α2 =
ρ− g¯
2
−
√(
ρ− g¯
2
)2
+ ·(ρ+m) · g¯
2 +m · LN/aN
g¯
< 0
General solution to the linearized system n˙N
g˙
 = A ·
 nN − n¯N
g − g¯
 with A =
 a11 a12
a21 a22

We write the negative eigenvalue of A as α2 = −α (with α > 0).
α = −α2 = −ρ− g¯
2
+
√(
ρ− g¯
2
)2
+ ·(ρ+m) · g¯
2 +m · LN/aN
g¯
> 0
Choose ν1 =
 ν11
ν12
 and ν2 =
 ν21
ν22
, non-zero eigenvectors for the eigenvalues α1 and
α2 respectively: Aν1 = α1ν1 and Aν2 = α2ν2. For ν2 this means: a11 a12
a21 a22

 ν21
ν22
 = α2
 ν21
ν22

We see that
 0
1
 is not a solution (not an eigenvector for α2 ), since:
 a11 a12
a21 a22

 0
1
 =
 a12
a22
 6=
 0
α2
 = α2
 0
1
 since a12 6= 0
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Therefore we can choose the first component of ν2 equal to 1: ν2 =
 1
ν22
. The second
component of ν2 is the solution of the system: a11 a12
a21 a22

 1
ν22
 = α2
 1
ν22

Multiplying we get: {
a11 + ν22 · a12 = α2
a21 + ν22 · a22 = α2 · ν22
and the solution is ν22 =
α2 − a11
a12
. Let Λ be defined such that ν2 =
 1
ν22
 =
 1
−Λ
.
Then, using the expressions for ν22 and α2:
Λ = −ν22 = −α2 − a11
a12
=
2a11 − 2α2
2a12
=
=
2a11 −
(
a11 + a22 −
√
(a11 + a22)2 − 4(a11 · a22 − a12 · a21)
)
2a12
=
=
a11 − a22
2a12
+
√
(a11 − a22)2 − 4a12 · a21
2a12
=
=
−(g¯ + ρ+ 2m) +
√
(g¯ + ρ+ 2m)2 + 4 ·m · (ρ+m)(LN/aN−g¯)g¯
2 mg¯+m
> 0
The general solution of the linearized system
 n˙N
g˙
 =
 a11 a12
a21 a22
 ·
 nN − n¯N
g − g¯

is given by:  nN(t)
g(t)
 =
 n¯N
g¯
+
 ν11 ν21
ν12 ν22
 ·
 C1 · eα1t
C2 · eα2t

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Since the eigenvalue α1 is positive, it corresponds to an unstable path. We choose, therefore,
C1 = 0 and get: nN(t) = n¯N + C2 · e
−αt
g(t) = g¯ + C2 · (−Λ) · e−αt
We set C2 = nN(0)− n¯N to satisfy the initial condition for nN(t) (which is nN(0) = n¯N), and
get the solution for the linearized system:
nN(t) = n¯N + (nN(0)− n¯N) · e
−αt
g(t) = g¯ + (nN(0)− n¯N) · (−Λ) · e−αt
Taking into account the initial condition nN(0) = n¯N we compute the partial derivaties with
respect to m:
∂nN(t)
∂m
=
∂n¯N
∂m
+
∂
∂m
(nN(0)− n¯N) · e−αt + (nN(0)− n¯N) · ∂
∂m
(e−αt) =
=
∂n¯N
∂m
− ∂n¯N
∂m
· e−αt + 0 = ∂n¯N
∂m
· (1− e−αt)
∂g(t)
∂m
=
∂g¯
∂m
− ∂
∂m
(nN(0)− n¯N) · Λ · e−αt − (nN(0)− n¯N) · ∂
∂m
(Λ · e−αt) =
=
∂g¯
∂m
+
∂n¯N
∂m
· Λ · e−αt + 0 = ∂g¯
∂m
+
∂n¯N
∂m
· Λ · e−αt
This gives by using equations (F.25) and (F.26):
∂g(0)
∂µ
= −∂g(0)
∂m
= −
(
∂g¯
∂m
+
∂n¯N
∂m
· Λ · e−α0
)
=
= −
(
g¯ · (ρ− g¯)
(g¯ +m)
√
∆
+
n¯N√
∆(g¯ +m)
[
(1− n¯N) · (ρ− g¯)−
√
∆
]
· Λ · 1
)
=
= − (ρ− g¯)
(g¯ +m)
√
∆
·
(
g¯ + Λ · n¯N · (1− n¯N)− Λ ·
√
∆
ρ− g¯ · n¯N
)
=
=
(g¯ − ρ)
(g¯ +m)
√
∆
·
(
g¯ + Λ · n¯N · (1− n¯N) + Λ ·
√
∆ · n¯N
g¯ − ρ
)
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We determine the sign of
∂g(0)
∂µ
:
∂g(0)
∂µ
=
(g¯ − ρ)
(g¯ +m)
√
∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·
g¯ + Λ · n¯N · (1− n¯N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ Λ ·
√
∆ · n¯N
g¯ − ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0

However note that the sign of the second factor is not completely determined by the sign of
(g¯ − ρ) (it can be positive also when (g¯ − ρ) < 0), as was the case for ∂g¯
∂µ
. But we can say
that
∂g(0)
∂µ
and
∂g¯
∂µ
are both positive when (g¯ − ρ) > 0.
Equilibrium conditions:
The two differential equations that describe the equilibrium are (F.27) and (F.28). In these
equations g is a jump variable while nN is a state variable.
n˙N = g − (g +m) · nN (F.27)
g˙ = (LN/aN − g) ·
(
ρ+m− (λ− 1)(LN/aN − g)
nN
)
(F.28)
Calculations deriving the above mentioned differential equations along with derivations of the
linearized system (and comparative statics with respect to µ, where m = m˜−µ) are presented
above.
Figure F.2: Phase diagram for short run changes - Quality Ladder
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Figure F.2 represents the phase diagram for the system describe by equations (F.27) and
(F.28). The thick curves represent the equation g˙ = 0 and the thin curves represent the
equation n˙N = 0. The intersection of these two curves at point A describes the steady-state
long-run equilibrium. The equilibrium trajectory consists of the saddle path that converges
to A. Along this saddle path the rate of innovation decreases and the amount of Northern
products increases over time whenever innovation is above the steady-state value. The opposite
is true when innovation is below the steady-state value. A reduction in the rate of imitation
(an increase in µ) shifts both curves g˙ = 0 and n˙N = 0 to the right, with the latter shifting by
proportionately more. The result is that the long-run equilibrium point shifts down and to the
right (B), implying that the long-run rate of innovation g declines and the long-run amount of
Northern products increases. But if the rate of innovation was to rise temporarily, both regions
might gain, even though temporarily. In the short run, the amount of products manufactured
in the North does not change while the innovation rate increases ( ∂g(0)∂µ is positive when
(g¯−ρ) > 0). This is represented in the graph above as a shift from A to A′. Therefore initially
the system jumps from A to A′ and subsequently follows the saddle path to B. The rate of
innovation remains higher at all points in time until it reaches its steady-state value.
The following numerical example will show the transitional dynamics following the imposi-
tion of stronger IPR. Set the unit labor requirement in innovation to aN = 5, and the discount
rate to r = 0.2, Northern labor supply LN = 10, the initial imitation intensity m = 0.6 (which
will decrease to 0.5 when stronger IPR are imposed).
The rate of innovation rises temporarily as a result of tighter IPRs. Therefore initially
the system jumps from A to A′ and subsequently follows the saddle path to B. The new
steady-state value for the innovation rate is below the initial steady-state value.
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Figure F.3: Transition path for the innovation rate when imitation is exogenous - Quality
ladder
Figure F.4: Transition path for the fraction of products not imitated when imitation is exoge-
nous - Quality ladder
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Appendix G
Appendix for Chapter 2 (the Quality
ladder model with endogenous imitation)
This section is based on the quality ladder model developed by Grossman and Helpman
(1991a). The main features of the model are presented in the first part of the section, but the
actual solving method will be different from the original paper in order to allow for transitional
dynamics analysis.
There are two countries, North and South. Each has a representative consumer (identical
in both countries) and many firms. The Northern firms supply nN goods, while the Southern
firms supply nS goods (nN + nS = 1).
Consumers
This part is identical with the situation presented in F (page 120).
Research and Development (R&D)
The model features endogenous and costly R&D. Consumers are willing to pay a premium
for quality which provides an incentive for firms to perform R&D. The process of innovation
and imitation are similar, but they have different resource requirements: aN is the resource
requirement for a Northern firm performing R&D in the North, and (1 + k)aS for imitation
targeting a Northern product. In this model changes into the strength of Southern IPR
protection are reflected into changes in the parameter k. Higher levels of k are consistent with
stronger IPR (reduces imitation efficiency). The corresponding R&D intensities are: ιN and
ιS. The rate of innovation is denoted by g (g ≡ ιNnS) and the rate of imitation is denoted by
m (m ≡ ιSnN).
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The value of typical Southern firm is given by:
vS(t) =
∫ ∞
0
piS(t)e
−R(t) dt (G.1)
To generate finite rates of innovation, the expected reward for a successful R&D (innovation
or imitation) should equal the expected R&D cost for each firm:
E(vS) = (1 + k)aSwS (G.2)
Corresponding valuation for the Northern firms (F.7) and the free-entry condition for Northern
R&D (9′) are given in F (page 123).
Producers
Only Northern firms can innovate. Southern firms imitate. A Northern firm can sell a newly
designed good until a Southern firm imitates it. A Southern firm can sell an imitated product
until another innovation occurs.
Southern firms are charging pS = εwS, so wS = pS/ε, where ε > 1.
Instantaneous profits:
piS = (pS − wS)xS =
(
pS − pS
ε
)
xS (G.3)
A Southern firm targeting a Northern firm earns the reward:
piS
vS
+
v˙S
vS
− g = ρ (G.4)
where piS is instantaneous profits for the Northern firm with domestic R&D, vS is its value,
piS/vS is the dividend from holding shares in that firm, v˙s/vS is the rate of appreciation/depreciation
of the shares, g is the rate of innovation and ρ is the subjective discount rate.
Profits (F.10) and no-arbitrage condition (F.11) for the Northern firms are presented in
Appendix F (pages 124 and 124).
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The resource market (market clearing conditions)
Southern firms use their resources for imitation (R&D) and the production of imitated goods
(where LS is the exogenous supply of labor in the South).
(1 + k)aSm+ nSxS = LS (G.5)
The market clearing condition (F.12)for the North is presented in Appendix F (page 124).
Calculations
From (F.12) we find:
xN = (LN − aNg)/nN (G.6)
From (G.5) we find:
xS = (LS − aSm)/nS (G.7)
In the North
From (F.9), (F.11), (G.6) we get
(λ− 1)(LN − aNg)
(nNaN)
+
v˙N
vN
= r +m (G.8)
EN = pNnNxN = pNnN
LN − aNg
nN
= pN(LN − aNg)
E˙N = p˙N(LN − aNg)− aNpN g˙
E˙N
EN
=
p˙N(LN − aNg)− aNpN g˙
pN(LN − aNg) = −
aN g˙
LN − aNg +
p˙N
pN
But
E˙N
EN
= r − ρ, and using the above equation we get:
− aN g˙
LN − aNg +
p˙N
pN
= r − ρ
r = ρ− aN g˙
LN − aNg +
p˙N
pN
(G.9)
(G.10)
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We know that pN = λwN and vN = wNaN , therefore
pN = λvN
p˙N
pN
=
v˙N
vN
Then (G.10) becomes:
r = ρ− aN g˙
LN − aNg +
v˙N
vN
(G.11)
From (G.8) and (G.11) we get:
(λ− 1)(LN − aNg)
nNaN
+
v˙N
vN
= ρ− aN g˙
LN − aNg +
v˙N
vN
+m
g˙ =
LN − aNg
aN
·
[
ρ+m− (λ− 1)(LN − aNg)
nNaN
] (G.12)
(G.13)
Equation of motion for the northern products:
We know that nN + nS = 1.
n˙N = gnS −mnN = g(1− nN)−mnN = g − (g +m)nN (G.14)
In the South
From (G.2), ((G.4), (G.7) we get
(ε− 1)(LS − aSm)
nS(1 + k)aS
+
v˙S
vS
= r + g
ES = pSnSxS = pSnS
LS − aSm
nS
= pS(LS − aSm)
E˙S = p˙S(LS − aSm)− aSpSm˙
E˙S
ES
=
p˙S(LS − aSm)− aSpSm˙
pS(LS − aSm) = −
aSm˙
LS − aSm +
p˙S
pS
(G.15)
(G.16)
(G.17)
(G.18)
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But E˙SES = r − ρ. Using the above equation we get
− aSm˙
LS − aSm +
p˙S
pS
= r − ρ
r = ρ− aSm˙
LS − aSm +
p˙S
pS
(G.19)
(G.20)
(G.21)
We know that pS = εwS and vS = (1 + k)wSaS we get
pS =
εvS
aS
p˙S
pS
=
v˙S
vS
Then (G.20), becomes:
− aSm˙
LS − aSm +
p˙S
pS
= r − ρ
r = ρ− aSm˙
LS − aSm +
v˙S
vS
(G.22)
(G.23)
(G.24)
From (G.15) and (G.23) we get:
(ε− 1)(LS − aSm)
nS(1 + k)aS
+
v˙S
vS
= ρ− aSm˙
LS − aSm +
v˙S
vS
+ g
m˙ =
LS − aSm
aS
·
[
ρ+ g − (ε− 1) · (LS − aSm)
(1− nN)(1 + k)aS
] (G.25)
(G.26)
Equilibrium conditions
The three differential equations that describe the equilibrium are (G.13), (G.14) and (G.26).
In these equations g and m are jump variable while nN is a state variable:
g˙ =
LN − aNg
aN
·
[
ρ+m− (λ− 1)LN − aNg
nNaN
]
(G.13)
n˙N = g − (g +m)nN (G.14)
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m˙ =
LS − aSm
aS
·
[
ρ+ g − (ε− 1) LS − aSm
(1− nN)(1 + k)aS
]
(G.26)
The following numerical example will show the transitional dynamics following the impo-
sition of stronger IPR. Set the unit labor requirement in innovation to aN = 10 and imitation
aS = 5, and the discount rate to ρ = .8. Lambda is 1.2 and epsilon is 1.2. Northern labor
supply LN = 10, Southern labor supply LS = 20 the initial IPR parameter k = 0 (which will
increase to 0.1 when stronger IPR are imposed such that the labor requirement coefficient
(1 + k)aS increases with stronger IPR). The rate of innovation rise temporarily as a result of
tighter IPRs, but then it decreases below the initial steady-state. Imitation falls abruptly and
than it stars increasing slowly reaching a new steady state below the initial one. The amount
of products produce in the North grows smoothly.
Figure G.1: Transition path for the innovation rate when imitation is endogenous - Quality
ladder
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Figure G.2: Transition path for the imitation rate when imitation is endogenous - Quality
ladder
Figure G.3: Transition path for the fraction of products not imitated when imitation is en-
dogenous - Quality ladder
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Appendix H
Calculations for Chapter 3
This section is based on a simplified structure of the quality ladder model developed by
Grossman and Helpman (1991a). Now the demand for each good is a constant fraction of
world expenditure (there is no uncertainty about the demand like in Section 3.3) and firms
are practicing limit pricing rather than profit maximizing prices.
A Northern firm has to choose between performing R&D at home, forming a joint venture
with an existing Southern firm and purchasing R&D from a Southern firm. The trade-offs
between these three organizational choices and the imitation probabilities (in case of offshoring)
are modeled as in Section 3.3.
A firm that successfully performed R&D resulting in an innovation engages in limit pricing,
setting a price equal to pN = λwS , and j = N,S. Consumers spread their consumption
expenditure evenly across goods. Normalizing the world expenditure at each point in time to
be one, the demand for each good is: xj = 1/pj , j = N,S.
A Northern firm that successfully performs R&D at home, will earn the following profits:
piH = (pN − wN )xN = λwS − wN
λwS
= 1− wN
λwS
(H.1)
A Northern firm that creates a joint venture with a Southern firm in order to perform the
same R&D activity as above, will earn the following profits:
piJV = (1− µ)(pN − wS)xN − F = (1− µ)(λwS − wS)
λwS
− F =
= (1− µ)(1− 1/λ)− F (H.2)
146
A Northern firm that purchases R&D from a Southern firm will earn the following profits:
piBUY = (1− γ)(pN − wS)xN = (1− γ)(λwS − wS)/(λwS) =
= (1− γ)(1− 1/λ) (H.3)
A Northern Firm will choose to create a joint venture over performing R&D at home if:
piJV > piH
wN
wS
> 1 + µ(λ− 1) + Fλ (H.4)
Weaker IPR (a higher probability of imitation µ) and a lower fixed cost required by the
participation in the joint venture will require a bigger gap between Northern and Southern
wage in order to have an incentive for collaboration. If the inequality holds as equality, then
the Northern Firm is indifferent between creating a joint venture and performing R&D at
home.
A Northern Firm will choose to buy R&D from the South over performing R&D at home
if:
piBUY > piH
wN
wS
> 1 + γ(λ− 1) (H.5)
Weaker IPR (a higher probability of imitation γ) will require a bigger gap between Northern
and Southern wage in order for the Northern firm to have an incentive to buy R&D from the
South. If the inequality holds as equality, then the Northern Firm is indifferent between buying
R&D from the South and performing R&D at home.
A Northern Firm will choose to create a joint venture over buying R&D from the South if:
piJV > piBUY
γ > µ+ F/(1− 1/λ) (H.6)
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When the two offshoring strategies face the same risk of imitation, the Northern firm will
prefer to buy the R&D from the South (if it gives higher profits than doing research at home)
because it avoids paying the fixed costs associated with joint venture. If the inequality holds
as equality, then the Northern Firm is indifferent between creating a joint venture and buying
R&D from the South. In order for joint venture to exist, the risk of imitation when buying
the R&D (γ) has to be bigger than the risk of imitation when creating a joint venture (µ).
Equations (H.4) and (H.5) describe the conditions under which a Northern firm will prefer
domestic R&D, forming a joint venture or buying R&D from the South. The strength of
intellectual property rights will determine Northern firm action.
Below each of the lines, there is a combination of wage differential between North and South
and the intensity of intellectual property rights that draw Northern firms to perform R&D at
home. Above the black line, buying from a Southern firm will be preferred to domestic R&D.
Above the blue line, forming a joint venture will be preferred to domestic R&D. Where the
two lines intersect (IPR1 and IPR2), the Northern firm will be indifferent between domestic
R&D, forming a joint venture and buying from a Southern firm. The lower envelope describe
the border between preference towards domestic R&D and the other two activities.
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For very weak IPR and big wage differential between North and South, Northern firms
will choose to buy R&D from Southern firms. This way they will avoid paying the fix cost
of forming a joint venture and take advantage of the wage gap between North and South (it
has to be a big gap to offset the high risk of imitation). For stronger IPR and lower wage
differential, Northern firms will choose to form joint ventures with Southern firms. It pays of
for Northern firms to pay the fixed cost as they will face a lower risk of imitation in a joint
venture than buying R&D from a Southern firm. For very strong IPR and very low wage
differential, Northern firms will again choose to buy R&D from Southern firms. At this point,
the probability of imitation in a joint venture is already zero while the risk of imitation from
buying R&D is now low enough to outweigh the fixed cost of a joint venture.
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Appendix I
Tables for Chapter 3
Table I.1: Description of variables
Variables Definition
Partnership type Is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the relationship
involved equity participation (joint venture) or 0 if there was
no equity involved (from the SDC Platinum database for 89
countries over the period 1990 to 2009)
IPR protection in
the destination country The measure of a country intellectual property rights
protection is based on the updated Ginarte and Park index
presented in Park (2008)
Wage gap This ratio measures the difference in the hourly wages
(denominated in USD) across participating countries in a
partnership (from the Yearbook of Labour Statistics and
The International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics). It
is the wage in the source country divided by the wage in
the destination country
Wage gap squared This is the previous ratio squared
Cost of doing business This measures the number of days required in order to start
a business in a country in a certain year. This index is
reported by The World Bank Group starting in 2004. For the
first part of the estimations, the 2004 value for each country
is considered to be the value for the previous years as well
R&D flag Is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the agreement
includes research and development services or 0 otherwise
(from the SDC Platinum database)
Country dummies These are 89 indicator variables that take value 1 if the
firms belong to that country or 0 otherwise
Year dummies These are 20 indicator variables that take value 1 if the
agreement belongs to that year or 0 otherwise
Data is in constant USD, deflated by GDP deflator reported in the IMF database
(base year 2005). The exchange rates used to transform hourly wages in USD came
from the IMF database. Where available, wages are reported at three digits level:
Chemical Manufacturing (NAICS 325), otherwise at the most detailed level available
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Table I.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Joint venture dummy .3073903 .4614322 0 1
R&D dummy .4323263 .4954202 0 1
IPR (Ginarte & Park index) 3.828589 1.093072 .59 4.88
Cost of doing business 29.94248 26.15059 2 168
Wage gap 8.87123 19.78742 .006064 186.255
Wage gap squared 470.2072 1893.636 .0000368 34690.93
Table I.3: Binomial Logit Estimation Results for the period 1990 - 2009 w/o R&D dummy
Variable Base Model with Cost with Country Country and
of Business dummies Year dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 4.518814** 6.999832** 6.310232** 6.784791**
(.1331988) (.1888116) (.5878757) (.6131868)
IPR protection -1.414687** -1.830279** -1.415384** -1.573669**
(.0325429) (.0408832) (.0601328) (.0852544)
(marginal effects) -.2001032** -.2400521** -.1676299** -.1852207**
(.0033201) (.0038685) (.0065958) (.0095487)
WAGE Gap -.0098146** -.0040103* -.000919 -.0018893
(.0015594) (.0016858) (.0025638) (.0026337)
(marginal effects) -.0013882** -.000526* -.0001088 -.0002224
(.0002197) (.000221) (.0003037) (.00031)
Cost of business -.0313948** -.0184249** -.0188402**
(.0014035) (.004307) (.0048164)
(marginal effects) -.0041176** -.0021821** -.0022175**
(.0001732) (.0005092) (.0005659)
Number of obs. 11718 11718 11685 11685
Log likelihood -5256.6435 -4943.8485 -4537.1391 -4516.8136
Notes:
*=significant at 10 percent
**=significant at 5 percent
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table I.4: Cross tabulation of actual and predicted outcomes for the fourth specification
JV flag
JV flaghat 0 1 Total
0 7,507 1,216 8,723
92.52 34.05 74.65
64.24 10.41 74.65
0 607 2,355 2,962
7.48 65.95 25.35
5.19 20.15 25.35
Total 8,114 3,571 11,685
100.00 100.00 100.00
69.44 30.56 100.00
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Table I.5: Binomial Logit Estimation Results for the period 1990 - 2009 with R&D dummy
Variable Base Model with Cost with Country Country and
of Business dummies Year dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 4.17263** 6.765199** 6.252342** 6.753488**
(.1353947) (.192195) (.5884544) (.6148474)
IPR protection -1.398758** -1.846205** -1.493529** -1.660005**
(.0326636) (.0417809) (.0606583) (.0857063)
(marginal effects) -.1944687** -.237611** -.1738332** -.1917825**
(.0032999) (.0038836) (.0064807) (.009375)
WAGE Gap -.0108747** -.0057761** -.0019822 -.0032225
(.0015328) (.0016506) (.0025514) (.0026206)
(marginal effects) -.0015119** -.0007434** -.0002307 -.0003723
(.0002121) (.0002123) (.000297) (.0003027)
Cost of business -.0322806** -.0185312** -.0202753**
(.0014207) (.0043486) (.0048706)
(marginal effects) -.0041546** -.0021569** -.0023424**
(.0001715) (.0005052) (.0005616)
R&D dummy .6353136** .7214194** .7799928** .8091663**
(.0496534) (.051882) (.0610994) (.0617486)
(marginal effects) .0883274** .0928484** .0907841** .093484**
(.006787) (.0065691) (.0070301) (.0070494)
Number of obs. 11718 11718 11685 11685
Log likelihood -5174.6932 -4846.3537 -4454.4574 -4429.558
Notes:
*=significant at 10 percent
**=significant at 5 percent
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table I.6: Cross tabulation of actual and predicted outcomes for the fourth specification
JV flag
JV flaghat 0 1 Total
0 7,528 1,271 8,799
92.78 35.59 75.30
64.42 10.88 75.30
0 586 2,300 2,886
7.22 64.41 24.70
5.01 19.68 24.70
Total 8,114 3,571 11,685
100.00 100.00 100.00
69.44 30.56 100.00
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Table I.7: Binomial Logit Estimation Results including the Wage Gap squared and w/o R&D
dummy
Variable Extended with Cost with Country Country and
Model of Business dummies Year dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 4.443959** 6.839247** 6.356433** 6.826559**
(.1407995) (.1914344) (.5947992) (.6209231)
IPR protection -1.400313** -1.798766** -1.420642** -1.578348**
(.0336685) (.0413156) (.0610586) (.0859988)
(marginal effects) -.1980173** -.2355238** -.1682538** -.1857686**
(.003565) (.0039935) (.0067125) (.0096377)
WAGE gap -.0053071 .0084577** -.004056 -.0045503
(.0032375) (.0034236) (.0066245) (.0067341)
(marginal effects) -.0007505 .0011074** -.0004804 -.0005356
(.0004577) (.0004479) (.0007846) (.0007926)
WAGE gap squared -.0000465 -.0001254** .0000245 .0000206
(.000029) (.0000298) (.000048) (.0000483)
(marginal effects) -0.00000657 -.0000164** 0.0000029 0.00000243
(0.0000041) (0.00000389) (0.00000568) (0.00000568)
Cost of business -.0319364** -.0182742** -.0187548**
(.0014105) (.0043176) (.0048206)
(marginal effects) -.0041816** -.0021643** -.0022074**
(.0001735) (.0005104) (.0005664)
Number of obs. 11718 11718 11685 11685
Log likelihood -5255.403 -4935.1969 -4537.006 -4516.7207
Notes:
*=significant at 10 percent
**=significant at 5 percent
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table I.8: Binomial Logit Estimation Results with Wage Gap squared and R&D dummy
Variable Extended with Cost with Country Country and
Model of Business dummies Year dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 4.189919** 6.686131** 6.365587** 6.875556**
(.1432104) (.195475) (.596123) (.6235884)
IPR protection -1.402336** -1.82912** -1.50692** -1.674661**
(.0340688) (.0424734) (.061807) (.086735)
(marginal effects) -.1949676** -.235286** -.1753793** -.1934522**
(.0035614) (.0040388) (.0066189) (.0094915)
WAGE gap -.0119778** .0004405 -.0094788 -.0107228
(.0033307) (.0034786) (.0067068) (.0068318)
(marginal effects) -.0016653** .0000567 -.0011032 -.0012387
(.0004626) (.0004475) (.0007805) (.0007891)
WAGE gap squared .0000113 -.0000617** .0000583 .0000578
(.0000304) (.0000302) (.0000488) (.0000491)
(marginal effects) 0.00000157 -0.00000794** 0.00000679 0.00000668
(0.00000422) (0.00000388) (0.00000568) (0.00000568)
Cost of business -.0325192** -.0182264** -.0201068**
(.0014259) (.0043573) (.004873)
(marginal effects) -.0041831** -.0021212** -.0023227**
(.000172) (.0005062) (.0005618)
R&D dummy .6381585** .7052092** .7839592** .8134205**
(.0502345) (.0524925) (.0611846) (.0618548)
(marginal effects) .0887235** .0907135** .0912392** .0939641**
(.0068691) (.0066502) (.0070388) (.0070603)
Number of obs. 11718 11718 11685 11685
Log likelihood -5174.6233 -4844.3171 -4453.7128 -4428.8377
Notes:
*=significant at 10 percent
**=significant at 5 percent
Standard errors in parentheses
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